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CHAPTER

NUMBER 4

13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
By

GLENN WARREN MERRICK*
INTRODUCTION

Wage earner plans were conceived in Birmingham, Alabama,
in the early years of the great depression by Special Referee Val-

entine Nesbitt, who created them out of "the whole cloth of former Section 74."' He perceived the need for a relief provision for
individual debtors comparable to that afforded corporations by
section 77B, the ancestor to Chapter X. Building on his frame-

work, Congress enacted Chapter XIHI as part of the Chandler Act
of 1938.1 The basic theory behind wage earner relief has been to
allow hard pressed debtors to avoid bankruptcy, judgment process, and creditor harassment by applying disposable income in
excess of necessary living expenses to the payment of debts under
4
a plan of extension, composition, or a combination of the two.

Periodic payments are made to a trustee under the protection of
the bankruptcy court, and the trustee distributes the appropriate
shares to creditors until the plan has been fulfilled or abandoned.,
The growth in the utilization of Chapter XIII was slow and
geographically skewed until fairly recently.' However, the 1970s
* The author is a clerk for Judge Thomas Reavley of the United States Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit. He received his B.A. from University of Colorado in 1976 and a
J.D. from University of Texas in 1979.
1 Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 115-16 (1975).
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086 (1976). In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the wage
earner relief chapter has been designated using arabic numeral 13. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2645 (1978) [The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 is hereinafter cited in text and notes as the new act or the 1978 Act]. In the
text and notes following, the designation "Chapter XIII" refers to wage earner relief
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, while the designation "Chapter 13" is reserved
for the wage earner relief chapter of the 1978 Act.
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
11 U.S.C. § 1006(7) (1976).
Id. § 1033(4).
For fiscal 1951, there were only 6924 plans filed in the United States and 84%
of these were filed in Alabama. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRrs, TABLES OF
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have seen more extensive and uniform utilization among the districts of this form of debtor relief.' The recent rapid growth in
filings can be attributed to greater awareness of its availability
and benefits among attorneys and debtors.8
From the debtor's perspective, the advantages of Chapter
Xm over liquidation are legion. The debtor is allowed to keep his
STATISTICS, Table F2 (1952) [hereinafter cited as TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
By 1969, almost 29,000 wage earner plans were being filed annually but vast
discrepancies in Chapter XIII use between districts still existed. TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS, Table F2 (1971).
One of the early motivating factors in revising the Bankruptcy Act, the Brookings
Report, D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORMATION (1971),
reported this disproportionality and the report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States echoed the finding. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. Doc. No. 137], The Commission suggested that lack of awareness on the part of debtors and lawyers as to the existence of wage earner relief, differing
creditor and community attitudes toward insolvency, and reluctance from the bar and
bankruptcy judges in certain geographical areas all combined to produce the variation
in use. Id. at 12, 157. Other causative factors which have been mentioned include the
relative stringency of the state's wage garnishment laws, Proposed Bankruptcy Reform
Act: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
BANKRUPTCY

STATISTICS].

Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1975) (statement

of Prof. Frank Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings], the liberality of the
state's exemptions, id. at 192, the practicality of wage earner plans in areas where the cost
of living consumes most of disposable earnings, id. at 1346 (statement of Paul Winkler),
and differences of opinion about the purpose of Chapter XIII as primarily a tool for debtor
relief or as a collection device for creditors. Cyr, supra note 1, at 117.
Some bankruptcy judges have been unenthusiastic about Chapter XIII because they
lack familiarity with it. A few devote most of their time to complex corporate reorganizations while others are only part-time judges. Id. at 116-17. Attorneys may be reluctant to
take on a Chapter XIII case because they fear it will prove uneconomical, requiring
numerous, sporadic court appearances. In addition, an attorney's volume of Chapter XIII
cases may not justify the expense. 1975 House Hearings,supra at 1325 (statement of U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr); id. at 1346 (statement of Paul Winkler). But cf. Meth,
Making Wage EarnerProceedings More Effective, 80 COM. L.J. 14, 14-15 (1975) (attorneys
not usually required to render extensive service).
However, one commentator pointed out that the Commission's criticism as to lack of
utilization and nonuniformity of use of Chapter XIII was based on findings by the Brookings Institution which were ten to fifteen years old and inconsistent with current facts.
ProposedBankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 590 (1975) (statement of Claude L. Rice, Chairman of the Legislative
Committee for the National Association of Chapter XIII Trustees) [hereinafter cited as

1975 Senate Hearings].
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 6 at Table F2 (1978).

At least one commentator has criticized the Commission's view that most debtors
are unaware of wage earner relief. Presson, Let's Talk Some Common Sense About the
Administration of Consumer Bankruptcies, 49 AM. BANKR. LJ. 263, 283 (1975).
1 One advantage has been eliminated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Under
current law, credit information concerning bankruptcies must be purged from credit res
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property and build equity because liquidation is not the focus.
Bankruptcy is more likely to have an adverse effect on future
employment, job advancement, bondability, and social status.
Some lending organizations will not make purchase money home
loans to those who have been in liquidation while Chapter XIm
debtors have obtained FHA insured home loans during the
pendency of their plan. After bankruptcy, the bankrupt may be
forced to defend against exceptions to discharge but these are less
likely to be filed after wage earner cases since the debtor generally
will have proposed significant payment rather than avaricious
composition. Moreover, bankruptcy remains an alternative
should financial problems recur within six years of the petition
for extension relief.'0 In addition, Chapter XIII allows the debtor
to retain a sense of pride in attempting to meet his obligations
and avoid a perceived stigma of bankruptcy." Finally, the automatic stay of suits against the debtor and actions to enforce liens
on his property are broader in Chapter XIII than in bankruptcy
because all creditors are stayed regardless of whether their claims
are dischargeable."
cords after a lapse of fourteen years. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (1976). Information regarding
wage earner relief can be kept only seven years. Id. § 1681s(a)(6). Section 312(b) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act amends the law to provide that information regarding either form
of relief can be kept for ten years. 1978 Act § 312(b) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §
1681c(a)(1)).
20.01 (14th ed. 1940); 3 D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW
'0 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
AND PRACTICE § 1121 (2d ed. 1978); Girth, The Bankruptcy Reform Process: Minimizing
Judicial Control in Wage Earners' Plans, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 54 (1977); Goldstein,
A Solution to Consumer Bankruptcy: Chapter XIII, an Alternative, 76 COM. L.J. 261
(1971). Under the 1978 Act, liquidation will be a viable alternative within six years of a
composition petition in certain circumstances. 1978 Act, § 727(a)(9) (to be codified in 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)). See note 263 and accompanying text infra.
" See authorities cited at note 10 supra. It is difficult to establish concretely whether
the slur of bankruptcy is actually more severe than the stigma of Chapter Xm. Intuitively,
it would seem that the credit community would be more receptive to those with wage
earner relief in their background. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595]; 3 D. CowANS, supra note 10 at 423-24; Goldstein,
supra note 10. However, it may be that creditors in some locales are not sophisticated
enough to distinguish between the two. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 607
(statement of Sam Plowden, Past President of the Association of Chapter XIII Trustees).
Where competition between creditors is stiff, neither form of relief is particularly condemning. See id. at 608-09 (statement of Andrew Leoni). In other areas, both forms of
relief may be fatal to a credit rating. See generally S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1978) fhereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 989].
23.05 (14th ed. 1940); Note, 4 MEM. ST. U. L. REv.
"z 10 COLLIER 6N BANKRUPTCY
554 (1974). But cf Power-Pak Products, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 684
(W.D.N.Y. 1974) (intimates a contrary result under BANKR. R. 11-44). The 1978 Act will
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It has been suggested that consumer credit counseling organizations, prevalent in some parts of the country, are viable alternatives for the debtor contemplating wage earner relief. These
organizations advertise themselves as non-profit entities which
counsel the debtor and attempt to work out arrangements between him and his creditors."3 However, these organizations cannot guarantee a cessation of creditor garnishment and harassment. Moreover, interest charges, late charges, and revolving
charges do not abate when the debtor seeks assistance from them.
Finally, Chapter XIII presents an opportunity to reject unprofitable executory contracts and unexpired leases, while these mediators, funded by creditors, do not offer this alternative.' 4 Thus,
while they advertise themselves as free, their actual cost can be
much higher than wage earner relief.
Chapter XHI's advantages to creditors are obvious. The creditor who is not fully secured is likely to receive a greater percentage of his claim under a wage earner plan than in liquidation,
and he may-retain the debtor as a future customer. 5 Wage earner
plans also provide a more equitable distribution for those creditors whose claims would not be reaffirmed subsequent to bankruptcy. 6
A wage earner's employer may find that the employee is less
accident prone after relief from financial pressure. The employer
will find that he no longer is required to respond to repeated
garnishment proceedings. Moreover, his community stature may
be enhanced to some extent by encouraging financial responsibility among his workers."7

I.

1978
A growing dissatisfaction with the operation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 stimulated studies and proposals for new legislation in recent years. The Brookings Report 8 spurred Congress
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF

stay virtually all actions in liquidation and Chapter 13 regardless of whether the debt is
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 1978 Act § 362 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 362).
111975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 176 (statement of Robert Norris, General
Counsel, National Consumer Finance Association).
", 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1401-02 (statement of Duncan Kester). Id.
at 1326 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
11This takes on added importance under the 1978 Act because business debtors are
eligible for Chapter 13 relief. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text infra.
IS 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 424; Girth, supra note 10.
1 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 424.
D STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 6.
D.
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to form the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to study current laws and draft new legislation." The Commission's report was published in 1973 and its proposed revision
was introduced into the Ninety-Third Congress.20 However, bankruptcy judges and others were displeased with the Commission's
bill because they felt that the new government agency it would
create to handle administrative matters arrogated judicial functions. In addition, they disagreed with the bill's form of a new
bankruptcy court system.2 Consequently, the National Conference on Bankruptcy Judges drafted a counterproposal, which was
introduced into the Ninety-Fourth Congress. 22 After a series of
compromises, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783 passed both
houses of the Ninety-Fifth Congress and was signed into law by
President Carter in November of 1978.24
11Previously, the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of the ABA's Corporation,
Banking and Business Law Section had drafted amendments to modernize Chapter XIII.
Twinem, A New Version of ChapterXIII of the BankruptcyAct, 25 Bus. LAw. 1741 (1970).
2 H.R. 10, 792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
2 See, e.g., Cyr. The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 45 (1974); Hertzberg & Weingarten, The Powers of the Administrator Under
the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 79 COM. L.J. 82 (1974); Lee, A CriticalComparison of the
Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1 (1975); Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 CoM. L.J.
297 (1974).
2 H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). The Commission's chairman
criticized this bill for failing to delegate any administrative duties from the bankruptcy
judge to the Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 19 (statement of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
" Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (to be codified principally in 11 U.S.C. §§
101-151326 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See 11 U.S.C.A. Sp. Pamph. (1979).
" The pertinent legislative history of the 1978 Act can be summarized as follows.
Senate Joint Resolution 88, seeking to create a Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, was introduced into the first session of the Ninety-First Congress to replace
Senate Joint Resolution 100 which had not survived the Ninetieth Congress. As amended,
it was enacted in 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission's final report
was sent to Congress in July of 1973, H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, and its proposed
bill was introduced into the Ninety-Third Congress. H.R. 10, 792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973). A modified version was introduced the following year, H.R. 16, 643, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Since neither bill was enacted into law by that Congress, it was
reintroduced in the following one, H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The
Judges' Bill was introduced in the same session. H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1975). Hearings were held and published on both bills in both houses. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6. Since neither bill was enacted
before the end of the second session, a compromise bill was introduced into the NinetyFifth Congress. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977). The sponsors of the bill introduced
two subsequent clean versions into this same session. H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Judiciary Committee of th House
recommended passage of the final version. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11. Meanwhile,
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On October 1, 1973, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy became
effective." The enabling legislation provides that the rules, confined to "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
are not to "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.""
However, to the extent the rules remained within their domain,
they are to supersede the Bankruptcy Act.2 The new act amends
this enabling statute to provide that the rules will no longer control over conflicting statutes. 5 To date, no new rules have been
drafted to complement the recently enacted legislation so the
current rules will remain in effect. However, Chief Justice Burger
has announced the formation of an Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to draft new rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's
2
rulemaking power. '

II.

A.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN CHAPTER XIII
Availability of Relief

The availability of Chapter XIII relief has been greatly expanded. Originally, plans under Chapter XIII were known as
wage earner plans because there was a dollar limitation on the
maximum annual income of an eligible debtor.3 The Chandler
Act had set this figure at $3600,' but it was raised to $5000 in
a similar bill had been introduced into the Senate, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
and hearings were held and printed on this bill, ProposedBankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 Senate Hearings], as was the Judiciary Committee's report which recommended
passage. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11. S. 2266 was incorporated into H.R. 8200 on the
floor of the Senate and H.R. 8200 passed the Senate as amended while consideration of
S. 2266 was discontinued. 124 CONG. REc. S14,745 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). After a series
of amendments on the floors of both houses, time was running out on H.R. 8200 in the
Ninety-Fifth Congress. Consequently, in lieu of a joint conference report, the amended
bill was read to the House where it passed with a final amendment, 124 CONG. REC.
H11,047,117 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978), and this final version was read to the Senate where
it passed as amended. 124 CONG. Rzc. S17,403-434 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
2See BANKR. R. 1-600, 11 U.S.C. app. (1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976).
' Id. For an extensive treatment of the current Chapter XIII rules, see Countryman,
New Rules for ChapterXI, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129 (1972); Leffler, The New Bankruptcy
Rules: ChapterXIII-An Evolution of Modem Bankruptcy Philosophy, 4 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 449 (1974); Note, The Chapter XIII Wage Earner Petition Under the New Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy, 4 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 554 (1974).
"
1978 Act § 247 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
n [1979 NEws AND COMMENT] BNKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) D-21 A121 (Feb. 1, 1979).
3 Meth, supra note 6, at 14.
3,Complete congruity never existed between the definition of a wage earner in Chap-
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19502 and was eliminated altogether in 1959.3 Currently, any
individual "whose principal income is deprived from wages, salary or commissions" is eligible, 3 and court decisions under this
definition have construed it liberally.15 Nevertheless, the Commission's report felt that this form of relief should be available
to any individual debtor who could reasonably be expected to
make payments out of an anticipated regular income."6 The major
disagreement arose over whether a self-employed individual has
a sufficiently regular income to permit resort to Chapter XIII.
The Commission was of the view that it was unrealistic to expect
self-employed persons to propose and faithfully execute a plan
contemplating recurrent, periodic payments.3 1 The National
Bankruptcy Conference 8 and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges 9 were unwilling to make such a conclusive presumption, and were more concerned with providing relief for
small business debtors for whom the elaborate procedures of
Chapter XI were not feasible.' 0 This latter view prevailed in the
1978 Act, although relief is restricted to an individual (and his
spouse is they file a joint petition) with a "regular income" and
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000
and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$350,000. These ceilings will apply to both individual and joint
petitions." The monetary restrictions were deemed necessary to
prevent sole proprietors with large businesses from abusing creditors by opting for the somewhat more protective provisions of
Chapter 13 over Chapter 11.2 However, one commentator deter XIII and the definition applicable to the remainder of the Bankruptcy Act which sets
a ceiling of $1500 on annual income. 11 U.S.C. § 1(32) (1976).
Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-905, 64 Stat. 1134.
Act of May 13, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-24, 73 Stat. 24.
11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976).
In re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1973); In re Reed, 368 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Va.
1968); In re Bradford, 268 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967); In re Shamma, 369 A.2d 191
(N.H. 1977).
' H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 165.
1975 Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 23-24 (statement of Prof. Frank Kennedy,
Executive Director, Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States).
1 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1421 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman,
National Bankruptcy Conference).
S' Id. at 1316 (Statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
The ABA's proposed amendments to Chapter XIII also favored allowing selfemployed business debtors access to wage earner relief. Twinem, supra note 19, at 1742.
" 1978 Act § 109(e) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)).
,2H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 119. See notes 272-94 and accompanying text
infra.
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scribed this view as an "irrelevant and excessive response to unsubstantiated conjecture that a few debtors may attempt to use
Chapter 13 to their own advantage."' 3
B. Abstention
A second structural change provides the court with unreviewable power to short-circuit any form of relief under the 1978 Act.
The abstention provision contained in Chapter 3 provides that,
after notice and a hearing," the court may dismiss a case or
suspend any proceedings at any time if the interests of creditors
5
and the debtor would be better served by such action.
C.

The Stay
The automatic stay enjoining suits against the debtor and
actions to enforce liens against his property has also undergone
change. Prior to the arrival of the bankruptcy rules, the courts
found power to stay creditors' actions in sections 611 and 614.6
This latter provision permits the court, without notice, to stay or
enjoin all actions against the debtor until final decree.' 7 In addition, upon notice and for cause shown, the court may stay or
enjoin any action to enforce any lien against the property of the
debtor until final decree. This power extends to suits by holders
of claims who cannot be provided for in wage earner plans, such
as claims secured by real property, 8 even if the mortgage was held
by the Veterans' Administration 9 or by the Federal National
Mortgage Association." Similarly, the stay power has been held
" 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 662 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
" Creditors should be alert to the fact that this phrase does not guarantee them a
hearing if they do not request it. 1978 Act § 102(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)).
5 Id. § 305 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 305).
4" 11 U.S.C. 44 1011, 1014 (1976). Prior to the Chandler Act, the courts found
power
to stay creditors in railroad reorganization cases under § 77 even without express statutory
authorization. Continental Illinois National Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry.,
294 U.S. 648 (1935). For a more comprehensive treatment, see Countryman, Treatment
of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349, 350 (1977).
"7In re Arzaga, 204 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Cal. 1962) held FED. R. Civ. P. 65, which limits
the duration of ex parte restraining orders at 10 days, inapplicable to this section.
" In re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305, 306 (4th Cir. 1973); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Mo. 1972);
In re Pizzolato, 281 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark. 1967); In re Willett, 265 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.
Cal. 1967); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
"In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
In re Scott, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
64,320 (E.D.
Mich. 1971).
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to extend to claims secured by personal property which were not
provided for in the plan." However, a few courts have suggested
that the court cannot prevent a partially 2 or fully securedu creditor from reclaiming his collateral or pursuing other remedies.
The courts have generally required several conditions for the
continuation of the stay. Among these are: (1) the plan is proposed in good faith and is feasible; (2) the stay is necessary to
preserve the estate or execute the plan; and (3) the stay should
not impair the secured creditor's collateral.u Several courts have

added that the secured creditor cannot be forced to accept less
than the full periodic contract payments 5 and that the stay
should be conditioned on the curing of defaults within a reasonably short period."
When rule 13-401 became effective, it changed prior law by
automatically staying all creditor actions against the debtor or to
enforce liens against his property upon filing of a Chapter XIII
7
petition. It is no longer necessary for the debtor to request a stay.
The rule provides for relief from the stay for any creditor who
timely files his claim or who is secured by the debtor's real property." This relief provision is somewhat confusing because it provides that the stay will not be terminated, annulled, modified, or
conditioned except upon "cause shown." 5 ' Simultaneously, the
rule requires a party seeking to continue the stay to "show he is
entitled thereto."0 This quagmire over the burden of proof can
11In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960); In re Burke, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] BANK. L. REP. (CCH) 63,507 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
0 In re Worley, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANK. L. REP. (CCH) 64,283 (E.D.
Mich. 1970); aff'd sub noma.Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
64, 285 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972).
" In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D.
Kan. 1962).
"+In re Wail, 403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975); In re Cassidy, 401 F. Supp. 757
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
" In re Thompson, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64, 769 (5th
Cir. 1973); Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234, 238 (1st Cir. 1968);
Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Townsend,
348 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Mo. 1972); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark. 1967);
In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
" In re Cassidy, 401 F,Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284
(W.D. Mo. 1972); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
61The constitutionality of a similar stay in BANK. R. 11-44 was sustained in Fidelity
Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976).
" BAmK. R. 13-401(d).
Id.
aId.
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be resolved by charging the creditor with the burden of going
forward and presenting a prima facie case for relief. Thereafter,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the debtor to justify continuing
the stay.6" The rule also provides for annulment of the stay thirty
days after the first creditor's meeting for a creditor whose claim
is not listed by the debtor and who does not file a proof of claim."2
Ex parte relief is available for a case where irreparable injury will
3
occur before notice and a hearing can be had.
The automatic stay will be found in section 362 of the 1978
Act. Like its predecessor in the rule, it serves to give the debtor
a breathing spell from his creditors by stopping all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions." It also affords
creditor protection by preventing a scramble to obtain payment
in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. 5
Subsection (a) defines the scope of the stay. It prevents the
commencement or continuation of any proceeding against the
debtor, 6 including the issuance or employment of process, 7
that was or could have been commenced before the filing
of the petition. It precludes enforcement of prior judgments
against the debtor or his property and any acts to obtain possession of his property. Conduct aimed at creating, perfecting, or
enforcing any lien against property of the estate, or similar action
against property of the debtor, 8 to the extent the underlying
6' Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 177, 226-27
(1978).
62 BANKS.

6

R. 13-401(c).

BANKR. R. 13-401(e).

" H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 121, 340; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at
54-55.
0 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 340.
" This includes arbitration, license revocation or any other judicial or administrative
proceeding. However, the court should ordinarily lift the stay for proceedings before specialized and nongovernmental tribunals to allow these proceedings to come to a conclusion. Thereafter, enforcement of the order or collection of assets would come under the
supervision of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 340-41.
11 This was included to prevent the issuance of a writ of execution by a judgment
creditor to obtain property that was property of the debtor before commencement of the
case but which was transferred, subject to the judgment lien, before filing. Since the
remainder of subsection (a) pertains only to property of the debtor or property of the
estate, it would not prevent pursuit of the transferred property by issuance of process.
However, the creditor is permitted to foreclose on the property. Id. at 341.
" This subsection is aimed at property that does not become property of the estate
such as exempt property and other property that is not included in the estate under 1978
Act § 1306(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)). H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11,
at 341.
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claim arose before the filing of the petition, is enjoined. Creditor
harrassments in the form of any action to collect, assess, or recover a claim that arose before filing of the petition are similarly
prohibited. Contrary to a result reached under the rule," postpetition setoffs are not permitted. The final provision in this
subsection stays the commencement or continuation of any suit
concerning the debtor before the United States Tax Court.
Subsection (b) lists eight exceptions to the automatic stay.7
These include criminal actions against the debtor, the collection
of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not
property of the estate," and acts to perfect an interest in property
when perfection would be effective against the trustee under section 546(b). Actions commenced or continued by a governmental
unit to enforce governmental or regulatory power72 and the enforcement of non-monetary judgments obtained by a governmental unit in enforcing its regulatory or police power are also excepted. Similarly, the setoff of any mutual debt that arises from
commodities futures contracts, forward commodity contracts,
leverage transactions, options, warrants, or rights to purchase or
sell contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or securities will be permitted. The seventh exemption, concerning foreclosure actions by the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development on property consisting of five or more living
units, will not be of major significance in Chapter 13 due to the
dollar limitations. The final exception permits any governmental
unit to issue a notice of tax deficiency.
Subsection (c) provides that the stay of any act against property of the estate continues until it is no longer a part of the

"gIn re Williams.

422 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
10 The Justice Department wanted to include judicial foreclosure proceedings initiated prior to the commencement of the case because mortgagees lose substantial sums
with any delay. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 2116.
11 The automatic stay is one means of protecting the debtor's discharge. Stay of these
collections does not further that goal because these obligations are not dischargeable, 1978
Act §§ 1328(a), 1328(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a), 1328(c)), and does not
prejudice other creditors because collections are from property that is not a part of the
estate. Moreover, a stay could lead to hardship on the part of the protected spouse or
children. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 342-43.
72 This provision is intended to be construed narrowly to permit actions to protect the
public health and safety and not to apply to suits by a governmental entity to protect a
pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or the estate. 124 CONG. REc. S17,409 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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estate. 73 The stay of any other acts continues until the case is
closed, dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied.
Subsection (d) contains the relief provision in the new act.
It provides that a court shall grant relief, such as terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning the stay, if certain conditions are met. The movant may seek relief for any reason constituting "cause," including lack of adequate protection of his interest in the debtor's property." The burden of proving that relief is
not warranted lies with the party opposing relief. 75 Alternatively,
with respect to a stay of an act against property, the moving party
7
may allege and show the debtor has no equity in the property.
If this is successfully established, a party opposing relief can still
defeat it by proving that the property is essential to the debtor's
rehabilitation .77

Subsection (e) adds protection which is not currently available to creditors. The stay is automatically terminated as to a
creditor requesting relief from the stay of any act against property
of the estate thirty days after such request unless the court, after
notice and a hearing, orders the stay continued in effect. 8 For
more complex cases, the court may make a temporary ruling after
a preliminary hearing.
13 Property is no longer part of the estate when it is exempt, sold, or abandoned. The
stay does not terminate as to property of the debtor which leaves the estate and goes to
the debtor. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 343.
1, 1978 Act § 361 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 361) provides guidelines for adequate
protection. However, lack of adequate protection is not the sole basis for relief under this
section. A desire to allow proceedings before specialized and non-governmental tribunals
to proceed to conclusion may be another reason for granting the request. See note 66 supra.
Other bases might include pending cases lacking any connection with or interference with
the pending Chapter 13 case. Examples include divorce or child custody proceedings, or
probate proceedings where the debtor is named as executor or administrator. Generally,
proceedings in which the debtor is a fiduciary or involving postpetition activities of the
debtor need not be stayed because they bear no relation to the purpose of the stay, which
is protection of the debtor from his creditors. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 34344.
47 1978 Act § 362(g) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)).
76 Id. §§ 362(d), 362(g) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 362(g)). This is aimed
at the problem of real property mortgagees where the petition is filed on the eve of
foreclosure. It is not intended to apply if the business of the debtor is managing or leasing
real property, such as a hotel operation, even if the debtor has no equity, if the property
is essential to rehabilitation. 124 CONG. REc. S17,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
17 1978 Act §§ 362(d), 362(g) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 362(g)). The
Department of Justice suggested that judicial and power of sale foreclosures should be
permitted solely upon a showing of a lack of equity in the property. 1975 House Hearings,
supra note 6, at 2116-17.
"' This section did not meet with universal acclaim. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings,
supra note 24, at 815 (statement of L.E. Creel 111).
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At all hearings on relief from the stay, the only issues which
are relevant are the adequacy of protection, the debtor's equity
in the property, the necessity of the property to rehabilitation of
the debtor, or the existence of other bases for relief. Other issues,
such as counterclaims against the creditor, are not to be decided.7" However, this should not preclude the party seeking continuance of the stay from presenting evidence as to the existence
of claims which the court may consider in exercising its discretion.80
Subsection (f) provides for ex parte relief from the stay for a
creditor who will suffer irreparable damage before notice and a
hearing can be had.
D.

Turnovers

An issue related to the stay of creditor actions has been resolved by the 1978 Act. Under current law, it has been argued
that a Chapter XIII court may have no power to order a turnover
of collateral which has been in the possession of the creditor for
more than four months"' prior to filing the petition when the
property is needed by the debtor to effectuate the plan.82 Section
542 of the 1978 Act provides that any entity which has possession,
custody, or control of property of the estate or exempt property
must deliver it to the trustee or account for it unless the value of
such property is inconsequential. Section 543 extends this duty
to a custodian of property of the debtor.8
E.

Codebtor Stay

One of the most controversial changes is the stay of actions
against a codebtor.Y Under the current Chapter XIII, a creditor
cannot be enjoined from proceeding against one jointly liable with
the debtor.5 5 However, if the creditor accepts a plan calling for

11

H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 344; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 55.
See generally In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
go S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 55.
" See 11 U.S.C. § 96a(1) (1976).

12Countryman. Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 COM. L.J. 349,
351-52 (1977), makes this observation and then argues that such power can be implied
from 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a)(15), 1011, 1014 (1976).
1 The term "custodian" is defined at 1978 Act § 101(10) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(10)).
IId. § 1301 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1301).
In re Shelor, 391 F. Supp. 384 (W.D. Va. 1975); Heckman v. National Bank of
Washington, 201 A.2d 688 (D.C. App. 1964).
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payment of the debt and actually accepts an initial payment, one
court has held that he will not be permitted to pursue the comaker during the pendency of the plan. 6 If the debtor fears reprisal against a codebtor, his plan may include a provision waiving the right to proceed against the codebtor as long as the debtor
is not in default under the plan. Such a clause would bind any
creditor who accepts the plan."
The Commission's report concluded that a moratorium on
collection from codebtors is necessary to prevent undue pressure
being brought to bear on the debtor indirectly through accommodation parties. Often these endorsors are coworkers, relatives, or
friends who cosign at the request of the debtor.88 The prospect of
creditor action against these persons was also thought to unduly
encourage payments conforming to contract terms under the
plan, thus making it more difficult to fulfill.8 9 Moreover, cosignors
may be in similar financial straights and recourse against them
will increase petitions under the Act. 0 Finally, if creditors are
permitted to proceed against codebtors, this may undermine the
purposes of Chapter 13 by encouraging the debtor to file a liquidation petition and to reaffirm the codebtor's claim subsequent
to discharge.' Nevertheless, while the codebtor stay enjoyed
strong support in the legislative history, 2 many admonished
against its advisability. Some urged that terms are often extended based on the added security of a codebtor and inclusion
of the section would tend to tighten credit. 3 In addition, the
"

In re Tesmer, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)

63,984 (W.D.

Mich. 1971). But see Heckman v. National Bank of Washington, 201 A.2d 688 (D.C. App.
1964) (creditor cannot be stayed unless he accepts a plan which releases his right to
proceed against a codebtor).
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1046(7), 1057; Schraer v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 408 F.2d 891 (6th
Cir. 1969); 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 446-47.
" H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 166-67.
0 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 122.
" 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 661 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
Id.

E.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1324 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Conrad K. Cyr); id. at 1400 (statement of Duncan Kester on behalf of the National
Association of Chapter XIII Trustees); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 315-16
(statement of Richard Hesse, Consultant to the National Consumer Law Center); id. at
622 (statement of California State Bar: Committee on Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
"1 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 904 (statement of Lynn Twinem on behalf
of Beneficial Finance System). Contra, 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 661 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr). Cf. 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6,
at 1432 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman) (any reduction in credit would be beneficial
to reducing the number of avoidable bankruptcy cases).
"
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constitutionality of enjoining actions against one who has not
filed under the Bankruptcy Act has been challenged." Nevertheless, Professor Countryman believes that the provision will withstand scrutiny because it deals with debtor relief and with the
debtor's obligations to his creditors. He argues that if the creditor
is permitted to harass accommodation parties, the pressure these
people will bring to bear on the debtor may frustrate any chance

of rehabilitation.'9
Section 1301 is a compromise measure tailored to meet the
situations which present the greatest potential for abuse. 6 The
stay extends only to acts or suits to collect from an individual
codebtor on a consumer debt. 7 Moreover, it does not protect a
surety if that person is in the business of guaranteeing or securing
such debts. The stay endures until the case is closed, dismissed,
or converted to Chapter 11 or liquidation. The creditor retains
power to preserve his rights on negotiable instruments by presenting and giving notice of dishonor, 8 but he cannot attempt to
collect from the codebtor while the stay is in effect." Relief from
the stay is afforded by subsection (c). After notice and a hearing,
to the extent that (1) the codebtor rather than the debtor received
111975 Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 130 (statement of Walter Vaughn on behalf
of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association); id. at 143
(statement of Alvin Weise, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law
Forum of the National Consumer Finance Association); id. at 606 (statement of Claude
L. Rice, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the National Association of Chapter
XIII Trustees). See In re Nine North Church Street, Inc., 82 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1936); 1 H.
REMINGTON, REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY § 11 (1908).

" 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 1431-32. Professor Countryman feels that an
expansive reading of the Act is permissible by analogizing to the breadth of the reading
the current law was given in Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Ry., 290 U.S. 648 (1935). Accord H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 123 (not
constitutionally infirm because any codebtor protection is only incidental to the effect
which protects the debtor).
The counterproposals to the codebtor stay ran the gamut from giving them more
protection in the form of procedures for obtaining a discharge in the proceedings, 1975
House Hearings, supra note 6, at 943-44 (statement of Ernest Sarason, Jr., attorney for
the National Consumer Law Center, Inc.), to permitting collection from the comaker if
the creditor could show that the coparty is financially able to pay from assets other than
current earnings or property reasonably needed to support his family. Id. at 1433 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
'1 "Consumer debt" is defined at 1978 Act § 101(7) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §
101(7)).
" U.C.C. § 3-501 to -511 (1972 version).
" 1978 Act § 1301(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1301(b)). See also 1975 House
Hearings, supra note 6, at 1413 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

the consideration for the joint obligation;'"0 (2) the debtor's plan
omits the claim; or (3) the creditor's interest would be irreparably
harmed by the stay; 0' relief will be forthcoming.
F. Debtors' Powers
The new act provides that all debtors may use, sell, and lease
property of the estate, other than in the ordinary course of business, 0 2 after notice and a hearing and subject to certain protections for affected creditors. 0 3 In addition, a debtor engaged in
business' 4 is authorized to continue operation of the business,
and may, subject to certain creditor protections,10 use, sell, and
lease property and obtain credit in the ordinary course of business.'06 This is a complete reversal of current law which limits the
rights, privileges, and duties of a Chapter XIII debtor to those of
a bankrupt after adjudication.0 7
G. Trustees' Powers
Any surviving controversy over the extent of the powers of a
trustee in wage earner relief' 05 will be laid to rest by Chapter 13.
A narrow reading of the current statute has led some to conclude
that a Chapter XIII trustee is a mere collecting and disbursing
agent. 0 9 Nevertheless, the Chapter XIII rules" and the over'" In other words, the debtor is the codebtor. This section is designed to protect the
individual who does not ultimately bear the liability, regardless of any agreement to share
liabilities in a different manner than profits. 124 CONG. REc. S17,423 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978).
"' This would include cases where the codebtor is deteriorating financially because
of a loss of employment or where the codebtor plans to leave the jurisdiction and would
no longer be available to insure payment should the debtor default on the plan. H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 11, at 122.
' 1978 Act §§ 1303, 363(b), (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1303, 363(b)).
"
Id. §§ 363(d)-(f) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. 3} 363(d)-(f)).
I
"Debtor engaged in business" is defined at id. § 1304(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1304(a)).
" Id. § 363(c)-(f), 364(b)-(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c)-(f), 364(b)-(d)).
,o Id. §§ 1304(b), 363, 364 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1304(b), 363, 364).
"
11 U.S.C. § 1036 (1976).
"0 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1331 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr); 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, § 1134, at 450; Comment, The ChapterXIII
Trustee: "Trustee" or DisbursingAgent?, 21 ME. L. REV. 53 (1969). See also Cyr, Chapter
XIII and the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: A Time of Reckoning,
75 CoM. L.J. 385, 389-91 (1970).
1' 11 U.S.C. § 1033(4) (1976); Bare, ChapterXIII, Wage EarnerPlan in PROCEEDINGS
OF SECOND SEMINAR FOR REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY 467-68 (1965). See also 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 34 (statement of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
"o See BANKR. R. 13-307(a), 13-605, 13-606, 13-607, 13-608.

1979

CHAPTER 13

whelming weight of the case law"' have allowed much greater
power for the trustee. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides a laundry list in Chapter 13 of the powers and duties of the
trustee. These include: (1) being accountable for all property received; (2) investigating the financial affairs of the debtor; (3)
examining proofs of claims and objecting to improper claims; (4)
opposing discharge of the debtor, if advisable; (5) furnishing information about the estate and its administration to a party in
interest who requests such information, unless the court orders
otherwise; and (6) making a final report and filing a final account
of the administration of the estate with the court." 2 He must
appear and be heard at any hearings concerning the value of
property subject to a lien, confirmation of the plan, and modification of the plan after confirmation." ' The trustee will also offer
nonlegal"' advice and assist the debtor in the performance of the
plan."15 This last duty is a compromise in a stormy controversy
over the proper roles of the trustee, debtor's attorney, and the
Commission's proposed new government agency." 6 It permits the
" City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 230 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1956); In re
Truman, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1702, 1711-13 (D. Me. 1975); In re Cote, 313 F. Supp.
509 (D. Me. 1970); In re Sparks, 306 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ala. 1969); In re Maye, 180 F.
Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1959); In re Heger, 180 F. Supp. 147 (D. Minn. 1959). See also 10
25.10, 26.01[3] (14th ed. 1940).
COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY
1121978 Act § 1302(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1)).
"' Id. § 1302(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(2)).
"I The trustee should advise debtors in advance that he cannot give legal advice and
any communication between them will not be privileged. See generally 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 876 (statement of Prof. Marjorie Girth).
"'
1978 Act § 1302(b)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(3)).
. The Commission felt that counseling prior to the selection of a form of relief was
essential to alerting debtors to the availability of Chapter XIII. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra
note 6, at 158-59. Both the Commission and Judges' Bills provides for such counseling.
Under the former, a newly formed government agency would perform the counseling. H.R.
31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-203 (1975). The latter bill authorized the local
office of the Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
or another entity under contract with them, to assist the debtor in the preparation of
documents. Thereafter, he was to have been referred to an attorney on a referral list for
counseling and the selection of a remedy. H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4203 (1975).
Some felt the bureaucratic counseling from a government agency might prompt the
debtor to choose wage earner relief when it was inadvisable. 1975 Senate Hearings,supra
note 6, at 863 (statement of Prof. Samuel Donnelly); 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6,
at 866 (statement of Prof. Philip Shuchman). Others felt that attorneys on a referral list
could not afford to be completely independent in their advice. Id. at 1264 (statement of
George Ritner). See generally 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 619 (statement of
California State Bar: Committee on Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
Judge Cyr reported remarkable success keeping down legal fees by maintaining a list
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trustee to assist the debtor in the preparation of documents and
the formulation of the plan"' and to counsel the debtor throughout the duration of the plan." 8 Finally, if the debtor is engaged
in business, unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee will
investigate the debtor's financial condition, the health of his business, the desirability of continuing the business, and other pertinent matters. Thereafter, he must submit a statement of the
investigation, including any irregularities in the affairs of the
debtor, to the court. He will transmit a copy or summary of the
statement to any entity that the court directs."'
In light of the dispute over the scope of the powers of a
Chapter XIII trustee, it would have been more advisable to explicitly make reference in Chapter 13 to the trustee's avoidance
powers. This is especially true since earlier bills provided that the
power of the wage earner trustee and the bankruptcy trustee were
to be coextensive.' 0 Moreover, some had argued that the avoidance powers should be limited to situations where creditors would
benefit rather than extending to those occasions when only the
debtor would gain because the property was not to be distributed. 2' However, the enumeration of powers and duties of the
trustee in subsections 1302(b) and (c) is not inconsistent with the
of attorneys willing to accept a Chapter Xm debtor at set rates. He also reported dramatic
increases in the success of Chapter XIII plans through the use of varied forms of counseling. Cyr, supra note 1, at 153-54; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 60-61. He felt
that further reductions in attorneys' fees were possible if preparation of documents accompanying filing was done by someone other than an attorney. 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 6, at 1326; see also id. at 27-28 (statement of H. Kent Presson, Assistant Chief,
Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts), Contra, 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 618 (statement of California State Bar: Committee on
Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
"I It has been suggested that neither the debtor nor the debtor's attorney tends to
formulate a plan with any degree of sophistication. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at
1327-28 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
"I Judge Cyr has suggested that ongoing counseling by a functionary other than the
debtor's attorney is necessary because few attorneys are trained or interested in extralegal
problems such as credit, domestic, employment, and medical problems which befall a
family pending completion of a plan. Id. at 1320. For a survey of the types of Chapter XIII
counseling that have been used, see Lee, The Counseling of Debtors in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387 (1971).
1" 1978 Act §§ 1302(c), 1106(a)(3)-(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c),
1106(a)(3)-(4)).
1wH.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-101 (1975); H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-601 (1975).
"1 1975 Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 130 (statement of Walter Vaughn on behalf
of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association).
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avoidance powers contained in sections 544 through 549. In addition, Chapter 1 explicitly makes the powers enumerated in Chapters 3 and 5 available to the Chapter 13 trustee.' 2
The current system under which the trustee is appointed by
23
the bankruptcy court has given rise to claims of "cronyism."'
Consequently, the draftsmen of the 1978 Act, while rejecting proposals to allow creditors to elect the trustee,"' provided that the
court is to select a trustee from a list prepared by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.'25 In those districts selected for the experimental United States Trustee System,' 5 the
United States Trustee will serve as the trustee in the case unless
he has appointed a standing trustee and that individual has qualified to serve. ' '
Chapter 13 retains the power of the court to appoint a standing trustee if the number of cases filed in the district so warrants.'28 This provision has met with general approval in its operation under current law.'"
H.

Creditor Control

Several structural changes are noteworthy because certain
provisions do not appear in the 1978 Act. Foremost among these
is the deletion in Chapter 13 of the requirement of creditor consent before a plan can be confirmed. Under current law, a plan
cannot be confirmed unless it is accepted by a majority, in number and amount, of unsecured claims "affected by"'30 the plan.
In addition, all secured creditors "dealt with" by the plan must
consent to it.' 3 ' The new act eliminates the need for any acceptance from unsecured creditors and provides that the plan can be
confirmed over the opposition of the secured creditors "provided
1978 Act § 103(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 431 (statement of U.S. District Judge
Robert DeMascio); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 19-20 (statement of Harold
Marsh, Jr., Chairman, Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States).
-2 Cf. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(a) (1977); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1302(a) (1977) (proposal contained in the earlier version of the 1978 Act).
"5 1978 Act § 225(b) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 604(f)).
" These districts are listed at 1978 Act § 1501 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1501).
" 1978 Act § 151302(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 151302(a)).
1 Id. § 1302(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(d)); cf. BANKR. R. 13-205(a).
" See, e.g., Lavien, Water a Myth and Watch It Grow!, 79 CoM. L.J. 116, 117 (1974);
Presson, supra note 8, at 284.
" This term is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1976).
"5
"5

3, 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1976).
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for" by the plan if certain creditor protections are met. These
protections are either: (1) the plan provides that the secured creditor will retain his lien and the value of property to be distributed
to the secured creditor as of the effective date of the plan is not
less than the allowed amount of his claim; or (2) the debtor surrenders the collateral to the secured creditor.'32 In this regard, the
new legislation carries forward the dichotomy of rule 13-307(d)
between fully and partially secured creditors, by providing that
a creditor is secured only to the extent of the value of his collateral.' 33 This will remove all remaining doubt as to the validity of
the rule.' 3 Creditors secured by a security interest in exempt
property should be considered to hold secured claims under the
1978 Act, because, unlike the current bankruptcy act, the 1978
Act contains no definition of secured creditor.' 35 Consequently,
secured claims are not restricted to security interests in property
3
that is assignable in bankruptcy.'
It has been suggested that the lack of creditor control is a
fundamental shift in a wage earner policy. Creditors' groups have
argued that higher down payments and shorter repayment terms
are inescapable results which will dry up credit availability to
some consumers. ,37 Moreover, they have argued that beyond tangible security interests in collateral, creditors possess an intangible
security interest, the leverage of being able to insist on full contract payment of the property, regardless of its value. They argue
that the value to the debtor may have been exactly what the
creditor bargained for in extending credit.'1 The 1978 Act rejects
this argument as unwarranted on constitutional grounds and as
a matter of policy.' 31 The elimination of creditor control is also
112 1978

Act §§ 1325(a)(5)(B)-(C) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)-(C)).
"I Id. §§ 506(a). 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1325(a)(5)).
,U Compare In re Moralez, 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Cal. 1975), appeal dismissed 553
F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1977), and In re Derryberry, 4 C.B.C. (Mathew Bender & Co.) 492
(N.D. Cal. 1974) with In re McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1976); In re Wall, 403 F.
Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975), and Countryman, PartiallySecured CreditorsUnder Chapter
XIII, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1976).
,3 11 U.S.C. § 1(28) (1976).
See In re Strickle, [1962-1966 Transfer Binder] BuiKR. L. REP. (CCH) 61,551
(E.D. Ky. 1965).
,3, E.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 141 (statement of Alvin Weise, Jr.,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law Forum of the National Consumer Finance Association).
's Id. at 142.
'' H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 124.
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expected to reduce the number of persons, eligible for Chapter 13,
who opt for liquidation because they believe their creditors will
not accept a feasible plan of extension or composition.'40
The shift of attention from creditors to the court increases
the court's role. The judge is now the sole protection for legitimate creditor interests through a determination of whether the
plan is proposed in good faith and whether it is feasible.' 4 ' However, as a practical matter, creditor control under current law has
been exaggerated. Secured creditors have been curbed by developing case law, and unsecured creditors fail to exercise their
check on pragmatic grounds.
While the authorities are in complete agreement that a plan
which deals with a secured creditor cannot be confirmed without
his consent, considerable doubt exists about when a plan actually
deals with the creditor. One line of cases steadfastly holds that a
plan cannot be confirmed where the secured creditor does not
receive full contract payments.'4 2 However, at least one case has
held that where the creditor's total payments under the plan total
at least as much as he would receive under the terms of the
contract or upon immediate liquidation, as long as his collateral
is not impaired, the plan may be confirmed notwithstanding his
objection.' 4 3 This result has met with favor among the commentators.' Moreover, a developing line of cases suggests that while
the plan may not be confirmed, the creditor can be removed from
the plan which can then be confirmed. The secured creditor can
be restrained from seizing his security if it is essential to the
success of any plan and payments to the creditor insure that his
collateral will not be impaired."15 Thus, the stay can be used in a
,I Id. at 123.
1978 Act §§ 1325(a)(3), 1325(a)(6) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3),
1325(a)(6)).
"1 In re Worley, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,283 (E.D.
Mich. 1970), aff'd sub. nor. Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
64,285 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972); Terry
v. Colonial Stores Employee's Credit Union, 411 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969); In re Pappas,
216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962); In re
O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961).
'" In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Ky. 1971); see also In re Wilder, 225 F.
Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
'" D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 436-40; Comment, The Uncertain Status of Secured
Creditors Under Chapter XII1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 377, 387-89 (1975-1976); Note, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1972).
"I In re Garcia. 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933
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number of circumstances to circumvent the leverage the secured
creditor has over confirmation.
In practice, unsecured creditors have not shown a great deal
of interest in voting on the plan. 4 ' Once the plan has been confirmed, one study indicates that creditors also fail to contest modifications or request dismissal or liquidation even after numerous
defaults under the plan.' 7 Apparently they realize that they have
nothing to gain by moving for dismissal or conversion.
Real property mortgagees should be counseled that a plan
under the 1978 Act will be able to modify the rights of any creditor other than a creditor secured by a security interest in the
debtor's principal residence.' 4 8 The Chandler Act does not currently permit a debtor to affect claims secured by real property
because, in the words of the House report, such claims are "not
essential to or a proper part of a plan of settlement."'4 9 The Commission' 50 and Bankruptcy Judge Conrad Cyr' both strongly
urged that the new act expand the ability of the debtor to provide
for continued payment on these claims but, understandably,
mortgage lenders were not enthusiastic about the proposal. 5 The
new provision is a compromise designed to afford protection for
creditors while allowing the debtor greater flexibility. Moreover,
it is intended that a claim secured by the debtor's principal resi53
dence may be treated in the plan under section 1322(b)(5).
(E.D. Ark. 1967): In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967). See also In re Wall,
403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975); H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 165-67.
146 Meth. supra note 6, at 14; H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 162.
, Girth. supra note 10, at 55-61.
1978 Act § 1322(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)).
' H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1937). Another explanation is that,
normally, payments under a wage earner plan will be so small as not to permit any
reduction in mortgage payments, or the claim is so well secured that, in case of difficulty,
the debtor is able to refinance the debt with a mortgage extending beyond the period for
a normal plan. In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 461 (N.D. Ala. 1962). See also 3 D. COWANS,
supra note 10, at 435.
110H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 166. The Commission seemed to believe that
the availability of Chapter XII relief was the reason that claims secured by an interest in
real property could not be dealt with in Chapter XIfm. Id.
,5' 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1330-31; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note
24, at 663.
"1 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 714 (statement of Edward Julik, Senior
Vice President. Real Estate Division, Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.); id. at 963
(statement of Daniel Goldberg, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
"1 124 CONG. REC. H11,106 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,423 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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1. Administrative Costs
The second major exclusion from the 1978 Act is the omission
of the "Seattle Plan." This device, conceived in its namesake,
would have provided that creditors pay the costs and expenses of
a Chapter 13 proceeding, including filing fees, the debtor's attorney's fees, and other administrative costs. Both the Commission's
Bill 54 and the Judges' Bill'55 had adopted the suggestion and it
had received the approval of the Commission on Bankruptcy
57
56
Laws, the National Bankruptcy Conference, and Judge Cyr.1
Nevertheless, substantial doubt existed as to whether the Seattle
Plan produces a composition which would bar further composition or bankruptcy relief for six years.' Others objected because
it precluded the debtor from ever paying his creditors in full and
avoiding the stigma of a compromise plan.
Finally, some doubt persists regarding the assessment and
collection of taxes in the 1978 Act. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
provides that federal taxes found to be owing within one year of
filing of the petition which have not been assessed prior to confirmation and any tax which may become due and owing during the
pendency of the plan, may be assessed against that collected from
the debtor, notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter
XIII.10 This provision also controls over section 57(n)'6 ' of the act
which requires claims to be filed within six months of the first
meeting of creditors.' While it was pointed out that such power
in the taxing authority to proceed within or outside the plan is
potentially disruptive to an otherwise feasible plan, 6 3 a similar
provision was included in both the initial House'64 and Senate' 5
H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-102(10), -102(25) (1975).
H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6-402, -701 (1975).
l 4 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 1434 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
Id. at 1320-21. However, Judge Cyr favors a general revenue tax over both the
Seattle Plan and current practice for financing Chapter 13. Id.
" Id. at 1327 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr); id. at 1429
(statement of Claude L. Rice, National Association of Chapter XIII Trustees).
I E.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 600 (statement of Claude L. Rice,
National Association of Chapter XIII Trustees).
"
11 U.S.C. § 1080 (1976).
161 Id. § 93(n).
"3 In re Gates. 256 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
"3 1975 House Hearings. supra note 6, at 1317-18 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
"I H.R. 8200. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1331 (1977).
"3 S. 2266. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1331 (1977).
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versions of the bill introduced into the ninety-fifth Congress. This
special tax section was deleted before final passage so the tax
aspects of Chapter 13 are controlled by section 505. This provision
allows a governmental unit to assess any tax, notwithstanding the
stay of section 362, after a determination of tax liability by the
court. 6 The final reading and explanation of the bill to the
House, however, which took the place of a joint conference report, ' 7 indicated that the tax could also be collected after court
68
determination.
III.
A.

MECHANICS OF CHAPTER

13

Commencing the Case

The Chapter 13 petition commences the case." 9 Unlike current law, there is no requirement of an allegation of insolvency or
inability to pay debts as they mature.'70 The 1978 Act continues
the rule under current law' that no involuntary petitions are
permitted in Chapter 13172 on the rationale that to compel an
individual to labor under a plan without his consent would impinge on the thirteenth amendment'7 3 and federal statutes.'74
Moreover, an unwilling debtor is unlikely to retain his job or
cooperate in repayment under the plan; failure would be a virtual
certainty.7 5 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that collaboration between creditors and a bankruptcy judge can, in some
cases, virtually compel what amounts to an involuntary petition.
If creditors file for an involuntary bankruptcy under section 303,
a bankruptcy judge who is so inclined may use his discretion
under section 305 to dismiss the petition provided the debtor will
file for relief under Chapter 13.176
1" 1978 Act § 505(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 505(c)).
17 See note 24 supra.
368 124 CONG . REC. H11,115 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
I" 1978 Act § 301 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 301).
17011 U.S.C. § 1023 (1976).
171 Id. §§
1021. 1022; In re Hale, 274 F. Supp. 813, 816 (W.D. Va. 1967).
372 1978 Act § 303(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 303(a)).
'71 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 120; 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at
499 (statement of Irving Sulmeyer); 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 360 (statement
of Prof. Vern Countryman).
' ' 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1976).
37 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 120; 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6, at
1420 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
37 This observation is drawn from 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 861-62
(statement of Prof. Samual Donnelly).
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The 1978 Act omits the provision in current law for a bond
to indemnify the estate against diminution thereof pending a stay
of adjudication and administration of a debtor who originally
filed in bankruptcy."' The provision is of limited usefulness because it is restricted to cases filed after bankruptcy and the bond
is always discretionary with the court.'
B.

Filing of Claims

The filing of claims by creditors will be controlled by the
statute. Any creditor may file a claim' 79 and if he fails to do so,
the debtor, a codebtor, or the trustee may file his claim.' 0 Unlike
current law, there is no requirement in the statute that each
creditor filing a claim prove that the debt is free from usury.""
However, such a requirement remains in the current rules and the
rule may be valid under the 1978 Act. 8 1 Post-petition claims arising from (1) the rejection of executory contracts and leases, (2)
the recovery of exempt property by the debtor under section
552(i), (3) transfers avoided by the trustee under section 550, (4)
the recovery by the trustee for improper setoffs, and (5) a tax
entitled to a section 507(a)(1) priority may be filed subject to the
same rules as pre-petition claims. 8 3 In addition, a claim may be
filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor for taxes
that become payable during the case or for a post-petition consumer debt for services or property essential to the debtor's per84
formance under the plan.'
C. Allowance of Claims
The allowance of claims will be controlled by section 502
generally. However, post-petition consumer debts for property or
services which are necessary to the debtor's performance under
7 11 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976).
10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
24.14 (14th ed. 1940).
i' 1978 Act § 501 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 501). Cf BANKR. R. 13-301, 13-302
(mechanics of filing will still be controlled by the rules).
1101978 Act §§ 501(b)-(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b)-(c)). Cf BANKR. R.
13-303, 13-304 (filing of claims by debtor, trustee, and codebtor).
I 11 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1976). For an exhaustive review of the history of this provision, see In re Perry. 272 F. Supp. 73 (D. Me. 1967).
"' BANKR. R. 13-301(a).
1978 Act §§ 502(g)-(i) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(g)-(i)). Cf. BANKER. R.
13-305 (post-petition claims).
1" 1978 Act § 1305(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)). Cf. BANKR. R. 13-305
(post-petition claims). Apparently this provision precludes the debtor, codebtor, or trustee
from filing such a claim under BANKR. R. 13-303, 13-304 if the creditor fails to do so.
'~'
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the plan will be disallowed if the creditor knew or should have
known that prior approval of the obligation from the trustee was
practicable and was not obtained.1 5 While the apparent purpose
of such an inclusion was to prevent unauthorized credit extensions to overburdened debtors,' it has been criticized as opening
the door for subsequent suit in state court on the debt, interest,
and late charges in the situation where the trustee should have
approved the debt but does not.'87
D. Setoffs
Despite strong criticism that setoffs are inconsistent with the
Chapter 13 policy of freeing the debtor's assets in return for a
commitment of payment out of future earnings,88 pre-petition
setoffs are permitted under the 1978 Act under certain conditions.' 6 A similar result has been reached under the current stat90
ute.1
E. The Plan
The plan is to be filed by the debtor 9 ' and may provide for
payments to continue for up to three years, or, with court approval, for not longer than five years.9 2 This limitation is designed to protect debtors from unduly onerous plans and the taxpaying public from excessive use of the bankruptcy courts as
collection vehicles for protracted cases. 9 3 It may be that the limi" 1978 Act § 1305(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1305(c)). The disallowed claims
are not discharged by completion of the plan. See note 246 and accompanying text infra.
M 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1317 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
"7 Id. at 1425 (statement of Claude Rice).
'
Id. at 1411 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
a 1978 Act § 553 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 553). Cf. 1978 Act § 362(a)(7) (to be
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7)) (enjoins post-petition setoffs).
In re Foutz. 271 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Va. 1967). Accord 47 Comp. Gen. 522 (1968).
"' 1978 Act § 1321 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1321). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1033(2) (1976);
BANKR. R. 13-201 (similar provision under current law).
" 1978 Act § 1322(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)). While there is no explicit
limitation on the duration of a plan under current law, most plans are limited to three
years as a result of 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976). This allows the debtor to seek a hardship
discharge if he has performed under the plan for three years. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra
note 6, at 160.
"3 Girth. supra note 10, at 67. These limits are the result of a compromise. Some felt
three years was too long to allow a debtor to subject himself and his family to the restraints
of Chapter 13 and to forecast the financial fate of debtors. 1975 Houe Hearings, supra
note 6, at 1323 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr). Others wanted to
permit plans to extend beyond three years because the terms of credit purchases of big
ticket items often extend for up to five years and beyond. Id. at 1406 (statement of Duncan
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tation on the duration of the plan will have less significance than
is expected. Initial statistical studies indicate that creditors and
debtors allow plans to continue well beyond scheduled completion dates even after several defaults' 94 and, absent a hardship
discharge or conversion to another Chapter, the defaulting debtor
will not be able to earn a discharge until all payments called for
19 5
in the plan have been made.
The plan subjects so much of the debtor's future income as
is necessary to payment of creditors under the plan.'"1 In addition,
the debtor will be permitted to provide for the payment of all or
any part of a claim from property of the estate or property of the
debtor.'97 Actual payment to creditors is to be made by the trustee
unless otherwise provided in the plan or order confirming the
98
plan.
The rights of any creditor other than a creditor secured by a
lien on the debtor's principal residence may be modified.9 9 However, the plan must provide for full payment for all claims entitled to a priority under section 507 unless the holder of the claim
agrees to different treatment. It may classify claims but must
provide for uniform treatment for each claim within a particular
class.20 ' Unsecured creditors may be classified on the basis of an
Kester, President, National Association of Chapter Xm Trustees). The Department of
Justice suggested that no plan be allowed which called for performance in less than three
years unless all creditors were to be paid in full. Id. at 2126.
" Girth, supra note 10, at 55-61.
" 1978 Act § 1328(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)).
1k Id. § 1322(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4)
(1976) (similar provision in current law).
"1 1978 Act § 1322(b)(8) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8)). The Commission
felt that such a provision would reduce creditor objections to composition plans. They also
felt that a plan that intended to pay a composition plan solely from future income might
not meet the statutory standards of good faith and best interests of creditors. H.R. Doc.
No. 137, supra note 6, at 163-64.
"' 1978 Act § 1326(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(b)).
" Id. § 1322(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)). Under current law, a
plan may not deal with claims secured by "estates in real property or chattels real." 11
U.S.C. § 1006(1) (1976); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.
1966);In re Willett. 265 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
"1 1978 Act § 1322(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2)). There is no similar
requirement that the plan include such a provision. However, 11 U.S.C. § 1059(6) (1976)
and BANKR. R. 13-309(a) require debts entitled to a priority under section 64 of the current
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104, to be paid first and in full before any distribution to
creditors.
"1 1978 Act § 1322(a)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3)). No definition for
classification of claims exists in Chapter 13 but the reference to section 1122 in section

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

arbitrary dollar' ceiling but the debtor may not discriminate unfairly against any such class. 2 In addition, the plan may provide
for the curing or waiving of any defaultm and for the payment of
any unsecured claim to be made concurrently with the payment
of any other secured or unsecured claims.204 With regard to any
claim on which the last payment is due after completion of the
plan, it may provide for the curing of any defaults within a reasonable time and for maintenance of payments while the case is
pending.205 All or any part of a post-petition claim for taxes or for
a consumer debt allowed under section 1305 can be dealt with in
the plan.205 However, others will continue to deal with the debtor
with assurance of being paid, irrespective of whether they have
section 1305 claims provided for in the plan if the claims are
section 507(a)(1) administrative expenses which are entitled to
payment before satisfaction of other creditors under the plan.0 7
The plan may also provide for the assumption or rejection of
executory contracts and leases 2 1 and the vesting of property of the
estate upon confirmation of the plan or at a later time in the
debtor or any other entity. 209 Finally, it may include any other
210
appropriate provision not inconsistent with the new act.
1322(b)(1) suggests that a class consists of claims "substantially similar to other claims
in such class." Under current law, the debtor can treat each secured creditor severally,
11 U.S.C. § 1046(2) (1976), but general creditors must be treated alike, id. § 1046(1).
m 1978 Act § 1322(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1)). The ability to treat
unsecured creditors by classes was urged because it allows for added flexibility in dealing
with diverse claims. 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6, at 1425-26 (statement of Claude
L. Rice); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 855 (statement of Prof. Samuel J.M.
Donnelly).
1978 Act § 1322(b)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)).
- Id. § 1322(b)(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(4)). Apparently, this was
the result of the feeling of the Commission that this would cure the inequity created when
a debtor pays his secured creditors to free his collateral and then defaults on the plan
before payment is made to the unsecured creditors. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6,
at 603 (statement of Senator Burdick).
20 1978 Act § 1322(b)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)). See also note 153
and accompanying text supra. Such a claim would not be discharged by the Chapter 13
discharge. See note 244 and accompanying text infra.
2" 1978 Act § 1322(b)(6) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(6)).
Id. § 1326(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)). See note 235 and accompanying text infra.
1978 Act § 1322(b)(7) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1046(6) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
" 1978 Act § 1322(b)(9) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
110(i) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
1978 Act § 1322(b)(10) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1046(7) (1976) (similar provision in current law). See also 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at
442-48.
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F. Modifications of the Plan
Pre-confirmation modifications of the plan will be somewhat
similar to the procedure under the present statute.21 I The debtor
may modify the plan at any time before confirmation subject to
the provisions required to be contained in the plan by section
1322. Since only secured creditors will accept or reject the plan
under the 1978 Act,212 the debtor will not solicit acceptances from

unsecured creditors. A secured creditor is deemed to accept or
reject the modified plan the same as he accepted or rejected the
plan alters his rights and he
original plan unless the modified
2
affirmatively rejects the plan. 13

Post-confirmation modifications will be crucial in Chapter 13
due to layoffs, strikes, illness, accidents, and other unforeseen
circumstances. On any plan providing for an extension, the current bankruptcy act authorizes the court to increase or reduce the
amount of any installment payment under the plan, extend or
shorten the time for such payments, alter the amount of the distribution to any creditor provided for in the plan to take account
of any satisfaction to such creditor outside the plan, or otherwise
alter the payment or confirmation order. Such action may only
be taken after a hearing and notice to such parties as the court
may designate."' Nevertheless, no reduction in the total amount
to be paid to creditors under the plan is sanctioned. The court is
limited to increasing or reducing the amount or frequency of the
installment payments.215 The 1978 Act eliminates the restriction
to extension plans and the requirement for notice and a hearing
before a plan can be modified. The plan as modified becomes the
plan unless a creditor objects and the plan is disapproved after
notice and a hearing. 211While it is not clear who is to modify the
plan, this latter change indicates the power lies exclusively with
the debtor rather than the court as under current law. This would
during the
conform with the suggestion of a noted commentator
21
act.
the
of
version
earlier
an
on
legislative hearings
11 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1055 (1976); BANKR. R. 13-212.
21 1978 Act § 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
211

Id. § 1323(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1323(c)).
11 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1976); BANKR. R. 13-214(a).
28.06 (14th ed. 1940).
215 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
, 1978 Act § 1329(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)).
21 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1319 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
21
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While the 1978 Act generally carries forward the language of
rule 13-214(a), two key changes have been made. The new act
permits the plan to be modified to "increase or reduce the amount
of [any of the installment] payments on claims of a particular
class provided for by the plan."'1' The bracketed portion is language from the rule which has been deleted and the italicized
section is new language added by the 1978 Act. Clearly, the plan
can be modified with respect to one class without affecting payments to others under the new act. It should also be understood
that this clause permits the modification of the total amount to
be distributed to any class under the plan. 219 In addition, language in the rule allowing modification to account for payments
to a creditor outside the plan has been excised in the 1978 Act
because amendment of the plan to allow satisfaction of a creditor
outside the plan was thought to be an invitation for abuse. 22
The modified plan must comply with subsections 1322(a)
and (b), 2 which control the contents of the plan, and cannot
extend beyond three years after the initial payment on the original plan was due unless the court, for cause, extends the limit for
up to five years.tm Secured creditors are given the same voting
protections they enjoy with respect to preconfirmation modifications and all creditors are protected by the confirmation requirements in section 1325(a) with which the modified plan must conform.23
G.

Confirmation

The confirmation of plans has undergone significant
changes. The plan will be confirmed if (1) it complies with the
applicable provisions of Chapter 13 and other apposite sections
of the 1978 Act;24 (2) the filing fee has been paid; 22 (3) it has been

"18

1978 Act § 1329(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)).
219Language referring to installment payments appeared in H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-205 (1975), and was criticized for not permitting a remodeling of the
whole plan. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1427-28 (statement of Claude L. Rice).
Moreover, since secured creditors are allowed to vote on the modification, 1978 Act §
1329(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)), and the modification is subject to
the other creditor protections contained in the confirmation provision, id., the power to
alter the total amount of payments under the plan should be inferred.
22 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1427 (statement of Claude L. Rice).
n' 1978 Act § 1329(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)).
2n Id. § 1329(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c)).
= Id. § 1329(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)).
22,Id. § 1325(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(1) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
22 1978 Act § 1325(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2)). The 1978 Act adds
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proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law; m
(4) each unsecured claim is scheduled to receive sums at least as
large as it would receive upon immediate liquidation;'" and (5)
the debtor will be able to make all payments under and comply
with the plan. 2 2 In addition, each creditor with an allowed, secured claim "provided for"'2 by the plan must (1) accept the
plan; (2) have his collateral surrendered to him; or (3) retain his
lien under the plan, and the value of the property to be distributed to him under the plan must not be less than the allowed
amount of his claim.2" Conspicuously absent is the requirement
in current law that confirmation is conditioned on the debtor
being innocent of any of the acts which would be a bar to discharge in bankruptcy. 2 '
As under current law, an order of confirmation may be set
aside within 180 days after its entry, after notice and a hearing,
upon application of a party in interest. The present statute rea new section to title 28 which requires a $60 filing fee for a Chapter 13 case. Id. § 246
(to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1930). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1024(2) (1976) (current fee is $15).
r" 1978 Act § 1325(a)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(4) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
22 1978 Act § 1325(a)(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(2) (1976) (plan must be in best interests of creditors). Current law is clear that
"best interests of creditors" is served by a plan which proposes to pay creditors substantially what they would receive in liquidation even if a more lucrative plan is feasible. 1975
House Hearings,supra note 6, at 1319, 1321 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad
K. Cyr); cf. Adler v. Jones, 109 F. 967 (6th Cir. 1901) (former section 12 proceeding).
' 1978 Act § 1325(a)(6) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(2) (1976) (plan must be feasible); In re Thompson, 349 F. Supp. 990 (M.D. Ga.
(1972) (test for determining whether plan is "feasible" is whether the plan can be accomplished as a practical matter with one factor being the debtor's earning power).
rn This term is not defined in the 1978 Act. Current law does not permit a plan to
"deal with" a secured creditor without his consent. 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1976). Likewise,
this term is undefined by the bankruptcy act now in force. Case law has split on whether
a secured creditor is "dealt with" by a plan. See notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
Current law also provides that the plan must be accepted by a majority in number and
amount of all unsecured creditors "affected by" the plan. This term is defined at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1007 (1976). Under Chapter 11 of the 1978 Act, absent certain creditor protections, each
class "impaired by" the plan must accept it. 1978 Act § 1129(a)(8) (to be codified in 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)). This latter phrase is defined at id. § 1124 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1124)).
"3*1978 Act § 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
23 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(3) (1976). The Commission felt that if the plan is in the best
interests of creditors and has been proposed in good faith, the fact that the debtor may
not be eligible for a discharge in bankruptcy should not prevent confirmation of a plan
proposing payment from future earnings. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 6, at 163. See also
1975 House Hearings. supra note 6, at 1318 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad
K. Cyr); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 605 (statement of Claude L. Rice).
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quires that fraud must be shown to have occurred in the procurement of the plan. 2 ' The 1978 Act alters this language and permits
revocation upon a showing of fraud in the procurement of the
order of confirmation.n Once the order of confirmation has been
set aside, the court will dismiss the case, or convert it to liquidation, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate,
unless, within a time specified by the court, the debtor proposes
a modified plan which is confirmed by the court.2'
H. Payment
Before or at the time of each payment to creditors, all first
priority claims must be brought currentm and any fees due to a
standing trustee must be paid.' In addition, the court has the
power to order any person or entity which pays income to the
debtor to make the payments directly to the trustee.27 The more
difficult question which remains unresolved is whether the
is permitted to dismiss him based upon one of
debtor's employer 238
these court orders.
I.

Conversion
The debtor is given plenary power to convert the case to

n2 11 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976). But see BANKR. R. 13-214(b), 13-215(a) (confirmation
procured by fraud).
2n 1978 Act § 1330(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a)).
-3 Id. §§ 1330(b), 1307 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1307).
u Id. § 1326(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 1059(b)
(1976); BANKR. R. 13-309(a) (current law has a much more extensive list, including all
priority claims). However, under Chapter XIII there has been a dispute over whether
priority claims under section 64(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(5) (1976), are entitled to prior
payment. Compare In re Belkin, 358 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1966) with In re Bailey, 188 F.
Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
1978 Act § 1326(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)).
'3 Id. § 1325(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1058(2) (1976);
BANKR. R. 13-213(b) (similar provision in current law). Under current law, it has been held
that such an order may not run against the United States as an employer. United States
v. Krakover, 377 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); accord 47
Comp. Gen. 522 (1968).
Compare In re Jackson, 424 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911
(1970) with In re Stephenson, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
63,566 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); In re Crutcher, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 63,415 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); and In re Sparks, 306 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
Since these cases were decided prior to the effective date of Title Inl of the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1976), it has not been decided
what effect the statute will have on this question. See Comment, [19701 ILL. L.F. 571.
The prohibition on discharge in section 304(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976), is
based on a garnishment for any "one indebtedness." See also Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513
F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).

1979

CHAPTER 13

liquidation or to dismiss the case if it has not been converted to
another chapter. His rights in this respect cannot be waived.m On
request of a party in interest and for cause shown, after notice and
a hearing, the court may dismiss the case or convert it to liquidation, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.u ° The court also has the power to convert the case to Chapter 13 on request of a party in interest, after notice and a hearing,
24
at any time before confirmation.

J.

Discharge
42
Unless .the court approves a written waiver of discharge
after the filing of the petition, the debtor is entitled to a discharge
from all debts which are disallowed or provided for by the plan
after completion of payments under the plan. 23 The only debts
which are excepted are (1) claims which were not to be exhausted
within the duration of the plan; 24 (2) alimony, maintenance, or
child support payments;2' 5 and (3) claims for post-petition consumer goods or services necessary for performance under the plan
which are disallowed because the creditor failed to get prior approval of the trustee for the obligation.2 6 Chapter XIII currently
provides that the discharge extends to all claims provided for by
the plan but excludes debts which are not dischargeable under
section 17 where the holder of the claim has not accepted the
plan. 247
1" 1978 Act §§ 1307(a), (b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(a), (b)). Cf. BANKR.
R. 13-215(a) (dismissal and conversion under current law).
1,*1978 Act § 1307(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)). The statute provides a
nonexhaustive list of factors constituting "cause." These are: (1) unreasonable delay by
the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (2) nonpayment of the filing fee; (3) failure to
timely file a plan; (4) denial of a plan and denial of additional time for filing another plan
or modification; (5) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; (6)
revocation of confirmation and denial of confirmation of a modified plan; and (7) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan.
One court has held that claims which are listed in a previous plan, dismissed for
nonpayment, are barred by res judicata from being listed in a subsequent plan. In re
Dunn, 251 F. Supp. 637 (M.D. Ga. 1966).
Involuntary dismissal may be more difficult for the creditor to obtain than would
appear from a reading of the statute. In re Beasley, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR.
L. REP. (CCH) 64,091 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
2411978 Act § 1307(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(d)).
2I See BANKR. R. 13-405, 13-406.
2" 1978 Act § 1328(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1060
(1976); BANKR. R. 13-404(a) (similar provision in current law).
4 1978 Act § 1328(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1)).
2, Id. § 1328(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2)).
2" Id. § 1328(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(d)).
2,111 U.S.C. § 1060 (1976).
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A major change in the discharge provisions is the elimination
of the three-year threshold requirement for a hardship discharge." 8 Section 661 was added to the Chandler Act to guard
against the use of Chapter XIII as an instrument of "wage slavery. ' 2 1 However, legislators felt that this three-year condition
placed an unnatural incentive for debtors to propose three-year
plans regardless of their circumstances and to disregard wage
earner relief when performance could not be accomplished within
this time frame.2 50 Moreover, there have been scores of cases
where the debtor has fallen victim to unavoidable circumstances,
such as illness or accident, befbre the lapse of three years. Under
current law, the court has no alternative but to dismiss the case
or to allow the debtor to convert to bankruptcy, the very stigma
the wage earner had tried to avoid.2 1' Under current law, it has
been urged that a suspension or reduction in payments pursuant
to section 646(5) should not entail a similar protraction of the
three-year requirement as a prerequisite to a hardship discharge. " 1 The elimination of the time limitation in the 1978 Act
reinforces the wisdom of that position.
Three requirements will have to be met before a hardship
discharge will be possible under the new law. First, the debtor
cannot be justly held accountable for his failure to complete payments. Second, each unsecured claim must have received a minimum of liquidation value as of the effective date of the plan.
Finally, modification of the plan must be impracticable.2 5, The
hardship discharge is subject to the same exceptions to discharge
as survive a total performance4 discharge and the additional exceptions found in Chapter 5.2
One of the major impediments to the use of a composition
24 1978 Act § 1328(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)).

119Cyr, The 'Compassionate'Discharge, or is it The 'Perilous' Discharge of .f 661, 22
PEaS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 96, 97 & n.8 (1968).
2" H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 125.
21 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1323, 1329 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
252 In re West, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
64,957 (D. Me.
1973).
2" 1978 Act § 1328(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)). Only the first of these
is a condition under current law. 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976). But cf. In re Bailey [1973-1975
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) $ 65,409 (D. Me. 1974) (discharge denied where
modification possible).
21' 1978 Act §§ 1328(c), 523(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(c), 523(a)). See
notes 244-46 supra and accompanying text.
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plan under current law is the bar to a subsequent discharge.2 5
This result stems from dicta in Perry v. Commerce Loan Co.51
which held that a prior bankruptcy within six years would not bar
confirmation of a plan of extension. The language of Perry
strongly suggests it would have barred confirmation of a plan of
composition. 257 The court's reasoning would also bar bankruptcy
relief or confirmation of a plan calling for a composition of debts
within six years after a discharge pursuant to a composition
plan. 58 However, a discharge pursuant to an extension plan
should not bar future relief under the act.25 It has also been held
that where the debtor never received the benefits of discharge
because his prior plan was dismissed, a subsequent plan filed
within six years could be confirmed.2 0 Despite strong language in
the cases that similar rules should apply to the hardship discharge under section 661,21 at least one court has held that the
entry of a hardship discharge does not bar future discharge relief
02
under the bankruptcy act.
The 1978 Act eliminates some of the deterrents to the use of
composition plans. They will no longer bar confirmation of future
Chapter 13 relief calling for composition relief. However, one
hundred percent payments are encouraged by the limitation on
the availability of a subsequent discharge in liquidation. 26 The
limitation is designed to provide a slight brake on the use of
SH.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 160-61; 1975 House Hearings,supra note 6, at
1328-29 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
- 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
257 Id. at 403.
2m Id.
2" Barnes v. Maley, 360 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1966); In re Autrey, [1960-1962 Transfer
Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 60,493 (D. Kan. 1962).
In re Dow, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
63,402 (D. Me.
1970).
"I Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 404 (1966); In re Schlageter, 319 F.2d
821, 822 (3d Cir. 1963).
2,2 In re West, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
64,957 (D. Me.
1973). The New Hampshire court was almost certainly wrong when it opined that a
bankruptcy discharge entered within six years does not prevent confirmation of any Chapter XIII plan. In re Shamma, 369 A.2d 191 (N.H. 1977).
2' 1978 Act § 727(a)(9) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)). This section provides
that a debtor will not be denied a discharge in liquidation if he has been granted a
discharge under section 1328 of the 1978 Act (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328) or sections
660 or 661 of the current statute, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1060, 1061 (1976), in a case commenced
within six years of the liquidation petition if (1) full payment was made on all allowed,
unsecured claims, or (2) seventy percent was paid on these claims and this represented
the debtor's best effort.
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Chapter 13 by small businessmen who wish to avoid some of the
restrictions of Chapter 11. The Senate Report felt that the provision was necessary to prevent Chapter 13 plans from becoming
exclusively composition offers in which payments would total the
value of the debtor's nonexempt assets."' It should be noted that
a discharge in liquidation will no longer bar relief by way of a
composition plan under Chapter 13 for six years since there is no
bar comparable to section 14(c)(5) of the current law operative in
Chapter 13.
The remodeled chapter allows a party in interest to request
a revocation of discharge within one year after its entry. The court
will have the power to grant the request only if the discharge was
obtained through fraud and the moving party did not acquire
knowledge of the fraud until after entry of the discharge order."
Chapter III of the present bankruptcy act contains a broader
revocation provision 27 and while no published cases have applied
it in a wage earner context, it applies to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter XIII.268
IV.

13 AND CHAPTER 11
Assuming that an individual can qualify to file in Chapter
13 or Chapter 11,69 it is expected that the advantages of Chapter
13 will prove more alluring. Under the current act, Chapter XI
arrangements have proven too cumbersome 270 and costly2' to be
a viable alternative for the small businessman or the individual.
Chapter 11 will permit considerably more creditor involvement than Chapter 13. The former provides for creditors' and
equity holders' committees"2 which will have the right to consult
the debtor or the trustee in regard to the administration of the
THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF CHAPTER

21' S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 13. This reasoning is suspect because a discharge
in Chapter 11 is a complete bar to liquidation relief for six years. 1978 Act § 727(a)(8) (to
be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)).
m Id.

2" 1978 Act § 1328(e) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e)).
"'
11 U.S.C. § 33 (1976).
Id. § 1002.
2

The eligibility requirements for Chapter 11 are set forth in 1978 Act §§ 109(b),

109(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.

§§

109(b), 109(d)). The eligibility requirements for

Chapter 13 are discussed at notes 36-43 and accompanying text, supra.
"'

H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 119.

271 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1327 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr); Lake, ChapterXIII: An Alternative to Straight Bankruptcy for the Wage
Earner, 46 L.A. B. BULL. 380, 384 (1971).

2121978 Act § 1102(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)).
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estate.21 They also will have the right to participate in the formulation of the plan,2' request the appointment of a trustee or examiner," 5 and perform such other services in the interests of creditors and equity holders. 26 Moreover, these committees, as well
as any other party in interest, have the right to raise and appear
and be heard in regard to any issue in the case.27
A debtor who files in Chapter 11 runs the risk that a trustee
will be appointed"I and divest him of the right to operate his
business.271 In addition, a Chapter 11 trustee, or an examiner
appointed by the court in a case where a trustee has not been
appointed, n " will have broad investigative powers to inquire into
the financial affairs and condition of the debtor's business similar
28
to those granted to the Chapter 13 trustee. '
A Chapter 11 debtor must solicit approval from unsecured
creditors and equity holders in addition to secured creditors while
the Chapter 13 debtor need only seek approval from the latter
group. Solicitation of approval of the plan from holders of claims
or interests in Chapter 11 cannot take place prior to the holder
being furnished a disclosure statement containing "adequate information ' ' 2 2 about the debtor and his business.23
The debtor may find that confirmation is more difficult to
obtain in Chapter 11. Therein, each class of creditors and equity
holders impaired by the plan must consent to the plan2' or be
afforded certain protections against erosion of position. In addition, a class of creditors secured by an interest in property of the
estate may be given an election to be treated as fully collateralized to the extent of their allowed claim.8 5 This means such a
class of secured creditors can elect to be treated as fully secured
17 Id. § 1103(c)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)).
d.
Id.
271Id.
rn Id.
'

"I Id.
271Id.
2 Id.
281Id.

§ 1103(c)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3)).
§ 1103(c)(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(4)).
§ 1103(c)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5)).
§ 1109(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)).
§ 1104(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).
§ 1108 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1108).
§ 1104(b) (to be codified in11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)).
§§ 1104(b), 1106(a)(3)-(4), 1106(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(b),

1106(a)(3)-(4). 1106(b)).
2" Id. § 1125(a)(1) (to be codified in
20 Id. § 1125(b) (to be codified in 11
2mId. § 1129(a)(8) (to be codified in
mlId. § 1111(b) (to be codified in 11

11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)).
U.S.C. § 1125(b)).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)).
U.S.C. § 1111(b)).
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creditors for purposes of the protection afforded secured creditors
in a Chapter 11 "cash out."
The protection afforded a class of dissenting secured creditors in Chapter 11 corresponds to a provision in Chapter 13 protecting nonconsenting secured creditors.nl The former requires
that the plan may be confirmed over the opposition of a class of
secured creditors if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and
it is fair and equitable. Section 1129(b)(2) provides guidelines for
the fair and equitable standard which are closely allied to the
protections afforded objecting secured creditors in Chapter 13.57
Since unsecured creditors and equity holders are not permitted
to vote on the plan in Chapter 13, no protections need be incorporated into the plan for the benefit of objecting classes to insure

confirmation as is required in Chapter

s
11.2 8

Chapter 11 offers more opportunities for the debtor to find
himself controlled by third parties. While only the debtor may file
the plan in Chapter 13, under certain conditions any party in
interest may file a plan in Chapter 11.28 Chapter 13 offers greater
opportunities for the debtor to convert the case to liquidation2
and fewer reasons to allow a party in interest to request dismissal
29
of the case or conversion to liquidation.
While Chapter 11 discharges the debtor upon confirmation
of the plan,S 2 and, absent a hardship discharge, the Chapter 13
debtor will not earn a discharge until fulfilling his obligations
under the plan, the discharge in Chapter 11 is more limited. None
of the claims excepted from discharge by section 523 are discharged in Chapter 11 whereas they would be upon completion
2" Compare id. §§ 1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§
1129(b)(a), 1129(b)(2)(A)) with id. § 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
21 The third alternative, providing secured creditors with the indubitable equivalent
of their claims, is clearly satisfied by surrender of the collateral to the creditor or by
extending a lien on similar property. 124 CONG. REC. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
" 1978 Act §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C)).
It should be noted that the fair and equitable standard of section 1129(b)(2) of the 1978
Act applied only to dissenting classes. Hence, unlike the fair and equitable rule of Chapter
X and section 77 of the present law, senior accepting classes of unsecured creditors and
interest holders are permitted to surrender value to more junior classes as long as no
dissenting intervening class receives less than the full amount of its claims. 124 CONG. REC.
S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
"1 1978 Act § 1121(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)).
"0 Compare id. § 1112(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)) with id. § 1307(a)
(to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a)).
21 Compare id. § 1112(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)) with id. § 1307(c)
(to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)).
"I Id. § 1141(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)).
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of the Chapter 13 plan.2 3 Moreover, if the Chapter 11 plan essentially calls for a liquidation of the debtor's assets, a discharge will
be denied in Chapter 11 if it would be denied in liquidation under
section 727(a).nl
CONCLUSION

On October 1, 1979, the nation will be confronted with the
first comprehensive revision of bankruptcy law since the Chandler Act of 1938. The modernization of the American law of bankruptcy has come only after persistent effort by the major participants and compromise by all factions of the economy. The increasing use of Chapter XIII wage earner plans has prompted a
major effort aimed at reform by the draftsmen who sculptured the
new Chapter 13. They have widened the corridors of eligibility
and have contemporized its structural provisions.
This analysis has attempted to explore the changes that will
be taking place and to put them in perspective by examining the
reasons for the modifications. Armed with a better understanding
of the workings of Chapter 13, the attorney will be better able to
serve his client and promote the economic health of the community.
IId. § 1141(d)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)).
1d. § 1141(d)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)).

COMMENTS
WATER: STATEWIDE OR LOCAL CONCERN?

City of

Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Colorado, through its state constitution,' delegates to home
rule municipalities' powers of the broadest possible scope.' City
of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.' was before
the Colorado Supreme Court for a decision on the constitutionality of the then recently enacted Condemnation of Water Rights
Act 5 as applied to home rule cities and towns.' Justice Groves for
the majority held as unconstitutional provisions of the Condemnation of Water Rights Act concerning the determination of necessity to acquire water rights. The basis for this determination
was that the Act's procedures conflicted with the enumeration of
powers delegated by the state constitution to home rule municipalities.7 Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Carrigan in dissent,
COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1-9 (1902, § 6 amended 1912, §§ 2, 5 amended 1950, § 9
amended 1970).
, The Colorado Municipal League reports that there were 54 home rule cities and
towns in Colorado as of 1978. COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, DIRECTORY OF MUNICIPAL AND
COUNTY OFFICIALS IN COLOADO 41 (1978).
3 Toll v. City & County of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959); Fishel v. City
& County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (1940). See generally J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN (3d. ed. 1976); Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado
36 U. COLO. L. REv. 321 (1964).
575 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1978).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to -216 (Supp. 1976).
Although the parties requested a determination as to whether the Condemnation
of Water Rights Act was unconstitutional on its face, the court ruled only relative to home
rule cities. 575 P.2d at 387. See generally R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (1967);
Gross, Condemnation of Water Rights for Preferred Uses-A Replacement for Prior
Appropriation?, 3 WILLAMETrE L. J. 263 (1965); Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1954); Thomas, Appropriations of
Water for a PreferredPurpose, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 422 (1950); Trelease, Preferences to
the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1955); Note, A Survey of Colorado Water
Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226 (1970).
575 P.2d at 388. Article XX, section 6, of the constitution provides home rule cities
and towns with all powers available to the City and County of Denver by § 1. The
pertinent part of § 1 provides:
[home rule cities and towns] shall have the power, within or without
[their] territorial limits, to construct, condemn and purchase, purchase,
acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct and operate, water works, light
plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any other
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would have held the condemnation of water rights to be a matter
of statewide concern, and thus outside the jurisdictional sphere
of home rule cities and proper for state legislative control.'
II.

CITY OF THORNTON

v.

FARMERS RESERVOIR AND IRRIGATION CO.

Thornton is within the expanding northern metropolitan
area of Denver, Colorado. To meet the needs of its increasing
population, Thornton, through its utilities board,9 determined
the necessity of acquiring new supplies of water.' 0 In early 1973
Thornton made an offer to Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
(FRICO), a mutual ditch company," to purchase its Standley
Lake Division.'" The offer was not accepted' 3 and in November,
public utilities or works or ways local in use and extent, in whole or in part,
and everything required therefore, for the use of said [home rule city or
town] and the inhabitants thereof, and any such systems, plants or works
or ways, or any contracts in relation or connection with either, that may exist
and which said [home rule city or town] may desire to purchase in whole
or in part, the same or any part thereof may be purchased by said [home
rule city or townl which may enforce such purchase by proceeding at law as
in taking land for public use by right of eminent domain ....
COLO. CONST. art. XX § 1 (1902).
575 P.2d at 393.
THORNTON Crry, COLO., CHARTER, § 201(b) (1967) provides:
The City shall have all the power of self-government and home rule and all
power possible for a city to have, under the Constitution of the State of
Colorado. The City shall also have all powers that now or hereafter may be
granted to municipalities by the laws of the State of Colorado ....
Section 1607 of the Charter provides the city with the power to acquire "within or without
its corporate limits . . . water, water rights and water storage rights . . . and may take
the same upon paying just compensation to the owner as provided by law." The City
Utilities Board by § 507(d) has the following powers:
Subject to the limitations contained in this Charter, the Board shall have
and exercise all powers of the City of Thornton granted by the Constitution
and the laws of the State of Colorado and by this Charter including, but not
limited to the following powers; powers to . . .condemn . . . water and
sewer utilities . . . and everything necessary, pertaining, or incidental
thereto ....
" Brief for Appellant Thornton at 9.
A mutual ditch company in Colorado is a nonprofit corporation organized under
special statutes for ditch and reservoir companies. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 742-101 to -117
(1973). For a thorough analysis of mutual ditch companies, see Jacobucci v. District Ct.,
189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975).
11 Standley Lake is one of four similar divisions of FRICO. Brief for Appellee FRICO
at 1.
13Thornton made a presentation at the FRICO annual stockholders meeting. Thornton, voting its own shares, made a motion to accept the offer. The motion was tabled. This
meeting followed a series of letters and discussions with FRICO management. Brief for
Appellant Thornton at 13-15.
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1973, Thornton commenced condemnation proceedings in the
District Court of Jefferson County, Colorado."
The Standley Lake Division of FRICO diverts waters .from
streams in Boulder and Jefferson Counties for storage in the Standley Lake reservoir located in Jefferson County.'5 The water is
carried by canal through Thornton to irrigate 10,000 to 15,000
acres of farmland operated by the FRICO division stockholders"
in Adams and Weld Counties.
Soon after Thornton began proceedings against FRICO, the
FRICO Standley Lake Division stockholders sought intervention
as indispensable parties. The district court denied intervention in
January, 1975.11 Thereafter the stockholders brought an original
action in the Colorado Supreme Court demanding joinder. In
Jacobucci v. District Court,'8 a unanimous court opinion delivered in September, 1975, by Justice Erickson held that the more
than 270 Standley Lake Division shareholders were indispensable
parties to Thornton's proceedings against FRICO.'5 The court
held that the shareholders were to be joined in the action if the
district court could find that Thornton satisfied the requirement
of failure to agree on compensation to be paid for the rights
sought to be taken.20
" Thornton had originally filed in October, but withdrew and filed again after the
offer to FRICO was rejected at the stockholders meeting. Brief for Appellant at 15. The
Condemnation of Water Rights Act would require Thornton to file in the district court in
the district in which it is located-Adams County. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-6-202 (Supp.
1976). However, the court did not decide the issue. 575 P.2d at 392.
,5 Brief for Appellee FRICO at 2-6. "Towns and cities are everywhere empowered by
either statute or state constitution to condemn private water rights to secure water for
public or domestic uses." C. MARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF NATURAL
RESOURCES 144 (1951).
When no extraterritorial power of eminent domain is expressly granted to a
municipality . . . [alnd in view of the strong policy consideration for allowing a municipality to obtain a water supply for its inhabitants, it is not
surprising that, by the weight of authority, an extraterritorial power of eminent domain is implied either from the power to purchase property outside
the city, or from the power to condemn a water supply within the city.
R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 304.3 (1967).
" Brief for Appellee FRICO at 2-6.
' The court's theory for refusal to admit the shareholders was that FRICO is the
owner of record and acting as trustee for the shareholders. Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at
2-3.
" 541 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1975).
" Although recognizing authority for the trustee theory (supra note 17), the court held
that the rights of the stockholders were in the rights to receive the water and were so
particularized as to require joinder. 541 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1975).
0 The failure to agree provision appeared in an amendment to the original opinion
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Three months before the supreme court decision in Jacobucci
the Condemnation of Water Rights Act became effective. Evidently Thornton believed that because condemnation was already in progress the Act was not applicable to it retroactively.
The city simply divided the previous offer to FRICO by the number of shares in the Standley Lake Division and forwarded it to
the stockholders. 2 ' Only a few stockholders accepted the offer.
Subsequently the others were joined in the proceeding. After
joinder in March, 1976, various stockholders made motions for
summary judgment or dismissal based on Thornton's failure to
follow the provisions of the Condemnation of Water Rights Act
relative to the new parties. The trial court found Thornton would
have satisfied all the requirements necessary for joinder under the
law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Condemnation of
Water Rights Act.22 However, the new act was found to control 2 3
and Thornton's failure to follow its provisions required dismissal
as to the stockholders, thus also requiring a dismissal as to
FRICO.2' Thornton appealed, contending mainly that the new
procedures were unconstitutional as applied to Colorado's home
5
rule municipalities.
III.

CONDEMNATION STATUTES

Prior to the enactment of the Condemnation of Water Rights
Act, a city or town, whether home rule or statutory, 6 could have
proceeded fairly simply in a typical condemnation proceeding
against water rights for public use. In Colorado there are two
general condemnation statutes,' both of which establish procedural rules for the exercise of eminent domain.2 8 As to home rule
cities and towns, the differences are important only for efficiency,
in Jacobucci.Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at 2 and appendix A.
" The original offer was $9,300,000.00. The per share offer was $3,920.00. Brief for
Appellant at 17. Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at 5. This equal per share value fails to
account for the historical application of each individual shareholder. Baker v. City of
Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930); White v. Nuckolls, 49 Colo. 170, 112 P. 329 (1910).
2 575 P.2d at 386-87.
Id. at 387.
24 If the shareholders could not be joined, under Jacobucci the action as to FRICO
had to be dismissed. Id.
Id. at 386.
'e Exercise of Municipal Powers-Water and Water Systems, COLO. REV. STAT. § 3115-708 (1977). See aLso COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-35-102 (1977), 38-6-101, -122 (1973).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-101 to -120, 38-6-101 to -122 (1973).
2 See COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 14, 15 (1902).
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and a home rule municipality may proceed under whichever it
considers appropriate for its needs."
The general procedure of either of these two statutes is for
the condemnor to determine the necessity of the taking and attempt to agree with the owner on compensation." Formal negotiations with the owner need not take place and a simple offer by
mail has been held to be sufficient. 3 ' If there is a failure to agree
or accept the offer the condemnor may proceed in district court
32
to determine compensation.
In both statutes the determination of the necessity of acquiring the property is left to the condemnors and may not be reviewed by the court absent a showing of fraud or bad faith.u The
inseparability of condemnation and the determination of necessity is supported by overwhelming authority 35 and is usually based
on the obvious notion that necessity, or what is the public need,
is a legislative or political question central to the concept of condemnation. 6 However, it has been pointed out that a legislative
determination can only be scrutinized against a constitution and
in most states the constitution provides nothing upon which a
court may base any opposition to a statute or ordinance determining necessity. 7 Whenever the power to condemn is delegated
by the sovereign, necessity is for the delegee to decide, otherwise
there would be no power delegated.Y
The Condemnation of Water Rights Act attempted to re11City of Englewood v. Wesit, 184 Colo. 325, 520 P.2d 120 (1974); Toll v. City & Co.
of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959).
3o COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-102 (1973).
11Interstate Trust Bldg. Co. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 172 Colo. 427, 473
P.2d 978 (1970).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-102, -6-102 (1973). See CoLo. CONST. art. II, §§ 15, 19
(1902).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-102(1), -6-105 (1973).
31 Colorado State Bd. of Land Comm'rs. v. District Court, 163 Colo. 338, 430 P.2d
617 (1967); Wassenich v. City & Court of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919). "The
court has no power to inquire into the necessity of exercising the power of eminent domain
for the purpose proposed, nor into the necessity of making the proposed improvement, nor
into the necessity of taking the particular property described in the petitions." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-6-105 (1973). The only powers conferred upon the courts in the other condemnation statute is determination of compensation. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-1-102 (1973).
J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11 (3d ed. 1975).
Id. at § 4.11(1).
37Id.
Id. at § 4.11(3)(2). A few states require necessity to be reviewed judicially in special
circumstances; e.g.. Michigan, Montana, New York. Id. at § 4.11(4).
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move the right to determine necessity from a city wishing to
condemn and vest it in a special commission. 3 FRICO and amici
curiae argued that the changes were merely procedural and did
not affect Thornton's substantive rights to condemn.40
The Condemnation of Water Rights Act requires that:
(1) The condemning city must file a petition with the district
court outlining the improvements and requesting the appointment of a three member commission to make a determination as
to necessity and compensation for taking.4 ' The petition is restricted to consideration of needs not in excess of fifteen years.4 '
(2) The city must submit to the commission a community
43
growth plan and detailed statement of the project.
(3) The city must join all owners of property to be condemned or who would be damaged."
(4) There must be a hearing before the commission on the
petition and the city must serve a summons on all defendants
who must be allowed to appear and be heard."
(5) The commissioners are to report one of the following:
(a) There exists no need and necessity for condemnation
as proposed.
(b) There exists a need and necessity for condemnation
as proposed.
(c) There exists a need and necessity for condemnation,
6
but it is premature.4
(6) A hearing on the report is to be held before the district
court with all defendants again having to be served a summons
by the city and all defendants again being allowed to be heard.41
(7) The court will give a final report which includes a review
of the "determination of necessity.48
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-6-202 (Supp. 1976).

40Brief for Appellee FRICO at 22. Brief for Amicus Curiae Colorado Farm Bureau,
at 8-14.
!

COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-6-202(1)

Id.
'3 Id.
" Id.
,5 Id.
,6 Id.
41Id.
" Id.
42

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

§ 202(2).
§ 203.
§ 204.
§ 205.
§ 207.
§ 210.
§§ 210, 214.

(Supp. 1976).
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With the above provisions the Condemnation of Water
Rights Act neuters eminent domain by striking at its basis in
sovereignty and necessarily at the constitutional delegation of
eminent domain to home rule cities by the sovereign-the people
of Colorado. The Condemnation of Water Rights Act substitutes
a temporary commission for the responsibility of elected officials
to determine the needs of the people. Although the opinion of the
court does not refer to it, Thornton and amici curiae argued that
a state legislative delegation of authority to determine necessity
was a delegation of municipal business to a nonelected special
commission in violation of article V, section 35 and article XXI,
section 4 of the state constitution. 9 As mentioned above, what is
necessary is more a political question than anything else and
should be decided by political representatives.s
IV. HOME RULE CITIES
Traditionally the powers of home rule cities have been limited to those necessary to control matters of purely local or municipal concern."' When these concerns are the subject matter of
"' Brief for Appellant Thornton at 29. "The general assembly shall not delegate to
any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise
or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held
in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever." COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 35.
Every person having authority to exercise or exercising any public or
governmental duty, power or function, shall be an elective officer, or one
appointed, drawn or designated in accordance with law by an elective officer
or officers, or by some board, commission, person or persons legally appointed by an elective officer or officers, each of which said elective officers
shall be subject to the recall provision of this constitution ...
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or limiting the
present or future powers of cities and counties or cities having charters
adopted under the authority given by the constitution, except as in the last
three preceding paragraphs expressed.
COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 4 (1912). It has been suggested in a novel hypothesis that the
exercise of extraterritorial powers denies equal voting rights to affected nonresidents under
the authority of the voting rights issues in the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. 45 U. CHICAGO L. REv. 151 (1977).
10See note 36 supra.
11It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of
all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of selfgovernment in both local and municipal matters and the enumeration herein
of certain powers shall not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and
to the people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to the full
exercise of such right.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (1902, amended 1912). See generally DILLON, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 92 (5th ed. 1911); supra note 3.
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provisions of home rule city charters or ordinances, such provisions will usually supersede any state statute in conflict,,2 Although the concept of supersession is clear, the problem has been
to determine what is a local or municipal concern. 5 The Colorado
Supreme Court has yet to set down an adequate test as to what
is a local matter and admits the difficulty of dealing with the constant flux of the various factors to be considered. 5 However, the
court has made it clear that the mere appearance of a provision
in a home rule city charter or ordinance in conflict with a state
statute does not preclude inquiry into the question of which controls.55
The power of a Colorado home rule city or town to condemn
and purchase water works within or without its borders is enumerated in the state constitution 5 and reiterated in the Charter
of the City of Thornton.5 7 Neither Thornton nor amici curiae
argued, nor did the court decide, whether water is a statewide
concern. Both instead relied heavily on a supremacy argument,
i.e., specific enumerations in the constitution prevail over general
statements in the constitution and conflicting statutes or cases. 5
In the 1913 case of People ex rel. Tate v. Prevost5 the court was
12 Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdictions of
said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue
to apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
CoLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. See note 51 supra.
13 City & County of Denver v. Pike, 140 Colo. 17, 342 P.2d 688 (1959); City & County
of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958); People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202,
110 P.2d 256 (1941). Of particular interest is Denver v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co.,
67 Colo. 225, 184 P. 604 (1919), overruled by People v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co.,
125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952), the latter holding that utility rates were a statewide
concern.
" See cases cited supra note 53.
"Id.
" See note 7 supra.
5? See note 9 supra.
u 575 P.2d at 389.
All respondents assert that water rights or condemnation of water rights
are matters of statewide concern and that therefore the Colorado Legislature
has exclusive jurisdiction to enact laws covering those subjects. Whether or
not matters of statewide concern are involved, the Legislature has no power
to enact any law which denies a right granted by the Colorado Constitution.
Reply Brief for Appellant Thornton at 11. Thus, Thornton argued that the statewide/local
determination needs to be made only when the delegation of authority is not specific.
" 55 Colo. 199, 134 P. 129 (1913).
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asked to respond to a pattern of arguments similar to those in
Thornton v. FRICO. The claim in Prevost was that the Home
Rule Amendment enumeration of powers to control municipal
elections and to assess property taxes did not relate to matters of
local or municipal concern. Without making a value judgment on
the claim the court replied that these subjects,
are declared local and municipal matters, and they have been so
declared by the people themselves. If they were not so before the
amendment, they are so now, in the towns and cities of the state
having two thousand inhabitants, whose people elect to be governed
under their own charter. 0

Unfortunately, the supremacy argument does not reach the important question of whether water in Colorado is a statewide or
local concern.
V.

WATER:

STATEWIDE OR LOCAL CONCERN?

Whether water is a statewide or local concern is a complicated political paradox and as with other political questions is
probably not a subject for the courts but rather for the people of
Colorado to decide. The obvious solution to the delegation of the
power of eminent domain over water rights to home rule cities is
to invoke the political process for amending the constitution."
However, it is too simplistic to base changes in water administration on the mere statement that water is an overwhelming statewide concern. It is misleading to point to sections of the constitution, to legislative policy of statutes, or to cases which start off,
"The water of every natural stream . . . is hereby declared to be
the property of the public . . .,,11 or, "[in this dry and arid
region, a right to the use of water appropriated for beneficial
0 55 Colo. at 215, 134 P. at 134.
" City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958). Such an

amendment was proposed in the 1978 Colorado General Assembly. The pertinent section
of the proposed amendment which has been postponed indefinitely is as follows:
The taking of water rights by eminent domain pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be subject to such limitations,
procedures, requirements, and prohibitions, including limitations as to the
necessity for such taking, as may be prescribed by the general assembly.
Such limitations, procedures, requirements, and prohibitions shall be those
specified in part 2 of article 6 of title 38, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, as
amended, in the form existing on January 1, 1979, unless and until modified
thereafter by the general assembly.
H.R. Concurrent Resolution 1006, 51st Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., HOUSE J., Apr. 23,
1978.
2 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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purposes is of great value .... ,"13 It is misleading because these
sections, statutes, or cases after such pronouncements then proceed to discuss authority which has been delegated to local concerns. The consistent statewide legislative policy regarding water
appears to be to delegate to local bodies or agencies all significant
authority to deal with the problems. Certainly water is not a
statewide concern in the same sense as liquor licenses, commercial transactions, motor vehicle operation, or public utilities.6 4
Each water problem has unique geographical, environmental,
social, and political considerations which must be balanced.
Water is a statewide matter, but the state's way of dealing with
it is to make it a local matter.
The Condemnation of Water Rights Act is supposedly the
latest assertion of statewide water policy. In fact, nearly the opposite is true. Nowhere in the statute is it said that the appointed
commission must consider the impact of the proposed improvement on the state as a whole. Only the effects of the proposed
condemnation on the county and suitable river basin area need
be considered within the "detailed statement." 5 Only the condemnor and owner of property taken or damaged participate in
the inquiry by the commission." The "community growth plan"
as its title indicates, is a report on local matters. 7 At only one
point in the Condemnation of Water Rights Act procedure is it
mentioned that there may be participation by "any interested
party" other than those directly affected, and that participation
is after the initial hearing and recommendation by the commission."
Even with the scope of the inquiry limited as it is, it would
be tremendously expensive to draw up community growth plans
and detailed statements, particularly for small towns. Thornton,
for example, would have had to draw up an impact statement for
at least four counties6 ' and three drainage basins, including that
0 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426-27, 94 P. 339,
340 (1908).
" See cases cited note 53 supra.
" COLO. Rav. STAT. § 38-6-203 (Penn. Supp. 1976).
" Id. at § 206(1).
'7 Id. at § 203(1)(a).
' Id. at § 210.
n Adams, Boulder, Jefferson, and Weld Counties would be included, because the
FRICO system goes through all four. Brief for Appellee FRICO at 2-6.
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of the South Platte River.70 Recalling that the Condemnation of
Water Rights Act is presumably still effective relative to nonhome rule cities and towns, 7 a qualified town should be encouraged to become a home rule municipality prior to commencement
of any expansion of its water system, thereby avoiding the act's
expensive procedures. Such a result places the burden on the
smallest towns which do not qualify for home rule status.7" These
towns are the least able to afford the expense and have the least
significant quantitative impact on available water supplies. The
result is that the most localized communities bear the burdens of
a program implemented to deal with a statewide concern.
The qualifications of the commissioners appointed under the
Condemnation of Water Rights Act are also based on an overriding awareness that the matter is a local concern. One commissioner is from the condemning municipality, one is from the area
affected, and the third is a disinterested party,7 3 not a representative of statewide interests.
With these thoughts in mind, it is hard to accept an argument that the Condemnation of Water Rights Act is an implementation of statewide policy in the sense that it should supersede a constitutional delegation of authority to home rule
municipalities. The Condemnation of Water Rights Act is itself
a delegation to local authority. Nor does it seem a valid argument
that the shift of the determination of necessity to a special commission is to a body that would be more responsible than elected
officials. This seems particularly true in light of article V, section
35 of the state constitution, the ability of a party to get review
of necessity by showing bad faith on the part of the city,7" and the
whole concept of representative government.
Other examples of similar delegations in Colorado with respect to condemnation of water rights are in the statutes concern"0 Clear Creek and South Boulder Creek would also be included. Id. Peculiarly, the
basins included in the detailed statement do not need to be feeders of the irrigation
system. CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 38-6-203(1)(b)(H) (Supp. 1976).
575 P.2d at 387.
7' Essentially any town with a population of 2,000 may qualify for home rule status.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (1902, amended 1912).
7' COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-7-202(1). (Supp. 1976).
, See supra note 49.
7' See supra note 34.
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ing water districts,7" drainage districts,7 river basin authorities,78
sanitation districts,7 underground water management districts,80
rights of way for irrigation ditches, 81 county commissioners' powers to set water rates82 (also in the constitution) ,8 county court
jurisdiction over ditch damage, 4 and the power of statutory cities
and towns to condemn and purchase water works within or without their boundaries."
The provisions in the Colorado Constitution beyond the
home rule amendments can also be interpreted as constructing
the framework for delegation of authority to local concerns. Article XVI, section 5 has been held to establish the rule of priority
of appropriation as distinguished from the doctrine of riparian
rights. 6 By diversion to a beneficial use, which is a matter of local
law, 7 the right to use the water vests in the appropriator8 8 on a
first in time, first in right basis." It may be argued that riparian
rights are more local by nature than are rights by appropriation,
but riparian rights are necessarily local relative to the natural
stream bed, whereas appropriation is local relative to the location
of the individual appropriator and his beneficial use. The difference is geographical. That an individual with a senior right to
water by appropriation may take his share for beneficial use regardless of whether there is enough in a dry season for junior
appropriators is an odd manifestation of a pronounced statewide
" COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-4-101 to
77 Id. at §§ 37-20-101 to -33-101.

-547. (1973 and Supp. 1975).

" Id. at §§ 37-93-101 to -108.

n Id. at §§ 37-4-101 to -547.
0 Id. at §§ 37-90-101 to -141.
s COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (1902); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-104 (1973).
8' COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 37-85-103 (1973).

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (1902).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-89-102, -104 (1973).
a Id. at § 31-15-708.
, Colorado has a system of prior appropriation for beneficial use to detemine water
rights priority and subsequent distribution. The system, since its inception, has been
generally based upon the concept of first in time, first in right. Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). This general rule is subject to modification by the Colorado
Constitution which provides "those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the
preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. See note 6 supra.
17 Snyder v. Colorado Gold Dredging Co., 181 F.62 (8th Cir. 1910); Cascade Town Co.
v. Empire Water and Power Co., 181 F. 1011 (D. Colo. 1910).
0 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
" See note 86 supra.
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concern with water, particularly when there is no attempt to set
a hierarchy of beneficial uses0 other than that which appears in
article XVI, section 6, of the Colorado Constitution.
Article XVI, section 6, of the constitution very generally sets
priorities for water use in the order of domestic, agricultural, and
manufacturing." Since all significant amounts of water in Colorado have been appropriated, article XVI, section 6, has been
held effective only in establishing the right to condemnation of
water for domestic purposes. 2 Condemnation and the determination of necessity, as mentioned above, 3 are local political matters, hence, the application of article XVI, section 6, is also local.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Water in an arid region has substantial emotional appeal, 9
but Colorado cannot afford to allow this to obscure the history
and complex nature of water systems. Nor should it be ignored
that agriculture uses approximately 95% of the water available in
Colorado 5 and any impact on the state as a whole because of
municipal condemnation would be slight. The above arguments
serve the purpose of pointing out that it is by no means the case
that water is nor could be a purely statewide matter. Water problems are a mixture of state, local, and individual concerns.
Thornton has no more power to condemn water rights than
3

See Carlson, Report to Governor John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law

Problems, 50 DEN. L.J. 293 (1973).
" See note 86 supra.
2 Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1929); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908). See Carlson, supra note 90, at 310.
" See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
94 See, e.g., "The great twentieth century conflict between agriculture and urban life
.
... Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at 20.
95

COLORADO WATER USE
WATER WITHDRAWALS FROM SUPPLY
USE

PUBLIC SUPPLY
RURAL

1970 ACRE FEET

PERCENT OF TOTAL

459,000
45,000

2.7%
.3%

IRRIGATION

15,876,000

94.7%

INDUSTRY
TOTAL

393,000
16,773,000

2.3%
100.0%

213,074

1.3%

DENVER

From the United States Geological Survey, reprinted in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION IN
COLORADO, WATER LAW FOR THE NON-SPECIALIST PRACTITIONER 1 app. (1977).
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many special districts in Colorado." FRICO and its Standley
Lake Division shareholders on the other hand have no more claim
than any other owners facing loss of property by condemnation.
Any change in water rights condemnation for implementation of
a statewide plan, whether statutory or constitutional, will have
to be far more comprehensive and farsighted than the Condemnation of Water Rights Act's focus on cities and towns, particularly
in light of the lesson learned from the ruling in City of Thornton
v. FarmersReservoir and IrrigationCo. and the resultant burden
on Colorado's smallest towns.' 7 Any change in the delegation of
powers to home rule cities will have to be done by those responsible for the delegation-the people of Colorado.
Jeffrey Herm
" See notes 76-85 supra.
"

See note 72 and accompanying text supra.

THE INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH TEST FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
SUMMONS:

United States v. LaSalle National Bank
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Service is charged with the responsibility of inquiring into and ascertaining the tax liability of all
persons.' Pursuant to this pervasive inquisitorial duty, the Service has the power to demand that a taxpayer or third party produce any information deemed relevant or material to any tax
investigation .2
The purposes for which the summons power may be used are
ostensibly limited by the language of section 7602. 3 Nevertheless,
the parameters of that power have been the subject of incessant
litigation.' The Internal Revenue Service seems determined to
expand the scope of its summons power beyond the statutory
language. Taxpayers and third parties seem equally determined
to resist enforcement whenever and however possible.
In the judicial arena, the need for a swift and effective tax
collection system has prevailed. The Supreme Court has consisI.R.C. § 7601(a). Historically, this section was not used to interpret the scope of the
summons power under § 7602. The Supreme Court, however, has recently used the language of both sections to determine the extent of the summons authority. See United
States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 149 (1975). The result is a vastly expanded summons
power. Id. at 153-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Congress reacted to the specific holding in
Bisceglia by placing explicit limits on the use of the summons power when the name of
the taxpayer is unknown. See I.R.C. § 7609(f).
I.R.C. § 7602(2). The Service is authorized to issue a summons to:
the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or
employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named
in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to
such inquiry ....
3 I.R.C. § 7602 authorizes use of the summons for the following purposes:
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has
been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability . .. .
'See Kramon, FEDERAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS: SOME CURRENT
PROBLEMS, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 625, 641-42 (1970).
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tently whittled away the substantive defenses against enforcement of a summons until only the nebulous concept of improper
purpose retains viability as a basis for successful resistance. 5
Within this category, the criminal purpose defense has been the
most frequently invoked objection to enforcement of a summons.'
The essence of the criminal purpose defense is that an Internal Revenue Service summons may not be used solely to gather
evidence of criminal tax violations. The utility of the defense,
however, was severely restricted by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. LaSalle National Bank.SIn LaSalle, the Court
held that a summons must be issued in good faith prior to a
recommendation for prosecution from the Internal Revenue Service to the Justice Department.' Furthermore, the subjective intent of an Internal Revenue Service agent is not determinative of
sole criminal purpose; the proper test is institutional good faith.9
While purporting to preserve a good faith test for enforcibility, the Court effectively disposed of the issue by requiring the
party attacking the summons to prove that no valid civil tax
purpose existed." Thus, from a practical standpoint, the criminal
purpose defense will not bar enforcement of a summons unless the
Service has formally recommended criminal prosecution of the
taxpayer. This conclusion as to the current status of the criminal
purpose defense is derived from an analysis of (1) the evolution
of the defense, (2) the compromise holding of LaSalle, (3) the
soundness of the rationale, and (4) the institutional good faith
test.
I See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (taxpayer lacks any
fourth amendment interest in third-party summons; no reasonable expectation of privacy
in bank records); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402, 404, 414 (1976) (attorney must
produce workpapers of taxpayer's accountant; such production in compliance with summons is not barred by any fifth amendment privilege of the taxpayer or by any attorneyclient privilege); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (no fourth or fifth
amendment bar to production of taxpayer's records by accountant); cf. Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (absent custodial interrogation, taxpayer has no
right to Miranda warnings before interview by tax agents even where the possibility of
criminal prosecution exists).
6 For general discussions of the criminal purpose defense, see Van Wert, Tax Frauds
and the Government's Right of Access to Taypayer's Books and Records, 5 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 403 (1978); Stroud, The Criminal Prosecution Defense: A Defense to a Section 7602
Summons?, 4 AM. J. CRiM. LAW 152 (1975-76).
See text accompanying notes 24-38 infra.
98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978).
Id. at 2366.
10Id. at 2367-68 & n.19.
" Id. at 2367.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL PURPOSE DEFENSE
The criminal purpose theory originated in United States v.
O'Connor,2 a lower court case in which the taxpayer's accountant
successfully argued that a summons issued in aid of a criminal
prosecution should not be enforced. 3 At least one purpose of the
summons, issued by a special agent whose assigned investigation
of the taxpayer had been completed, was to secure specific information about the sources of the taxpayer's income for use by the
Justice Department in a criminal case then pending against the
taxpayer." The court held that under the circumstances enforcement of the summons would be contrary to public policy.' 5 The
rationale of the court was that the statute limited the purposes
for which the summons could be used, Congress had not granted
unlimited administrative agency power for pretrial discovery in
criminal cases, and such power historically was vested in the
grand jury."6
In Boren v. Tucker,' 7 the criminal purpose objection was subsequently raised as a defense against enforcement of a summons
issued by a special agent to a corporation in an investigation into
the individual tax liability of its officers. Although issuance by a
special agent implied that criminal charges were being considered,' 8 the lower court ordered enforcement and held the taxpayers in civil contempt for their refusal to comply." On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that the mere possibility of criminal prosecution did not invalidate the summons because the actual amount
'

118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass 1953).

,sAlthough O'Connor interpreted § 3614 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 438,
it has been consistently cited by the Court in § 7602 cases. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 533 (1971).
" 118 F. Supp. at 249-50. O'Connor did not bar use of the summons only if its sole
purpose was that of gathering information for a criminal prosecution; in fact, the court
explicitly acknowledged the civil nature of the investigation and then refused to enforce
the summons because one of the purposes was to aid a criminal prosecution. See, id. at
250; Van Wert, supra note 2, at 415-16.
118 F. Supp. at 250.
Id. at 250-51.
' Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1957).
" Determination and investigation of civil tax liability is normally the function of a
revenue agent, whereas a special agent is responsible "for the development of evidence
pertaining to the potential criminal features of the case and the ad valorem additions to
the tax .... " 5 INT. REv. MAN. - AD. (CCH) § 9324.2, at 28,080 (11-78). Thus, issuance
of a summons by a special agent is an indication that a criminal investigation is under
way.
,9239 F.2d at 768-69.
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of tax due varies with the presence or absence of fraud30 While
agreeing in theory with the O'Connorholding, the court nevertheless distinguished it on its facts.2
Within their respective factual contexts, O'Connor and
Boren are analytically sound decisions. 2 Read together, the cases
stand for the proposition that a summons issued in aid of a
pending criminal prosecution is improper, but the mere fact that
the summons may uncover evidence of value in a future criminal
case will not preclude its enforcement if it retains a valid civil tax
purpose .23
In Reisman v. Caplin,24 the Supreme Court stamped its imprimatur on the criminal purpose defense. After dismissing an
appeal for an injunction to bar an Internal Revenue summons on
the grounds that an adequate remedy was provided at law,2 5 the
Court stated that "in any of these procedures . . .the witness
may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This
would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the
material is sought for the improper purpose of obtainingevidence
for use in a criminal prosecution . ...2 By this unfortunate
choice of words, the Court implied that every use of the summons
power to investigate possible violations of criminal law was improper.
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court restated the improper purpose doctrine in United States v. Powell. 7 The issue
in the case was what criteria should be used to determine if a
" Id. at 772 (alternative holding). If no fraud is found, the amount of tax due would
be limited to the deficiencies between the amount paid and the amount payable, if any.
However, where the deficiencies in tax are the result of fraud, an additional 50% is
assessed as a penalty. I.R.C. § 6653(b).
21 239 F.2d at 772-73.
When the facts of O'Connor and Boren are measured against the holdings of all
subsequent Supreme Court decisions relating to the criminal purpose defense, including
LaSalle, the same results obtain. See text accompanying notes 24-39, 63-71 infra.
See Comment, Taxpayer Intervention at Summary Proceedings to Enforce an Internal Revenue Service Summons, 32 MD.L. REV. 143, 151 (1972).
375 U.S. 440 (1964) (unanimous decision).
Id. at 443. The adequate remedy is that in order to enforce a summons when
compliance is not forthcoming, the Internal Revenue Service must petition the District
Court to order compliance. The Court found this procedure to be sufficient protection for
the taxpayer. Id. at 445-46.
11 Id. at 449 (citing Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1956)) (emphasis
added).
379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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summons is enforceable. The Court rejected any probable cause
standard's even where assessment of ordinary tax deficiencies was
barred by the statute of limitations and the only basis for further
investigation was fraud.2 Using only a statutory analysis,30 the
Court held that the burden on the Service was four-fold: "[to]
show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not already within [its] possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have
been followed . . . ,,3 Once these threshold requirements are
met,312 the summons is enforceable unless the taxpayer or third
party offers substantial evidence that the summons was issued for
an improper purpose, which the Court defined as any use of the
summons for a purpose adversely "reflecting on the good faith of
the particular investigation."ss Furthermore, utilization of the
judiciary to enforce such a summons constitutes an abuse of the
3
Court's process. 4

" Id. at 51. The actual holding contains a caveat: "the Government need make no
showing of probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question that judicial enforcement. . . would be an abusive use of the court's process .... "
Id. (emphasis added). No subsequent cases were found in which such a standard was
imposed. One situation in which the Court has implied that probable cause and a search
warrant would be required in place of a summons is where the Service seeks to obtain an
individual taxpayer's personal business records directly from him. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976). The importance of the caveat to the criminal purpose
defense, however, is that if the taxpayer can make a substantial showing of improper
criminal purpose, then Powell implies that the Service should be required to meet the
probable cause standard before the summons could be enforced, whether directed to the
taxpayer personally or to a third party.
" 379 U.S. at 57. The summons may still serve a noncriminal purpose because no
statute of limitations applies to civil fraud. See I.R.C. § 6501(c).
m There were no constitutional issues raised in Powell. In light of subsequent Court
decisions, there appear to be no such issues which would act as a complete bar to enforcement of a third-party summons. See note 5 supra.
,1 379 U.S. at 57-58.
32 The burden placed on the Service is minimal: it is met by filing an affidavit with
the petition for enforcement alleging that each of the four requirements has been met. The
format may be virtually verbatim from the language of the Court, with the addition of
such facts as the name of the taxpayer or business under investigation. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 520 (1971); United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.,
572 F.2d 36, 37 (1978); cf. Miller, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INTELLIGENCEGATHERING: AN APPRAISAL OF THE INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rgv. 657, 680-81 (1965) (the
burden of proof of impropriety or absence of administrative requirements is on the taxpayer or third party, not the Service).
0 379 U.S. at 58. As specific examples of bad faith, the Court cited harassment or
pressure to settle a collateral dispute.
' Id. It may be noted that in a companion case, the Powell criteria were made appli-
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With the good faith element interjected into the concept of
improper purpose, the Supreme Court subsequently felt compelled to clarify the ambiguous Reisman dictum.' Using the organizational structure of the Internal Revenue Service as its reference point,36 the Donaldson Court concluded that a summons is37
sued by a special agent has a dual criminal and civil purpose.
To deny enforcement of such a summons would unnecessarily
hamper the legitimate investigatory power of the Service. The
Reisman dictum was restricted to pending criminal prosecutions
or investigations solely for criminal purposes.38 The Court then
formulated a two-prong test for enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons: it must be "issued in good faith and prior to a
'3
recommendation for criminal prosecution.

Absent any concrete guidelines from the Court, its attempt
at clarification led only to confusion and conflict in the lower
courts revolving around two issues: (1) at what stage of the Internal Revenue Service procedure the determinative recommendation occurs,' 0 and (2) whether the criminal purpose defense raises
a question of good faith."
Courts concerned with pinpointing the exact moment when
the prohibitive recommendation occurred generally disregarded
the good faith element in the Donaldson test. The underlying
premise of these cases was that the summons could not be chalcable to summonses issued directly to the taxpayer as well as third parties. See Ryan v.
United States, 379 U.S. 61, 62 (1964). But see note 28 supra.
" Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531-32 (1971). Having denied the right
of the taxpayer to intervene in an enforcement proceeding against his employer, the Court
had no need to consider his substantive defense.
" d. at 534-35. Of significance to the Court was the fact that the Service is organized
in such a manner that responsibilities for civil and criminal investigations are intertwined.
'" Id. at 535. But see United States v. Friedman, 388 F. Supp. 963, 969-70 (W.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976); Comment, Constraintson the Administrative
Summons Power of the Internal Revenue Service, 63 IOwA L. REV. 526 (1977).
" 400 U.S. at 533.
"' Id. at 536.
,0See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977)
(crucial recommendation is from the Service to the Justice Department); United States
v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1975) (determinative recommendation is within the
heirarchy of the Service; reversing district court holding that Donaldson meant a recommendation from the Justice Department to the Service); United States v. Billingsley, 469
F.2d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972) (referral by the Service to Justice is determinative;
reversing district court holding that recommendation by special agent to his superiors
precluded enforcement).
" Compare United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975) with United
States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1978).
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lenged on criminal purpose grounds unless prosecution was pending or had been recommended.' 2 Other courts, however, insisted
that the good faith element must be considered even if no recommendation for prosecution had been made.' 3
A comparison of United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co." with United States v. Wall Corp.'5 illustrates the extent of
disagreement in the lower courts. After reviewing the evolution of
the criminal purpose defense in Morgan Guaranty, the Second
Circuit Court strongly argued that Donaldson imposed an objective test for enforcement of a summons in aid of a criminal investigation: the only necessary inquiry being whether in fact a recommendation had been made for criminal prosecution.'0 In its
opinion, the good faith element was wholly inapplicable to the
issue of improper criminal purpose. 7 This interpretation is diametrically opposed to the analysis of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in the Wall Corp. case:
Our inquiry is not ended upon a determination that prosecution has
neither been instigated nor recommended, since Donaldson also requires that a summons be issued "in good faith." Thus, if it can be
shown that the investigating agent had already formed a firm purpose to recommend criminal prosecution even though he had not as
yet made a formal recommendation, issuance of the summons would
presumably be in bad faith. Similarly, if the civil liability were
already determined, the summons would appear to be solely for a
48
criminal purpose.

In spite of their obvious theoretical conflict, these two cases have
much in common: (1) both assumed that the good faith test
4
would require probing the mental processes of the special agent; 1
5
0
(2) neither offered any real protection to the taxpayer; and (3)
" See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1971).
a E.g., United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208,
1210 (10th Cir. 1972).
44 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978).
- 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" 572 F.2d at 41.
,1Id. Judge Friendly argued that the good faith test should apply only to such issues
as harrassment or pressure to settle collateral disputes which were used as illustrations of
bad faith by the Powell Court. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
" 475 F.2d at 895.
" Compare 572 F.2d at 41 with 475 F.2d at 895.
1 The lower court enforcement of the summons was upheld in both cases, as was
denial of the taxpayer's request for discovery. 572 F.2d at 42-43; 475 F.2d at 895.
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the Supreme Court rejected both extremes in the LaSalle case.
III. THE COMPROMISE OF LaSalle
An Internal Revenue Service special agent issued two summonses to the LaSalle National Bank for all documents and correspondence pertaining to certain trusts administered by the
bank on behalf of the taxpayer. 5' When the bank refused to comply, the Service petitioned the district court for enforcement. 2
In response, the bank invoked the criminal purpose defense as
grounds for denial of enforcement, arguing that it did not have
to establish that a particular summons could serve no civil purpose, but only that the special agent's investigation was " 'solely
for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.' "3
At the hearing, the special agent testified that he had specifically requested assignment to investigate the taxpayer on the
basis of information received from extraneous sources, but that
no other law enforcement agency had suggested the investigation.54 He further stated that his objective was to investigate possible criminal tax violations; that no revenue agent was jointly
assigned to the investigation; and that at the time of the enforcement petition, he had not concluded that criminal charges should
be filed nor made any such recommendation to his superiors.5 5 In

its petition for enforcement, however, the Service alleged that the
documents contained information necessary to establish the civil
tax liability of the taxpayer and that the Service did not already
possess such information. 6

Although acknowledging the inherent probability that a
criminal investigation has concurrent civil tax aspects, the district court nevertheless found that the special agent's sole interest was to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. 7 Applying
" 98 S. Ct. at 2359-60.
52 The Internal Revenue Service has no authority to enforce its own summons but
must rely on the courts to do so. See I.R.C. § 7402(b).
98 S. Ct. at 2360 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 77).
98 S. Ct. at 2359 (citation omitted).
" Id. at 2359-60 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 2360 (citation omitted). These allegations were necessary to meet the Powell
criteria for enforcement of a summons. See text accompanying note 30 supra. The allegations as to a civil purpose, however, were discounted by the district court. See 98 S. Ct.
at 2360-61 (by implication).
1198 S. Ct. at 2361.
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the improper purpose dictum from Reisman v. Caplin,5 and the
two-prong test of Donaldson v. United States,"9 the court held
that when an Internal Revenue Service investigation focuses upon
a criminal prosecution as its end goal, a summons issued in aid
of such investigation is not in good faith, even though no formal
recommendation for prosecution has been made. 0 The lower
court therefore refused to enforce the summonses.
On the grounds that the district court's finding of sole criminal purpose was one of fact which was not clearly erroneous and
that such finding was consistent with the legal test articulated in
Donaldson, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of enforcement.6 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on the grounds that the lower courts had not
applied the proper legal standard for determining whether an
2
investigation is conducted solely for criminal purposes.
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court specifically intended to resolve the conflicts over the meaning of the Donaldson
test as applied to the criminal purpose defense. 3 Its decision
leaves no doubt that the test is bifurcated and that both elements
apply when the issue of improper criminal purpose is raised. 4 The
determinative point in time contemplated by the test is when the
formal recommendation for criminal prosecution is made by the
Internal Revenue Service to the Justice Department. 5 Prior to
such recommendation, the test is one of institutionalgood faith.
Relying on isolated provisions of the present Internal Revenue Code, 7 the historical precursors of the summons power,6" and
375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
400 U.S. 517. 536 (1971). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,072, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 761239, 76-1240 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2357
(1978).
' 554 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1977).
,2 98 S. Ct. at 2368 n.21.
3 Id. at 2357, 2359, 2362.
" Id. at 2365-66, 2367 n.18, 2368 n.19.
65 Id. at 2365.
" Id. at 2367-68 & n.19.
ld. at 2363. The significant provisions provide for civil and criminal penalties for
I7
tax fraud. The civil penalty is considered to be a tax liability. See I.R.C. §§ 6653(b),
6659(a), 7206.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2364 & n.14. The Court noted that the 1939 Code explicitly authorized
use of the summons power to investigate fraud. It further noted that use of the summons
in conjunction with fraud investigations has been allowed since 1864.
"
'
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the organizational structure of the Service, 9 the Court reiterated
the dual purpose doctrine: the civil and criminal purposes of
section 7602 are inherently inseparable by Congressional design.70
Thus, reasoned the Court, it necessarily follows that any investigation into possible criminal tax violations has an underlying
civil purpose (the determination of the applicability of the 50%
civil tax penalty) unless and until the Internal Revenue Service
abandons or otherwise completely settles the tax penalty issue."
Even the fact that a criminal case is being prosecuted by the
Justice Department does not dispose of the civil aspects of the
investigation.7 2 Thus, prohibiting use of the summons after a recommendation to the Justice Department is not mandated by the
dual purpose analysis: it is a precautionary measure imposed by
the Court to preserve the traditional accusatory function of the
grand jury and to prevent circumvention of the limitations placed
on the government's discovery rights in a criminal proceeding.73
The dual purpose analysis, however, is the underlying premise of the Court's refusal to allow the summons to be used in aid
of a solely criminal investigation. The good faith test is met only
if it is determined that the summons was issued in honest pursuit
1,Id. at 2363 n.12. The Court's point in reviewing the organizational structure of the
Service was that special agents are not only responsible for criminal investigations but
also for civil fraud violations of the Code.
70 Id. at 2363.
u Id. at 2365.
72 Id.
11Id. Since their original articulation in O'Connor, these are the only reasons cited
for refusal to enforce a summons when a criminal prosecution is pending. See United
States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1978).
None of the cases include any analysis of the comparative scope of the Internal
Revenue Service summons power and the grand jury subpoena power or the Justice Department's expanded pretrial discovery rights in criminal cases. The premise, however,
is that constitutional safeguards exist in the latter contexts which do not apply to administrative agency summonses. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960) (dictum).
The Court has, however, analogized the scope of the IRS summons power to that of the
grand jury. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (dictum). Nevertheless, the
Court has consistently stated that administrative agency summons power may not be used
solely for criminal purposes. Conversely, the grand jury subpoena power may not be used
as a subterfuge to gather evidence solely for civil proceedings. Compare United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) (dictum) with United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677, 683-84 (1958).
For the scope of the government's pretrial discovery, see Moore, CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 865 (1968); Note, PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY
UNDER PROPOSEDRULE 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1972). For role of the grand jury
in tax cases, see Morvillo, Grand Juries and Their Use in Criminal Tax Controversies,
N.Y.U. 35TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX. 249 (1977).
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of a statutorily-authorized purpose.7" Section 7602 on its face limits use of the summons to determination and collection of civil
tax.7 5 While the interrelated civil and criminal tax enforcement
provisions of the Code imply that the summons may be used
when a dual purpose exists, there is no authority for such use if
the civil tax element disappears altogether. Absent an express,
affirmative grant of such authority, the Court would not permit
the summons to be used exclusively for criminal purposes."
While theoretically preserving the criminal purpose defense
prior to a recommendation for prosecution, the Court acknowledged that it would seldom have any practical applicability because a solely criminal investigation would be "an extraordinary
departure from the normally inseparable goals of examining
whether the basis exists for criminal charges and for the assessment of civil penalties."7 7 The Court rejected the argument that
such a departure may be established by probing the subjective
intent of the issuing agent.78 By referring to the standard procedures set forth in the Internal Revenue Service Manual for reviewing a special agent's recommendation, 7 the Court concluded
that the motives of the special agent do not substantially determine the ultimate outcome of the investigation. In the Court's
opinion, the established bureaucratic process provides the taxpayer with sufficient protection from the poor judgment of the
investigating agent. 0
The Court underscored its decision with two policy considerations: (1) the legitimate tax enforcement function of the Service
7,98 S. Ct. at 2367.
7' See note 3 supra.

7'98 S. Ct. at 2367 n.18.
Id. at 2366.
Id. at 2367. The Court specifically noted, however, that the subjective intent of the
agent may be important where other issues of bad faith are raised such as harrassment.
Id. at 2367 n.17. For extraordinary circumstances under which bad faith harassment may
be alleged, see United States v. Fensterwald, 553 F.2d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (taxpayer
previously served as counsel to senate committee investigating the IRS); United States
v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 822, 825 (9th Cir. 1975) (allegations of harassment
were not sufficient to allow immediate discovery but were enough to require a limited
hearing to determine if discovery should be allowed).
"' 98 S. Ct. at 2366-67. Even if a special agent recommends criminal prosecution, that
decision is not made final until it has been reviewed by supervisors on at least two different
levels within the Service. In addition, the possibility that the Service will pursue penalties
for civil fraud remains.
" Id. at 2367.
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should not be obstructed by the personal motivation of one lowerechelon employee; and (2) judicial inquiry into the mental processes of individual agents would result in unwarranted delay in
the enforcement procedures."
In lieu of a subjective test, LaSalle shifts the focus of inquiry
into improper criminal purpose at the pre-recommendation stage
to the institutional policies of the agency. Thus the issue is
whether the Service, as an institution, has abandoned these policies in the particular investigation. The burden is on the party
opposing the summons to show such an abandonment. In particular, the Court expressly imposed upon those parties the onerous
burden of proving a negative: that there is no valid civil tax
purpose to the summons. 2
Although the Court thus severely restricted the criminal purpose objection, it addressed a stern warning to the Service:
We shall not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to
the Justice Department when there is an institutional commitment
to make the referral and the Service merely would like to gather
additional evidence for the prosecution. Such a delay would be tantamount to the use of the summons authority after the recommendation ....

Similarly, the good-faith standard will not permit the

IRS to become an information gathering agency for other departments, including the Department of Justice, regardless of the status
of criminal cases.Y

In a brief but stinging opinion, four dissenting justices castigated the position of the majority." The dissent found no valid
statutory or constitutional reason for imposing the good faith
requirement on the use of an Internal Revenue Service summons
for criminal investigation purposes. Instead, the only standard
acceptable to the dissent was the objective test enunciated in
Donaldson. Thus the sole question should be whether the summons was issued prior to a recommendation for prosecution. If so,
the summons should be enforced without regard to any inquiry
into its civil or criminal purposes. From the dissent's perspective,
the institutional good faith test is untenable: its end result will
be infinite discovery attempts by the taxpayer and third parties
81Id.
2id.
SId. at 2367-68.
SId. at 2369-70.
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which will unduly interfere with the legitimate tax enforcement
duties of the Service.8 5

IV.

THE SOUNDNESS OF THE RATIONALE

The Court's use of the language of section 7602, the legislative history, and the internal organization of the Service to resolve the issue of improper criminal purpose is entirely consistent
with its approach to any issue of the scope of an administrative
agency's summons power: the point of departure is always the
statutorily-authorized purpose. 0 If a summons is issued within
the parameters of the statute, it will generally be enforced.
Although commentators have vociferously criticized the
Court's dual purpose analysis, 7 it may be argued that Congress
has at least acquiesced in this interpretation. In the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Congress specifically reacted to the Court's holding
in Donaldson that a taxpayer could not intervene in an enforcement proceeding as a matter of right 8 Notably absent from the
comprehensive provisions of the Act was any change in the language of section 7602 which would have evidenced any disagreement with the Court's determination that a summons could be
issued in aid of an investigation of criminal tax violations so long
as it retained a valid civil tax purpose. Furthermore, in the legislative history of the Act, there is no indication that Congress
disapproved of the prohibition against using the summons solely
Sd. at 2369. But see text accompanying notes 99-105 infra.

" In the leading Supreme Court case concerning the scope of administrative agency
summons power, the Court said: "It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command." Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (dictum). For a general discussion of the scope of
administrative agency subpoena powers, including the IRS, see 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, J.
GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 19.02-20.05 (1979). For an analysis of the IRS summons
power in the context of the leading administrative law cases, see Miller, supra note 32, at
668-78.
11See Van Wert, supra note 6, at 435-36; Kramon, supra note 4, at 635-36; Duke,
Prosecution For Attempts To Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural

Hybrid,76 YALE L.J. 1, 34-38, 42-44 (1966).
" See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 307-09, reprintedin [1976] 4 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3202-06; S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 368-70,
reprinted in 119761 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3797-99.
Congress added I.R.C. § 7609(b) which gives a taxpayer the right to intervene in a
summons enforcement proceeding and to stay compliance by a third party. These provisions apply only when a summons is issued to certain third parties: banks, savings and
loan associations, credit unions, credit card issuers, stock brokers, attorneys, and accountants. See I.R.C. § 7609(a). These changes in the Code, however, would not alter the result
in Donaldson where a summons is issued to an employer. See 400 U.S. 517, 518-19 (1971).
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for criminal purposes. In fact, the Committee reports explicitly
indicate that Congress did not intend to affect the substantive
defenses of the taxpayer against enforcement of the summons,
although the taxpayer-intervenor may now raise certain procedural defenses previously reserved to the third party.8 '
The Court's stated rationale for refusal to consider the special agent's subjective intent is not so easily supported. The
agent's investigation is more than a cursory examination of the
facts to determine the possibility of fraud. Its function is to develop sufficient evidence to determine whether criminal prosecution is warranted.' 0 Although multiple layers of review exist, the
purpose of that review is to determine the adequacy of the known
facts to support a legal theory of fraud." If at any stage of the
review process the facts are deemed insufficient, the criminal
investigation is not necessarily dropped. The case may instead be
2
returned to the agent for further investigation.'
It is difficult to perceive any protection for the taxpayer from
the overzealousness of a special agent in this procedure. If his
subjective intent may not be probed, any experienced agent with
a passing knowledge of the case law in this area will conduct a
" The taxpayer may now attach a third-party summons on the basis of ambiguity,
vagueness, and irrelevance. The taxpayer, however, is still precluded from raising defenses
which affect the third-party's interests only, such as improper service of process or undue
burden or expense. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 309, reprinted in [19761
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3205; S. REp. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. at 37071, reprintedin [19761 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3800.
When a summons is attacked on procedural grounds, the result is rarely complete
denial of enforcement. Instead, the courts tend to narrow the scope of the inquiry and/or
require the government to reimburse the respondent. Note, IRS SUBPOENA POWER TO
INVESTIGATE UNKNOWN TAXPAYERS, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 177, 179-85 (1975). See
Note, IRS ACCESS TO BANK RECORDS; PROPOSEDMODIFICATIONS INADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA POWER, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 270-71 (1976); Constraintson
the Administrative Summons Power of the InternalRevenue Service, 63 IowA L. REv. 526,
531-33 (1977). The latter remedy has apparently been superseded by a new provision in
the Internal Revenue Code providing for reimbursement of the reasonable costs incurred
in complying with a third-party summons. See I.R.C. § 7610(a).
,0 See, 5 INT. REV. MAN. - AD. (CCH) §§ 9311.1(1), .2(1), .2(3), at 28,075-76 (3-79);
Galen, Discovery and Privilege in Tax Cases; What to do When the Special Agent Arrives,
28 S. CAL. TAx INST. 833, 838-39 (1976).
" Bacon, How IRS views the practitioner'srole in its criminal enforcement program,
34 J.TAx. 198, 200 (1971); 13 AM. JUR. TRIALS 2 Defending Federal Tax Evasion Cases §§
12-13, 15 (1967).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 623-24 (3d Cir. 1975); Bacon, supra
note 91 at 200.
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meticulous investigation before he makes a recommendation for
prosecution . 3
The policy considerations cited by the Court to bolster its
argument are likewise subject to criticism. The viability of the
tax system may hinge upon swift and efficient enforcement which
will not tolerate obstructive or dilatory tactics by the taxpayer,
but it is not the taxpayer's motives which are at issue in this case.
Why should the taxpayer suffer an unnecessary invasion of his
privacy with the concomitant probability of damage to his business and personal reputations merely because the special agent's
investigation retains some trace of a valid civil tax purpose? The
more reasonable approach would have been to place the responsibility for frustration of the legitimate goals of the Service squarely
on its own shoulders when one of its employees acts imprudently.
The occasional inability of the Service to build a criminal or civil
fraud case against a taxpayer might have had the laudable effect
of containing hasty, ill-advised investigations before the taxpayer
sustained any irreversible damage.
While expediency was the articulated basis for the restriction
on judicial inquiry into the subjective intent of the special agent,
it may be noted that the courts have been consistently reluctant
to probe into the thought processes of administrative agency decisionmakers absent an absolute necessity to do so." The mental
processes privilege, originally formulated by the Supreme Court
in the context of judicial review of formal agency actions, has
been extended by the lower courts to informal decisions as well.
In particular, the privilege has been held to bar taxpayer access
to Internal Revenue Service documents which relate to the purely
deliberative processes of agency personnel 5 and to allow an agent
to refuse to answer questions concerning his mental impressions,
conclusions, and opinions. 6
93 Agents are well informed of the practical ramifications of the court decisions
on the
conduct of investigations. It is obviously in the best interest of the Service to update its
directives t6 the agents so that investigatory methods maximize the information-gathering
powers granted by the courts. See 5 INT. REV. MAN. - AD. §§ 261-267.51, at 28,801-06 (1278).
"' United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). But see Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1971) (limits the mental
processes privilege of Morgan if necessary to prevent abuse of the court's process).
" Weir Foundation v. United States, 508 F.2d 894, 895 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974). But see
Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 392 (D. Del. 1977) (mental processes privilege
does not apply to documents).
" ISI Corporation v. United States, 503 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1974).
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THE INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH TEST

The Supreme Court cited no authority for its conclusion that
the proper legal standard must be based upon the good faith of
the Service as an institution. Thus, the conceptual origins of the
institutional good faith test are unknown. The idea of institutional good faith, however, is a logical corollary of the theory of
institutional decisions articulated by Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis in his treatise on administrative law: "Decisions are and
must be anonymous, for they are in truth an institutional product. The superior officers never see the bulk of the cases, but the
cases reflect the views of those officers through their instruction
and supervision and advice and check, and sometimes through
their direct consideration."' 7
The institutional good faith test is arguably an objective
standard. As an analytical methodology for determining whether
a summons issued prior to a recomendation for prosecution is for
an improper criminal purpose, it is a relatively simple approach.
As a point of departure, it requires the courts to refer to the
established rules, regulations, and internal procedures of the
Service. The posture of the agency in a particular case must then
be measured against applicable institutional guidelines. If the
Service has substantially deviated from its standard procedures
or arbitrarily disregarded existing rules or regulations, the court
may conclude that the summons was issued in bad faith."
The simplicity of the approach is deceptive, however, because the Court left one major question unanswered: How is the
institutional posture of the Service to be determined? If the test
is intended to be objective, then the answer must be that the

position of the Service is ascertainable from its records: the special agent's notes and reports, correspondence in the taxpayer's
file, internal memoranda, and the like. This is precisely what may
have prompted the dissent to express concern that the majority's
approach would lead to "endless discovery proceedings.' '
, 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.07 (1st ed. 1958).

Cf. Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 867-78
(D.D.C. 1973) (taxpayer entitled to refund and injunctive relief compelling IRS to grant
an exemption from tax). Shultz is an excellent example of the analytical methodology
suggested by the institutional good faith test of LaSalle. The district court painstakingly
compared the manner in which the taxpayer's request for an exemption was handled by
the IRS at all levels with the applicable regulations, procedures, and rulings published
by the IRS.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2369.
"
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The lower courts, however, have severely restricted the discovery rights of the taxpayer in enforcement proceedings.' 0 While
some disagreement exists, the prevalent attitude is that an enforcement proceeding is summary in nature.1'0 Unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question that the summons has been
issued for an improper criminal purpose, the courts have generally denied any discovery. 02 Mere allegations of improper purpose
are not enough: the pleadings must be supported by sufficient
facts from which improper purpose may be inferred. 0 3 If the taxpayer cannot meet this threshold requirement, the summons is
enforced. To determine the sufficiency of the supporting facts,
some courts have determined that a limited evidentiary hearing
should be held prior to discovery by the taxpayer or third party.0 4
Even if the facts cast suspicion upon the motivation of the Service, where the court determines that discovery would serve no
useful purpose, the taxpayer has been denied access to the agency
files. o5
By requiring the taxpayer to disprove the existence of any
valid civil tax purpose, the Supreme Court effectively foreclosed
the possibility of discovery in the ordinary case. Unless the taxpayer already possesses firm facts to indicate that no civil tax
penalty could attach under any circumstances, he will be unable
to meet the threshold requirements. Thus, the only time he could
have access to the information he needs to establish institutional
bad faith would be when he doesn't need that information at all.
Assuming arguendo that the taxpayer gets by the discovery
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Salter,
432 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1970). Authority to limit discovery derives from FED. R. Civ.
P. 81(a)(3).
101E.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529 (1971); United States v.
Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. McCarthy, 514
F.2d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1975) (dictum). See generally Kramon, supra note 4, at 630-31.
'0 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42-43 & n.3 (2d
Cir. 1978); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972).
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970). But see Pierson v. United States,
428 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D. Del. 1977) (taxpayer may obtain discovery upon a showing of
relevance unless documents or information sought is subsequently determined to be privileged).
'" See, e.g., United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1970). But see United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d
165, 169 (5th Cir. 1971).
' United States v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Vt. 1970).
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barrier, the probability of the records revealing an abandonment
of the civil fraud penalty is virtually nil. Knowing that it must
preserve some trace of potential civil tax liability in order to use
the summons power for criminal investigation purposes, the Service has no incentive to abandon the possibility of collecting that
penalty. While the statute of limitations for assessment of ordinary tax deficiencies is three years, there is no limitation for
collection of taxes due in case of fraud, willful attempt to evade
taxes, or failure to file a return.'"0 In contrast, the limitation for
prosecution of criminal tax violations is six years. 07 Thus in any
case in which fraud is suspected, the standard procedure is to set
aside the civil aspects of the case until the criminal investigation
is completed.'"8 Even if the investigation fails to uncover sufficient evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, the possibility of
civil tax fraud remains because of the differences in the burden
of proof the government must meet.' °9 Under the circumstances
it is difficult to imagine any situation in which the Service would
entirely dispose of the civil tax issue before completion of the
special agent's investigation into potential criminal liability."0
VI.

CONCLUSION

For all practical purposes the LaSalle decision limits the
criminal purpose defense to post-recommendation cases. Except
in extraordinary situations, the court's inquiry need go no further
than determination of one fact: Has there been a formal recommendation of prosecution from the Internal Revenue Service to
the Justice Department? For the ordinary taxpayer facing a criminal tax investigation, the burden of disproving the existence of
any civil tax liability makes the institutional good faith test illusory.
JosI.R.C.

§§ 6501(a), 6501(c).

I"ld. § 6531.
See, e.g., 5 INT. REv. MAN. - AD. (CCH) § 9324.31, at 28,082-83 (11-78).
'" The government need only show civil fraud by clear and convincing proof whereas
criminal fraud must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Comment, Civil Tax
Penalties: Changes and Recommendations, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 465, 486 (1978).
110There may be two circumstances under which the civil tax issues might be deemed
completely settled: (1) the taxpayer and the IRS have entered into a closing agreement
allowing the IRS to collect a deficiency after the statute of limitations has expired in
return for dropping the fraud penalty; or (2) the taxpayer has protested assessment of an
alleged deficiency in court proceedings, the IRS raised a defense of fraud, and the taxpayer
won. See Nash, Effective Internal Revenue Service Appellate Division Practice, N.Y.U.
'

35TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX.

325, 342-43, 345 (1977).
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If the good faith element of the Donaldson test provides no
viable protection for the taxpayer, why did the majority insist
that it is applicable when the issue of sole criminal purpose is
raised? Beyond its concern with the possibility of delay at the
higher levels of review merely to build a stronger case against the
taxpayer, the Court unequivocally put the Service on notice that
it would not tolerate abuse of the legitimate summons power for
non-tax purposes. The Court thus implicitly recognized the inherent danger in allowing the Internal Revenue Service to use its
summons power to gather information for other agencies. With
financial overtones to virtually every private endeavor, the Service is in a unique position to act as a central data collection
agency for the rest of the government. With no good faith limit
on the summons power, it could be used to circumvent the statutory and constitutional limitations placed on other agencies by
Congress and the Court.
While the institutional good faith test severely restricts the
utility of the criminal purpose defense, the Court's tenacious refusal to dispense with this requirement may be viewed as a compromise between the legitimate criminal tax enforcement function of the Service and the dangers of an unlimited summons
power. By retaining the good faith element-albeit in an ambiguous, elusive form-the Court reserved the right to invoke the
doctrine as deemed necessary in the future to prevent gross
abuses of the summons power solely for the purpose of criminal
prosecution."'
Dorothy J. Cramer
lu 98 S. Ct. at 2368 n.20.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND JURY SIZE:

Ballew v.

State of Georgia*
INTRODUCTION

In 1973, Claude Ballew, manager of the Paris Art Adult Theatre in Atlanta, was brought to trial in the Criminal Court of
Fulton County after being charged in a two-count misdemeanor
accusation for distributing obscene materials. Ballew moved that
the court impanel a twelve-person jury after a jury of five persons
had been selected and sworn. The Georgia Constitution, however,
provided for misdemeanor cases in this criminal court' to be tried
before juries of five persons. Ballew contended that a jury of only
five was constitutionally inadequate to assess the contemporary
standards of the community, and that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments required a jury of at least six members in criminal
cases.' The motion was overruled, Ballew was convicted, and the
court imposed a sentence of one year and a $1000 fine on each
count. Ballew took an appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals and
there argued that the use of a five-member jury deprived him of
his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a trial by jury. His
contentions were rejected because a constitutional minimum
number of jurors had not been established by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari
and Ballew petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. There petitioner raised three issues, but since the Court
found that the five-member jury did not satisfy the jury trial
guarantee of the sixth amendment as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, it did not reach the other
issues.

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TRIAL BY JURY AS

IT EXISTS

TODAY

A.

Constitutional Guarantee for Jury Trial
The right to trial by jury for criminal offenses is provided for

* This article was completed before the unanimity requirement for six person juries
was established in Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
""'The proceedings [in the Criminal Court of Atlanta] after information or accusation, shall conform to the rules governing like proceedings in the Superior Courts, except
Ballew v. Georgia, 98 S. Ct. 1029,
that the jury in said court, shall consist of five'.
1032 n.5 (1978).
1 The Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that a jury of six members
did not violate the constitutional guarantee to trial by jury, but made no determination
as to a jury of lesser number. Id. at 91 n.28.
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in the Constitution.3 Over the years the United States Supreme
Court has struggled with questions concerning the meaning of
certain phrases such as "all crimes" and "all criminal prosecutions," the requirements of due process, the essential elements of
a jury trial, and the meaning of the term "jury." To further complicate matters, passage of the fourteenth amendment guaranteed that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States would not be abridged by the states and that due process
of law would be extended to state actions.' This has generated
such questions as: What are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States and which requirements of due process must the states provide?
B.

Judicial Interpretationof the Constitutional Guarantee

Before discussing the Court's opinion in Ballew v. Georgia,5
it would be helpful to review the cases which have shaped "trial
by jury" as it exists or is interpreted today.
1.

Serious or Non-Petty Crimes

In 1888, in Callan v. Wilson,' the Court held that except for
those petty offenses which according to the common law could be
proceeded against summarily, the guarantee of a jury trial in a
criminal prosecution conducted either in the name or under the
authority of the United States was secured to the defendant.
Eighty years later in Duncan v. Louisiana,7 the Court reaffirmed
the long-established view that there were certain petty offenses
which could be tried without a jury, citing several cases going
back to Callan.8 Thus, the words of the Constitution are not to
be taken literally; rather, the guarantee of a right to trial by jury
pertains only to "serious" or "non-petty" crimes. Duncan clarified one question only to raise another: What determines whether
or not a crime is to be classified as petty or serious?
"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ...
.
CONST. art. III. § 2, cl. 3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
' "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98 S. Ct. 1029 (1978).
£ 127 U.S. 540. 557 (1888).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 159 n.31.
U.S.
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In Baldwin v. New York, 9 the Court examined the criteria to
be used in determining whether or not a crime is in fact "petty."
Ideally, a court should use "objective criteria" whenever possible
in order to indicate the seriousness with which society regards the
offense.' 0 The criteria that have been set out by the Supreme
Court at various times are: the existing laws and practices in the
nation," the severity of the maximum authorized penalty," the
severity of the penalty actually imposed in the absence of an
authorized maximum,' 3 and the nature of the offense.' 4 In the
federal court system, a petty offense is defined as a misdemeanor,
for which penalties do not exceed imprisonment for a period of
six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both.' 5
2.

Essential Elements of Trial by Jury

Until Williams v. Florida,6 the essential elements of trial by
jury, at least for the federal system, were assumed to be: a jury
consisting of twelve members, neither more nor less; the presence
and supervision of a judge having the power to instruct the jury
as to the law and to advise them regarding the facts; and a unanimous verdict.' 7 Prior to Williams, all of the cases which considered the problem stated that the right to trial by jury meant a
jury as it existed at common law and included all the essentials
as they were recognized when the Constitution was adopted.'8
Until Williams (and arguably even to this day),' 9 the right of trial
by jury guaranteed by the Constitution was interpreted to mean
for all non-petty ofenses trial by a jury as it existed at common
law when the Constitution was adopted. But this conclusion ap399 U.S. 66 (1970).
Id. at 68.
391 U.S. at 161.
Ii Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
I Id. at 149.
14 District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976).
'D 399 U.S. 78 (1976).
" Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1930) (citing Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1899); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898); American
Pub. Co. v. Fisher. 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897)).
" E.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
" Justice Harlan. concurring in Williams, found that the necessary consequence of
the Court's decision was that 12-member juries were not "corntitutionally required in
federal criminal trials either." 399 U.S. at 118 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
".
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plies only to the federal judicial system; what about the right to
trial by jury as it applies to the state courts?
3.

Right to Trial by Jury in the State Courts

The right to trial by jury was not always extended to criminal
defendants in the state courts. 0 In Maxwell v. Dow,"' the Court
stated that the right to trial by jury in a state court for a state
offense was not included in the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States. In other words, the right to trial by
jury was not among the rights extended to defendants in state
courts by the fourteenth amendment. 2 The Court went so far as
to say that trial by jury had never been affirmed to be a require23
ment of due process of law.
It was not until 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana,2 4 that the
Court recognized the right to trial by jury as one extended to the
citizens of the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
finding by the Court which allowed this turnabout was that trial
by jury was a fundamental right essential to a scheme of "ordered
liberty. ' 25 A look at history convinced the Court that although the
Framers of the Constitution did not intend for the sixth amendment to bind the states to jury trial, the fourteenth amendment
2
was adopted specifically to put limitations on the states. 1
Duncan thus extended to criminal defendants in the state courts
the right to trial by jury for those crimes for which defendants
would be afforded a jury trial were they tried in a federal court.
After Duncan, a defendant accused of any serious crime was entitled to a jury trial whether in state or federal court.
4.

Essential Elements of Trial by Jury in the State Courts

Although Duncan established the right to jury trial in state
Trial by jury was not guaranteed in the state courts by the United States Constitution; however, the right was provided in many states by state constitutions.
21 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
2 Id. at 595.
22 Id. at 603.
2'4391 U.S. 145 (1968).
23 "Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right
of jury trial in all criminal cases [covered by the Sixth Amendment]." Id. at 149.
2' For a discussion of the fourteenth amendment and incorporation, see Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The JudicialInterpretation,2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949).
27391 U.S. at 149.
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criminal prosecutions, the Court specifically indicated that there

was no reason to assume that the decision would impose the
federal requirements of unanimity and twelve members on the
states.28 Since only those aspects and provisions of the Bill of
Rights considered to be essential or fundamental rights are incorporated by the fourteenth amendment,2 only those elements of a
jury trial considered to be fundamental would be imposed.
This process of "selective incorporation" pervaded the trio of
cases which set the stage for Ballew v. Georgia.3 In Williams v.
Florida,3 it was held that a twelve-member panel is not a neces-

3
32
sary ingredient of trial by jury, and in Johnson v. Louisiana 1

4 the Court held that unanimous verdicts
and Apodaca v. Oregon"
were not required in noncapital trials in state courts. The Court
in its holdings on the essentials of trial by jury has progressed
from the historical meaning 3 of the term to a functional interpretation of the jury's purpose. In Williams the Court maintained
that consideration must be given to the function that a particular
3
feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial.
The purpose of the jury trial as noted in Duncan and Williams is
to prevent oppression by the government.3 7 The right to be tried
by a jury of one's peers gives the accused a safeguard against the
"corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,

biased, or eccentric judge.

' 38

The essential feature of a jury ac-

cording to the Williams Court is its interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group
of laymen. 3' The number of jurors required is only that number
necessary to promote group deliberation, to insulate members
from outside influence and intimidation, and to provide a fair
chance of having a representative cross section of the community. 0
Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Morrison, supra note 26.
98 S. Ct. 1029 (1978).
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
3'Id. at 86.
406 U.S. 356 (1972).
34 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
1 For a discussion of the historical meaning of trial by jury, see Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 86-99 (1970).
"

Id. at 99-100.

= Id. at 100.
31 391 U.S. at 156.
11 399 U.S. at 100.
' Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

Applying its new-found functional criteria to the number of
jurors required, the Court in Williams intuitively determined that
there was little reason to think that the purpose and function of
the jury would "in any meaningful sense" be less likely to be
achieved with a jury of six than with a jury of twelve.4
In analyzing whether or not a unanimous verdict was required to satisfy the purpose of a jury, the Court in Apodaca and
Johnson found that a nonunanimous verdict did not impair the
function of the jury. The dissenting opinion contended that a
minority view on the jury could be ignored unless the minority
was substantial enough to preclude the majority from obtaining
the necessary number of votes,"2 a result which essentially defeats
the effective representation of a cross section of the community.
Further, if a sufficient majority was obtained on the first ballot
not only would deliberation not be promoted, but deliberation
need not take place at all. To these objections the majority merely
said that no presumption could be made about the jurors and that
there was no reason to think that they would not take seriously
their reponsibility for the liberty of the defendant. Although the
majority's view on juror behavior may be correct more often than
not, a knowledge of human nature would indicate that there will
be exceptions to these responsible juries.
II. EFFECTS OF JURY SIZE ON THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
In Williams v. Floridathe Court conjectured that there was
no discernible difference between the results obtained by the two
different sized juries based upon the few experiments that had
been conducted.'" However, the Court did not critically analyze
the "experiments" it relied upon. In Coigrove v. Battin," the
Court found "convincing empirical evidence" in four studies
which confirmed the conclusion in Williams.'4 But, again, the
studies relied upon did not really prove what the Court indicated
they did. As Richard Lempert suggests in his study of the Court's
failure to find any difference due to jury size, the majority in
those cases was looking for evidence which would support its
intuitive assumption that jury size had no relation to jury ver41Id.
2 406 U.S. at 388-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
,3 399 U.S. at 101 n.48.
" 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
4IId. at 159-60 n.15.

1979

STATISTICS-JURY SIZE

dicts." The studies that have been published regarding the
Court's finding of "convincing empirical evidence" and "no discernible difference" in these two cases indicate that an elementary knowledge of statistics and behavioral science should point
out to those analyzing the problem that jury size does have an
appreciable effect on at least some of the Court's stated jury
functions. Some of these studies have pointed out problems which
exist when conducting research in this area; therefore, care must
be taken when interpreting or relying on any conclusions drawn
from such research.4 7 But the research, once analyzed for validity,
should be used when available. Sophisticated analysis is not required to show that the Court has allowed the right to trial by jury
to be fundamentally altered by its holdings beginning with
Williams. The right to trial by jury as it exists today differs in
both form and function from that which existed at common law
at the time the Constitution was adopted.
The amazing point about the Court's holding in Ballew v.
48
Georgia is that it cites numerous "scholarly works" on jury size,
most of which deal with the significant differences between sixand twelve-member juries, yet the Court tries to use these studies
to conclude that the purpose and functioning of the jury in a
criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size below six members. 9 At the same time
the Court reaffirmed the holding in Williams, a case which much
of this scholarly work tends to criticize. The fact that these studies show a difference in six- and twelve-member juries would
seem to indicate that the Court's decision in Williams was erroneous, since the rationale relied upon was that the two juries
would not function differently. But instead, the Court takes the
information and tries to use it to show that a further reduction
in jury size to five impairs the functioning of the jury to a constitutional degree. Thus, what the Court is essentially doing in
Ballew is using studies and data comparing six- and twelve" Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 645, 649 n.9 (1975).
," See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 46 at 647-48; Zeisel, ...
And Then There Were
None: The Diminution of the FederalJury, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 714 (1971); Zeisel &
Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
281 (974).
4 98 S. Ct. at 1034-35 n.10.
' Id. at 1034-38.
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member juries and applying it to show that a five-member jury
is undesirable. This is analagous to performing a physics laboratory experiment with a twelve pound weight and a six pound
weight, then using the information gathered from their behavior
to determine the behavior of a five pound weight. It might be
possible to determine the direction of any change in performance
with relative certainty, but to be able to determine anything
about the magnitude of the change much more. information would
be required. Here the Court is doing essentially the same thing.
The Court has decided that a reduction in jury size from six to
five is of constitutional proportion based upon the evidence obtained by comparing twelve- and six-person juries. Certainly one
would have to agree with the direction of the difference, but the
Court really needed more information before determining that
the magnitude of the change was of constitutional significance.
In fact, the opinion gave no indication as to the magnitude of the
change other than it brought the issue to that part of the "slippery slope" which had become too steep." Admittedly there is a
relationship between the decrease in jury size from twelve to six
members and the decrease from six to five members, but without
information as to the magnitude of the change how could the
Court determine that it was of constitutional significance? To use
intuitive judgment when there is significant information available seems to be a naive approach to the problem.
If the essential elements of the jury function, as stated in
Williams," are analyzed with respect to the twelve- and sixmember juries, it can be seen that the Court did not apply its own
test properly; that in fact there is a discernible difference between these two juries. Further analysis can then be used to show
the change that could be expected by decreasing the jury size
from six to five.
A. Cross Section of the Community and Minority Representation Considerations
The most popularly analyzed aspect of jury size reduction
concerns minority representation on different sized juries. This
relates to the Court's requirement that the jury should be large
enough to provide for a fair representation of the community. The
1*Id. at 1038.
5, See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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degree to which minorities are included on juries determines in
part the degree to which community representation is being attained.
The likelihood that a particular jury of a specified size will
contain a given number of minority members can be obtained by
the use of the binomial distribution." The only additional information needed is the percent of the population from which the
jury will be drawn who exhibit the minority characteristic in
question. 3 Table I indicates the likelihood that any particular
jury will not contain any minority members for different sized
juries and different levels of minority representation in the community.
TABLE I
Percentage of individuals
sharing characteristic
in the population
10
20
30
40
50

Jury Size
Twelve
.282
.069
.014
.002
.000

Six
.531
.262
.118
.047
.016

Five
.590
.328
.168
.078
.031

The Court in Ballew shows the significant increase in the
likelihood that a minority would not be represented on a sixmember jury, but what it does not do is to show that the change
in the likelihood when going from a six-member to a five-member
jury is relatively insignificant. For the case where a minority
makes up 10% of the population, 28% of all twelve-member juries
would be expected not to have a minority member, whereas 53%
52 The binomial distribution assumes independent random sampling with replacement. Since the population from which jurors are selected is so large in comparison to the
number of jurors selected for a particular jury, the fact that the replacement assumption
does not hold is not significant. The binomial distribution is given by the formula
n!
p(x=k)=
(p)k(l-p)n-k where p is the probability of a member of the populak! (n-k)!
tion having a particular characteristic, 1-p is the probability of a member not having the
particular characteristic, n is the sample size (here the jury size), and k is the number of
individuals on a jury having the characteristic.
53The percentage of the population which contains a given characteristic may not be
the same as the percentage on the jury list which contains the characteristic. In addition
to the difference between the population and the jury lists, any selection procedure which
does not provide for a random selection of jurors from the list would cause the statistical
prediction given by the binomial distribution to be incorrect. Challenges for cause and
preemptory challenges also prohibit the jury from being a true random sample. Lempert,
supra note 46, at 664-66.
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of all six-member juries would not be expected to contain any
minority members. This seems to indicate a rather significant
difference between the two juries. However, with a five-member
jury the likelihood only increases to 59%, not a significant increase relative to the change from twelve- to six-member juries.
If the Court has held, and reaffirmed its conclusion, that there is
no discernible difference between twelve- and six-member juries,
can it now say that the difference between six- and five-member
juries is significant? This question is raised not to advocate a fivemember jury, but to point out the inconsistency in the Court's
logic. A move from six to five does not impair the functioning of
the jury as significantly as a move from twelve to six, which has
been held not to impair the functioning of the jury to a constitutional degree. The move from twelve to six increased the likelihood 88% of not having a minority member on the jury, whereas
the move from six to five would only increase this likelihood by
Reducing the Chance of Obtaining a Hung Jury
The likelihood of representation of minority members on a
jury can also be applied to analyzing the likelihood of obtaining
a hung jury in any particular case. A hung jury is favorable to the
defendant for several reasons and therefore any decrease in the
likelihood of a hung jury would be detrimental to the defen5 It is well recognized that in order for one in the minority
dant.1
to maintain his position it is generally necessary that he have at
least one other person supporting his position." Table II shows
the likelihood of obtaining juries with at least two members having the minority point of view.
B.

TABLE II
Percentage of individuals
sharing characteristic
in the population
10
20
30
40
50

54

Jury Size
Twelve
.341
.725
.915
.980
.997

Five
.081
.263
.472
.663
.813

Six
.114
.345
.580
.767
.891

The percentage change may be calculated using the formula

P,

-

Pi2

P1,

x 100, where

P,, is the probability of a 12-member jury having no minority members.
Although a hung jury is not equivalent to an acquittal, there is always the chance
that the prosecution will not pursue the case, that the defendant will be more capable
knowing the prosecution's case, or in civil cases that the plaintiff will not have the resources or inclination to pursue another trial.
" Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL. 371 (1963).
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The likelihood of obtaining at least two members with a minority viewpoint is not particularly favorable when the percentage of individuals in the population sharing that viewpoint is
low, regardless of jury size. The problem is even worse than it first
appears because if Kalven and Zeisel are correct, even two jurors
holding a minority viewpoint will not be sufficient to hang a
jury. 57 According to their study, in order to hang a jury there must
8
initially be a "massive minority" of four or five members. The
problem with this observation when trying to apply it to smaller
sized juries is whether the "massive minority" must be in absolute number or relative size. If the relative or proportional size of
the minority is what is important, a minority of two on a sixperson jury would be expected to result in a hung jury just as
often as a minority of four would result in a hung jury with a
twelve-member jury. Since the likelihood of obtaining two out of
six jurors with any minority viewpoint is higher than obtaining
four out of twelve59 it would be expected that six-person juries
0
would hang more often than twelve-person juries. However, the
available data indicates that the number of hung juries is about
one-half for six-person juries as compared to twelve-person juries.6 If the absolute size of the minority were any larger than two
in a six-member jury it would cease to be the minority. So it
would seem that the absolute size of the minority plays some role
in the inability of a jury to come to a unanimous verdict, and that
two cannot perform the same function as four. The fact remains,
however, that there is virtually no chance of a hung jury when
11H.

KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY

462 (1966).

Id.

As long as the minority viewpoint is held by less than 40% of the population. See
note 60 infra.
Percentage of individuals

in the population sharing
characteristic
Probability of obtaining
at least four out of
twelve jurors with the

10

20

30

40

50

.03

.21

.51

.77

.93

.11

.35

.58

.77

.89

characteristic
Probability of obtaining

at least two out of six
jurors with the characteristic

Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A. J. 367, 369 (1972).
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there is only one juror with the minority viewpoint present, and
the likelihood of obtaining at least two with this viewpoint is
decreased with the size of the jury.6 2 The decrease in this likelihood when decreasing jury size to five is, however, less than the
decrease obtained when decreasing from twelve to six. This again
illustrates the inconsistency of Williams and Ballew; in the former case the Court held what would appear to be a significant
decrease in the likelihood not to be of constitutional significance,
while the apparently small additional decrease in Ballew was
deemed constitutionally significant.
C.

The Effects of Jury Size on Verdict Consistency

Anyone familiar with statistics knows that variability of a
sample increases with a decrease in the sample size. Because of
this, the relative consistency of verdicts for different sized juries
can be measured using the common statistic of dispersion, the
standard deviation. 6Nagel and Neef, using data from The American Jury,64 determined that the average juror had a propensity
to convict of .677, meaning that the average juror would vote to
convict the average defendant approximately 68% of the time.,5
With randomly selected twelve-member juries, one-half of the
juries would have average propensities to convict ranging from
58% to 78%.6 With a reduction in jury size to six, half of the juries
would have average propensities to convict lying in the range 53%
to 83%, and with a further reduction to five members the range
would be 51% to 85%.'" Again, as has been shown before, the move
from twelve to six has caused a greater change than the move
from six to five. The ten percentage point increase in variability
See Table II, supra.
The statistic when dealing with the standard deviation of sample means is called
the standard error. Here the standard error is the variability of the juries' average propensity to convict. This average is obtained by a simple arithmetic average (mean) of the
individual jurors' propensities to convict on a given jury (the sample).
64 H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction Required to Convict. 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933, 952, 971.
6 Id. at 971-72.
a The standard deviation of the means of the samples (here the average propensity
to convict of a jury) is related to the standard deviation of the population by the formula
62

s = (-, where cy is the standard deviation of the population and n is the sample size (here
the jury size). o can be estimated from Kalven and Zeisel's data on 3,576 juries. By
changing the sample or jury size, n, the standard error for 12, 6, and 5-member juries can
be calculated, and from this the 50% interval is obtained from tables of the normal
distribution.
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caused by decreasing the jury from twelve to six members was
considered by Nagel and Neef to be significant in both real and
percentage terms. 8 The further reduction in size to five, however,
only adds four percentage points to the range. Whether or not this
is significant is not clear, but what is clear is that it is certainly
less significant than the increase allowed by decreasing jury size
from twelve to six.
Increased variability of juries not only affects the jury's average propensity to convict, but may also cause juries to reach
extreme solutions more often than a jury with less variability.
Since jury deliberation often acts as an averaging process, the
increased variability of that average for a smaller jury is likely to
cause smaller juries to more frequently reach extreme solutions.
In civil trials this would take the form of more extreme dollar
awards and in criminal trials it could affect compromises on of
what offense the defendant was convicted.
D. Likelihood of Conviction with Smaller Juries and NonUnanimous Verdicts
A jury comes to the conclusion it does because of the interaction or combination of three variables: the case itself, the individual jurors and the preconceptions and characteristics they bring
with them to the trial, and the deliberation process." It would be
incorrect to come to any conclusion as to the effects of jury size
based upon its impact on only one of these variables. However, if
it could be shown that the other variables would move in the same
direction or not be affected by a change in jury size, then a valid
conclusion could be reached as to the direction and relative magnitude of any effects. The case itself would not be expected to
change with a change in jury size,70 and a decrease in jury size
would be expected to have a detrimental effect on the deliberation process.7 Therefore, if decreasing jury size could be shown
to have a detrimental effect on the defendant due to the individual jurors and their preconceptions and characteristics, then it
could be concluded that the overall effect would be detrimental.
"

Nagel & Neef, supra note 65, at 971-72.

"

Id.

70 There has been some conjecture however, that the increased variability of jury
verdicts as well as the changed probability of conviction with smaller juries does affect
the type of cases defense as well as prosecuting attorneys will bring to jury trial.
11Thomas & Fink, supra note 56.
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In order to compute the likelihood of conviction for an average defendant in an average case with a given community average
propensity to convict, the binomial distribution can again be
used. Table III gives the likelihood of conviction for unanimous
as well as nonunanimous verdict rules. As can be seen, the likelihood of conviction increases as jury size decreases for unanimous
verdicts regardless of the community's propensity to convict. The
propensity to convict could be thought of as one of the preconceptions a juror brings with him to the trial. It is therefore a distinct
disadvantage for the average defendant to have the jury size decreased. Admittedly, individual preconceptions (including the
propensity to convict) will not be the sole determinants of a verdict, 2 but even if there were some mellowing of these characteristics by the deliberation process, this input would still affect the
end result in the direction indicated. And if the deliberation process is also detrimentally affected by the decrease in jury size,
then the effects will combine to decrease the defendant's rights
even further.
TABLE III
Average propensity to
convict within the
community
.9
.8
.7

Vote required for conviction/Jury size
12/12
.28
.07
.01

11/12
.66
.27
.09

10/12
.89
.56
.25

9/12
.97
.79
.49

6/6
.53
.26
.12

5/5
.59
.33
.17

The most interesting point to be derived from this table,
however, is the likelihood of conviction for nonunanimous verdicts. The Court in Apodaca and Johnson ruled that ten-out-oftwelve and nine-out-of-twelve majority verdicts do not violate the
constitutional right to jury trial, yet a least in this repect, the
nonunanimous verdicts are more unfavorable to the defendant
than even a five-member jury with a unanimous verdict requirement. Again, consistency seems to be lacking.
E.

The Balancing of Errors

Although the likelihood of convicting a guilty person is increased as the size of the jury is decreased, so is the likelihood of
However, Kalven and Zeisel suggest that "with very few exceptions the first ballot
decides the outcome of the verdict . . . . [I]f this is true,... the real decision is often
made before the deliberation begins." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 64, at 488.
72
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convicting an innocent person. In order to decrease the likelihood
of convicting an innocent defendant it would be necessary to
increase the jury size, thus increasing the likelihood that a guilty
defendant would go free. The goal is, therefore, to somehow balance these two conflicting types of error in order to reach an
optimal solution. 3 Traditionally these errors have not been considered to have equal weight. The commonly accepted view, and
the one accepted by the Court in Ballew, is that the error of
convicting an innocent defendant is ten times more significant
than the error of letting a guilty defendant go free.7" Given this
weighting and several other assumptions, Nagel and Neef concluded that the optimal jury size is between six and seven members.75 That is, the number of jurors is such that the weighted sum
of the two errors is minimized with that jury size. Changing the
weight attached to the errors, however, will have a significant
effect on the optimal jury size.76 It is interesting to note that a
weighting of thirteen to one is required to obtain an optimal jury
size of twelve.77 This relationship indicates one of three possibilities: the jury system has been operating under a misconception
for centuries, Nagel and Neef's assumptions are incorrect, or this
is only one consideration that must go into the selection of an
optimal jury size. It is probable that all these and other possible
explanations are involved.
F.

The Jury as a Reflection of Community Opinion
There is one additional sense in which the representativeness

7' An optimum solution differs from a maximum solution in that there is a constraint
or conflicting goal which must be considered.
1, 98 S. Ct. at 1036.
15 Nagel & Neef, supra note 65, at 946-48, 956, 975. The model developed by Nagel
and Neef conjectured that the probability of a 12-member jury convicting an innocent
defendant was .4 and the probability of convicting a guilty defendant was .7, and also
assumed that 950 out of 1000 defendants were guilty.
" Changing any of the parameters of the Nagel and Neef model will have an effect
on the optimal jury size determined. Thus, the Court's reliance on any conclusion as to
optimal jury size from this study is questionable at best. Nagel & Neef were not trying to
give an empirically determined optimal jury size, but rather they were trying to show that
a model could be built to shed some light on the question. The predictions of a model are
only as good as the assumptions upon which it is based.
71 By using Nagel and Neers information and changing the weights of the errors, the
following optimal jury sizes were determined:
Weight ratio
Optimal jury size

9:1

10:1

11:1

12:1

4

6

8

10

13:1
12
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of different sized juries can be compared. If it is assumed that the
ultimate verdict of a given jury will be in the same direction as
that jury's initial majority vote,' Table IV gives the probability

of conviction for given divisions of community opinion. As a determination of the correctness of a given verdict it could be
argued that the verdict that agrees with the opinion of the majority of the community is in some sense the "right" verdict. 7' From
the table it can be seen that in all cases where more than fifty
percent of the community is in favor of conviction the twelvemember jury is more likely to convict than the six-person jury,
but the six-person jury is equally likely to convict as the fiveperson jury. Where the majority of the community is in favor of
acquittal, the twelve-person jury is more likely to acquit, but
again, there is no difference between the five- and six-person juries.80
TABLE IV
Percent of community
that would vote for
conviction

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Probability that at least
three out of five would
eventually vote for conviction

.01

.06

.16

.32

.50

.68

.84

.94

.99

Probability that at least
four out of six would
eventually vote for conviction

.01

.06

.16

.32

.50

.68

.84

.94

.99

Probability that at least
seven out of twelve would
eventually vote for conviction

.00

.01

.08

.25

.50

.75

.92

.99

1.0

G.

Behavioral Considerations
The Court's summary of the behavioral considerations of
jury size in Ballew seems to be a fair assessment of considered
opinion.8 ' However, this view must be taken for what it is worth.
, According to Kalven and Zeisel only one in ten juries will arrive at an ultimate
verdict contrary to the majority in the initial vote. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note
64, at 488. See note 72 supra.
7 Lempert, supra note 46, at 682.
This is due to the fact that a six-member jury may have tie votes initially whereas
a five-member jury cannot. Assuming the tie is broken with an even chance for conviction
causes the probabilities to be identical.
" See Thomas & Fink, supra note 56; Lempert, supra note 46, at 684.
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The research which has been conducted on small group performance is far removed from the jury setting, and although there is
general agreement on these propositions, there are conflicting
studies in some instances. There are probably other factors involved in small group performance other than the number of
members in the group. Thus, seemingly conflicting results may
exist because the setting or circumstances of the experiments
differed, and these differences outweighed the effects of group
size. Whether or not the jury setting is one which would confirm
the results of small group experiments or contradict them is unknown. In the area of behavioral considerations, therefore, no
statement as to the magnitude of the effects can be made, and
even a conclusion as to the direction of any size effects is less than
certain.
CONCLUSION

Although the preceding analysis has been concerned primarily with the magnitude of differences between different sized juries, there is perhaps a more basic consideration which has to this
point been overlooked. Whether or not the magnitude of the differences between twelve- and six-member juries or between sixand five-member juries are significant may not be the relevant
question. The question may be whether any difference is too
much. The Constitution guarantees certain rights, and any diminishing of those rights, however small, would seem to be a violation of those rights. To say that something only violates the Constitution a little bit is not a relevant statement. Either the Consitution has been violated or it has not; large or small, violations
are still violations.
Thus, when the Court in Williams conjectured that the
differences between six-and twelve-member juries were
"nondiscernible" and "negligible" based on a functional analysis,
it was saying not that the violation of the constitutional right was
small, but rather that it was nonexistent. In Ballew, however, the
Court could no longer conjecture that jury size had no affect on
performance, and correctly determined that a five-member jury
would impair the jury's functioning. But in light of all the available evidence how could the Court reaffirm its holding in
Williams? The only plausible answer is that the Court, although
recognizing that reduction in jury size was detrimental to a defendant, found an interest of the state which justified the reduction.
The problem with this analysis, however, is that it would seem
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to be impossible to weigh the costs and the benefits of a reduction
in jury size. Comparing dollar savings with the defendant's rights
goes against our sense of justice. The gains are relatively small
and the costs are speculative.
A quantitative analysis in law, as in any social science, is
imprecise. People do not behave in a readily predictable manner
as do inanimate objects. But this does not excuse the failure to
use those quantitative techniques available when approaching a
problem. Although the results may not be precise or certain, they
can often give valuable insight to the problem if properly used.
Here the Court seems to have failed to use the available tools.
The relative change between six- and five-member juries seems
so small compared to that in going from twelve- to six-member
juries that it seems incredible that the Court found the former to
be of constitutional significance whereas the latter was not. The
Court should have overturned Williams or affirmed Ballew; to
do neither was inconsistent with the evidence.
If the Court is going to use quantitative methods, and it
should where they are appropriate, they should be used consistently and to their full capabilities. To quote H.G. Wells,
"Statistical thinking will one day be as necessary for efficient
citizenship as the ability to read and write." The day has arrived.
Dana Richard Katnik

Horstmann v. Horstmann: PRESENT

RIGHT TO

PRACTICE A PROFESSION AS MARITAL PROPERTY
The common law had its origins in a literal culture; the middle ages regarded the union of marriage as a fusion into a single
legal entity, the husband. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, adopted in various forms in most jurisdictions, I is one of the
vanguards in the gradual transmogrification of the "union" into
the "shared enterprise" or "implied partnership" concept of the
marital relationship in common law jurisdictions. Its outstanding feature is a characterization of dissolution as a "no fault"
equitable process in which both parties receive a just share of that
which was accumulated jointly during coverture. 3
The Iowa court in In re Marriage of Horstmann' recently
directed that equitable power to a traditionally inequitable phenomenon in the division of marital assets. This case presents the
familiar pattern of a wife who, willing to sacrifice for a more
secure financial future, works to send her husband through
school, only to be awarded a divorce decree shortly after he is
awarded his degree. 5 Normally the parties have not accumulated
much in the way of marital assets because the return on the
educational investment has not yet been realized, so the amount
of divisible marital property is limited. Nor are the wife's expenditures refunded, because the monies are deemed to have been
spent for "community purposes'" rather than on the enhancement of separate property,' although the education itself has
'Including IOWA CODE ANN. § 598. See Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act,
7 FAm. L.Q. 179 (1973); Foster and Freed, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 F m. L.Q. 275
(1973); State Divorce Laws, FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 401:001 (1978).
Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo.
L. Rav. 165 (1976); Murphy, The Implied Partnership:Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Methods of PostmaritalProperty Distribution,26 U. FLA. L. REv. 221, 226 (1974).
IOWA CODE ANN.

§§ 598.3, .21.

263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
* In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
The positions occupied by husband and wife are obviously reversible, but because
Horstmann follows the more typical role pattern of the wife as the supporting spouse the
case is discussed in the context of this model.
I Cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 30 Colo. App. 57, 489 P.2d 1062 (1971) (husband's
expenditures, which made it possible for wife to invest heavily in her separate property,
should be considered a contribution to the increase of the parties' joint assets).
I Cf. In re Abdale's Estate, 28 Cal. 2d 587, 170 P.2d 918 (1946) (advancement of
separate funds by wife to husband for investment in his separate property presumed a
loan).
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never been characterized as a marital asset.' Valuation of the
parties' assets normally occurs at the time of the decree, therefore
the husband leaves the marriage with a valuable asset in terms
of increased earning capacity attributable to the present right to
practice a profession,' while the wife is not even recompensed in
the amount of her initial investment.
In response to unjust enrichment of the husband, literally at
his former wife's expense, Horstmann seems to be the first case
in which the wife is guaranteed a right to share in the fruits of
the joint labor expended acquiring the education. The Iowa court
termed that right an interest in the husband's potential for increase in future earning capacity, made possible by completion
of law school and admission to the bar. 0 To the extent the Iowa
court views the joint acquisition of a license to practice law in the
nature of a franchise to be considered in a division of property,
the author agrees it is within the equitable powers of the court to
recognize that interest. However, the remedy fashioned by the
court does not accord with its definition of the wife's interest and
because the value of that interest is indeed speculative, subsequent decisions may well shape the nature of the interest to conform with the remedy."
I.

FACTS

Donna and Randall Horstmann were married in 1969 while
both were juniors in college. By 1976 Randall had completed a
successful law school career as editor in chief of the law review.
During law school his net income totalled about $9,200. Donna
never completed her college education. She worked as a bank
teller during her husband's law school career, netting approximately $15,800, which she contributed to the family's living expenses (including some of Randall's school costs). In addition to
Donna's salary the couple received parental support. Randall's
In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978).
For a discussion on the association between educational attainment and income see
Does Increased Education Produce IncreasedIncome?, N.E.A. RESEARCH BULL. 102 (Dec.
1968) (with tables) (concluding that percentage increases in income vary directly with
educational attainment). See for details, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
ANNUAL MEAN INCOME, LIFETIME INCOME, AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MEN IN THE

1956 To 1966 Series P-60, no. 56 (1968), cited in
Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. WEST. L.
REv. 590 (1974).
263 N.W.2d at 891.
See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra for more detail.
UNITED STATES FOR SELECTED YEARS,
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parents permitted free use of a mobile home for four years and
loaned their son $5,700, which he used for school expenses.
Donna's parents gave her gifts of money totalling $10,500 which
she contributed to family living expenses.
At the time of the divorce in 1976, the court assessed each
party's present and prospective financial status. Randall had
been admitted to the bar and was clerking for a federal district
court judge at a salary of $900 per month. He testified that by the
following year he hoped to be employed at the U.S. Department
of Justice, starting at $12,000 a year, with expected increases up
to $26,000 at the rate of $1,000 a year, not an unreasonable prediction given his outstanding school credentials. Randall estimated
his monthly living expenses at $524. Donna's take-home pay was
$405 per month and she testified that $600 per month was the
maximum wage she could receive in her present job. She estimated her monthly living expenses to be $704 (including caring
for the couple's only child).

II.

THE COURT'S EQUITABLE POWER IN THE DISSOLUTION PROCESS

As the facts indicate, the object of the Horstmanns' joint
efforts throughout the marriage was the attainment of the husband's law degree, pursued to the exclusion of other possible activities and investments. The husband's license to practice law
represents the only substantial asset accumulated during the
marriage, and by way of recognition of Donna's role as the supporting spouse, the court awarded her a cash sum of $18,000.12 A
recognition of that interest is well within the court's equitable
power in the matter of divorce 3 and the manner of its exercise in
Horstmann has three particularly significant aspects.
One is that the Iowa appellate court has de novo review of
all matters raised at the trial level. 4 The ability of the appellate
court to emphasize the peculiarities of the individual case at bar
is significant in its implication that each marital relationship is
unique. Thus, the best assessment of the parties' circumstances
12Although the court's calculations are sketchy, Donna's award seems to total her
monetary contributions offset by Randall's earnings during his law school career: ($15,800
+$10,500) - $9,200 = $17,100. See text accompanying notes 66 and 70 infra.
*3 IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.3.
* In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 265 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Iowa 1978); In re Marriage of
Murray, 213 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Iowa 1973). IOWA R. Cirv. P. § 344(f)(7) (current version at
IOWA R. App. P. Rule 4).
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becomes the vital consideration in fashioning a decree." The facts
of this case were clearly paramount in equitably assessing the
parties' divisible assets.
Second, property is a protean concept, taking form by contextual definition. 6 In its broadest sense, property means "a
thing owned" and is applicable to whatever is the subject of legal
ownership. It includes things physical and intangible, entitlements and expectations. 7 "In short it embraces anything and
everything which may belong to a man and in the ownership of
which he has a right to be protected by law."' 8 That the wife's
interest in the instant fact pattern may be an intangible expectation during coverture does no violence to its conceptualization as
property and should not foreclose its being deemed a guarantee
in the nature of a property interest.
Finally, one of the underlying fundamentals of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act is an attempt to provide for each
party's financial needs by way of an equitable property settlement. Although maintenance is available as a supplement, the
Act reflects the hope that the "more flexible property division
powers of the court will end reliance on maintenance awards as
the primary means of support."" Once the property is distributed, the court may determine whether either party's financial
situation merits an alimony award. 2' The court in Horstmann
framed its decree in accordance with these principles, and managed to settle the parties' financial affairs without resorting to
22
alimony.
"1 Bowman v. Bowman, 146 N.W.2d 333, 334 (Iowa 1966) (citing Arnold v. Arnold,
257 Iowa 429, 133 N.W.2d 53, 60 (1965)).
" Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975).
* See, e.g., In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App. 1975) (husband's
interest in profit-sharing plan included in parties' divisible assets); In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (pension rights considered
community asset regardless of vesting to extent such rights derive from employment
during marriage).
IA Ludlow-Saylor v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 342, 205 S.W. 196, 198 (1918), quoted
in Las Animas County High School Dist. v. Raye, 144 Colo. 367, 371, 356 P.2d 237, 239
(1960).
" See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra for more detailed discussion.
MODEL UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACr at 2 (1974) (comment, Editors of FAM.

LAW REP.).
21 In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 892 (Iowa 1978); In re Marriage of
Zoellner, 219 N.W.2d 517, 524 (Iowa 1974).
2 One dollar per year alimony was awarded to preserve the issue for appeal as well
as later modification should there be a sufficient change of circumstances. 263 N.W.2d at
888.
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III.

ALIMONY: AN INADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE

Colorado and Michigan courts have dealt with the problem
of the husband's unjust enrichment when the supporting spouse
is denied a claim in the asset she helped create; unlike the Iowa
court, both declined to raise that claim to the status of a property
interest and instead provided a remedy in the form of alimony.
Since the trial court in In re Marriageof Graham23 had recognized
an interest in the wife, the case was reversed and remanded with
instructions that Ms. Graham's contributions were to be considered relevant in the award of maintenance. The Michigan court
in Moss v. Moss 24 found it "impossible" to award the wife "a

portion of the husband's medical degree" and affirmed an award
of $15,000 alimony "in lieu of a property settlement.

'25

Since the wives in Horstmann and Moss left their respective
marriages in similar financial shape, 6 it would appear that maintenance is an adequate method of confronting the situation without the necessity of a redefinition of property interests. Alimony
is an attractive idea, because as the husband's ability to pay
increases the wife may seek to have the order modified (if she
carries the burden of proving a sufficient change in circumstance).27 Moreover, such an award does not disturb the pervasive
" 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978). Here the husband acquired his M.B.A. while his wife
worked as a stewardess (providing approximately 70% of the total family income) and
handled the majority of the couple's household and apartment managerial duties. At the
time of the divorce the husband had been employed for eight months with Hamilton
Management Corp. at $14,000 per year. No marital assets were accumulated during coverture. The case seems to modify Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973), in
which the wife was awarded a $7,200 lump sum payment in recognition of her contributions to the husband's medical education. See note 31 infra.
",264 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. App. 1978). Ms. Moss worked as a guidance counselor while
her husband attended medical school. At the time of the decree he was completing his
residency, so her income still exceeded his. Ms. Moss claimed her contribution to her
husband's medical degree totalled $60,000. No marital assets were accumulated during
coverture.
2 Id. at 98.
" See text accompanying notes 12 and 25 supra.
17Parmly v. Parmly, 125 N.J. Eq. 545, 5 A.2d 789 (1939). That alimony is always
modifiable is an oversimplification. Periodic alimony is generally modifiable while alimony in gross, characteristically a lump sum payment, is. not. Moreover, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21, which permits modification when "expedient," has been interpreted as requiring
a material (basically permanent) change in circumstances, Holland v. Holland, 149
N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1967), not within the contemplation of the court at the time of the
original decree. Maikos v. Maikos, 147 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1967), meaning the burden is
on the applicant, IOWA R. Civ. P. § 344(f)(5), to show the change in circumstances renders
the former decree unconscionable, Pucci v. Pucci, 143 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1966). See, e.g.,
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rule that the court should not speculate as to a party's future
earnings when adjusting finances upon dissolution.2 8
However, the conceptual differences between alimony and
property division make the former the less satisfactory alternative: in the first instance because the wife's right to a property
division is independent of her rights to alimony;2 in the second
because alimony itself is devoid of the qualities of a property right
and never mandatory.10 While the amount to which she is entitled
may be disputed when the wife is said to have a right in the
nature of a property interest, she is, nevertheless, specifically
guaranteed some measure of return in recognition of the significance of her contributions to the acquisition of the parties' marital assets." Though the court is not bound to a precise fifty-fifty
split, an equitable division is based on the principle that each
spouse is entitled to a just share of the property accumulated as
a result of their joint efforts.2
In re Marriage of Haben, 260 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1977). The expense, time, and uncertainty
of litigation may also deter the wife from attempting to assert her interest by seeking
modification. Finally, the wife confronts the fact that although an appellate court has de
novo review of the facts of the case, there is a general reluctance to disturb a decree
without a showing of an abuse of discretion. Kjar v. Kjar, 154 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1967).
U See, e.g., Donelly v. Donelly, 167 Colo. 229, 449 P.2d 350 (1968); Menor v. Menor,
154 Colo. 475, 391 P.2d 473 (1964). Iowa has been somewhat more generous in allowing
consideration of a party's future prospects in awarding alimony. See Lehmkuhl v. Lehmkuhl, 145 N.W.2d 456 (Iowa 1966).
Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363 (1946); Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa
347, 144 N.W.2d 140 (1966).
3 Kjar v. Kjar, 1,54 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1967); Parmly v. Parmly, 125 N.J. Eq. 545,
547, 5 A.2d 789, 791 (1939) (quoting Sobel v. Sobel, 99 N.J. Eq. 376, 132 A. 603 (1926));
Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 A. 694 (1902).
" Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 199, 510 P.2d 905, 907 (1973). Although Greer
clearly remains authority for its practical differentiation between alimony and property
division, Graham may have rendered its classification of the wife's share as a species of
marital property valueless as precedent. See note 23 supra.
'2 Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa 347, 352, 144 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1966). Colorado, a
common law jurisdiction, defined the marital accumulations as community and characterized the wife's share as an interest similar in conception to community property, i.e.
regarded as held by a species of common ownership. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp.
1102, 1110-11 (D. Colo. 1974). As a result, property division accompanying divorce is a
non-taxable transfer. See Note, Federal Taxation of Divorce PropertySettlements and the
Amiable Fictions of State Law, 52 DEN. L.J. 799 (1975) for an excellent analysis of ]mel.
Oddly enough, the opposite conclusion was reached in Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d
757 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971), at least insofar as it involved a
transfer of stock, although the decision in Horstmann demonstrates that the time of
vesting of the wife's interest is not controlling when the court orders an equitable division
of property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carruthers, 577 P.2d 773 (Colo. App. 1977) (crops
unsevered at the time of separation are included among the parties' divisible marital
assets). See also text accompanying notes 55-59 infra.
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On the other hand, the very essence of alimony is judicial
discretion founded on the husband's duty at law to support his
former wife, based on her need and his ability to pay,3 and three
significant factors will reduce the amount to which the court finds
her entitled.3 4 That she was the family's principal breadwinner
during coverture will concurrently reduce her need and the husband's ability to pay, although as a result of his education, the
husband's actual earnings will outstrip the wife's in the following
years.3 5 Further, duration of the marriage is of some consequence, 36 and a generous alimony award following a short-lived
marriage is disfavored. Moreover, the import of the wife's commitment and its far-reaching impact on her spouse's earning
power has very little to do with the brevity of the marital relationship, and to the extent the wife's contributions are counterbalanced by diminished obligations of the supported spouse, the
husband is unjustly enriched. Finally, the husband is also obligated, to the greatest extent possible, to maintain his wife in the
standard of living to which she was accustomed during coverture.
Here the parties' marriage did not survive the preparation stage,
though both anticipated a change in living standard to accompany the completion of the husband's education. In an unfortunate twist the wife's practice of deferred gratification renders her
investment virtually worthless.
From the standpoint of a combined impact of these considerations on the award of alimony, the wife's chances of reimbursement are narrowed markedly. Even when her contributions are
relevant in the determination of the maintenance award as in
Graham, final realization by monetary compensation is purely
discretionary, uncertain even in existence, and, more obviously,
in amount. What distinguished Graham and Moss from
" Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa 347, 352, 144 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1966); Schantz v.
Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968); Flanders v. Flanders, 241 Iowa 159, 40 N.W.2d
468, 469 (1950) (quoting Brannen v. Brannen, 237 Iowa 188, 193, 21 N.W.2d 459, 466
(1946)).
" Cf. Stuckey v. Stuckey, 231 Cal. App. 2d 382, 41 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1964) (wife's salary
as teacher vital in determining whether court abused discretion by awarding too much
alimony).
" Donna never completed college after she married. Ironically, by foregoing her own
educational opportunities to invest in her husband's, she reduced her own potential earning power. Remmers v. Remmers, 264 N.W.2d 857 (Neb. 1978), takes into account the
interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities when making a property
division.
" Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968).
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Horstmannis that in Iowa some remuneration is obligatory, while
in Colorado and Michigan it is discretionary. "Alimony. . .lies
within the discretion of the trial court; the spouse should not be
dependent on the discretion of the court. . . to provide her with
the equivalent of what should be hers as a matter of absolute
right. ' 37 The nature of the wife's sacrifice merits the kind of guarantee that seems to exist in Iowa since Horstmann was decided.

IV.

JUSTIFICATION OF HORSTMANN'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE

PRESENT RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION AS MARITAL PROPERTY

Identified as a property interest in the context of the marital
community, education (more specifically, the present right to
practice a profession) suffers no crisis of credibility, 38 for property
is essentially "nothing but an expectation; the expectation of
deriving certain advantages from a thing we are said to possess,
in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it." ' 9 In
Horstmann, the parties made the support arrangement with the
expectation of jointly reaping the harvest of their collective effort.
The completion of a professional education represents the first
step in that process, and the resulting potential for an increase
in earning power is the only real asset acquired during coverture.
That "a lawyer's professional education and the right to practice
law are in the nature of a 'financial resource' "40 gives substance
to both parties' expectations, and is attributable to the interaction between the concept of acquisition and the partnership
theory of the marital relationship.
It is the method of acquisition that determines what becomes
a marital asset subject to equitable division. Marital property is
that which is acquired by onerous title through the labor of both
spouses (or as a gift to the community), while property which has
its basis in pure donation is said to be acquired by lucrative title
37In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 849, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
639 (1976) (quoting In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 651, 115 Cal. Rptr.
184, 191 (1974)).
" Schaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL.
WEST. L. REV. 590, 591 (1974).
3' Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code, Part 1, 111-13,
Dumont Edition, Hildreth translation (1864), quoted in Brief and Petition for Writ of
Cert., petitioner-appellant at 6, In re Marriage of Graham, No. C-1054, appealing from
decision in 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. App. 1976).
10In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Mo. 1976).
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and remains the separate property of the owner." Acquisition by
onerous title focuses on the joint and several expenditures and
efforts of the marital partners' 2 and should encompass all assets
of every nature possessed by the parties. 3 The key word is
acquired,since the Uniform Marriage Act allows for the equitable
distribution of property legally and beneficially acquired during
marriage." Accepting that Donna's contributions played a significant part in the .acquisition of her husband's law degree 5 and that
the degree increases the likelihood of future financial success, the
manner in which it was obtained seems to call for its inclusion in
the parties' marital assets.
As joint and beneficial acquisition define the contents of the
marital community, the marital relationship is analogous to a
partnership or shared enterprise. In determining the value of a
license to practice a profession, consideration must be given the
fact that upon dissolution that practice goes automatically to the
licensed spouse. He is not selling out or liquidating, but continuing in business. In effect, it is the case of a silent partner withdrawing from the business. If such partner is to receive fair compensation for her enforced retirement, the value of that license to
the community must be determined.' Upon divorce the wife's
"partnership interest" is not based solely on the money she invests, but rather on the totality of her contribution to the accomplishment of the goals of the partnership. 7 In Horstmann Donna
" Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Grahm v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d
390 (Tex. 1972).
11Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 214, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974). Here the court

enlarged the ambit of beneficial acquisition by the marital partners to include property
acquired by gift or inheritance, although such property has been traditionally excepted
from the division in community property states. The court noted common law principles
rather than community property principles controlled, and cited the mandate for equitable distribution to justify its decision.
,3 Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978).
" Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J.
196, 215, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974).
'3 In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Mo. 1976). The wife was the principal
breadwinner while her husband attended law school. Because her contributions were of
"inestimable value" in increasing his earning capacity, the court based the alimony award
on his earning capacity rather than actual present income which was low because he had
left an established law firm to go into solo practice.
" Brawmen v. Brawmen, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962). By
way of recognition of the partnership, Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d
247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1961) declared the existence of a fiduciary relationship, distinguished from the traditional confidential relationship existing between spouses.
" Hogan v. Hogan, 234 Ark. 333, 352 S.W.2d 184 (1962).
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functioned for a time as the supporting spouse so that Randall
could complete law school, and determinative of her right to share
in her husband's asset under the implied partnership theory is the
nature and quantum of their commercial interrelationship and
expectations. Had the Horstmanns' marriage survived, Donna
would have shared in Randall's earnings. Had he deliberately
attempted to defeat his marital obligation of support by refusing
to work to his capabilities the court could have framed the decree
in reference to his earning capacity rather than his actual earnings.4 8 Had Donna advanced the fund specifically for investment
in Randall's separate property the money could have been presumed a loan rather than a gift.4" Denial of a guaranteed interest
in the product of joint labor in Graham and Moss because the
divorce antedates the monetary rewards for those efforts is to
sacrifice an equitable property division on the altar of impermis50
sible speculation.
Placing a value on an individual's earning potential admittedly engages the court in speculation. The crux of the problem
is that the husband will never have a vested right to any particular level of income, but only a potential for increased earnings
made possible by his education. In essence Graham and Moss
refuse to vest in the wife that which cannot vest as a right in the
husband .5
What is crucial however, is not what the husband will earn,
but rather, the effect of the present right to practice a profession
on his earning capacity. 2 The Iowa court has recognized that an
education can increase earning potential, basing an alimony
award on the husband's projected earnings, 53 and a California
" Hess v. Hess, 134 N.J. Eq. 360, 35 A.2d 677 (1944) (citing Robins v. Robins, 106
N.J. Eq. 198, 150 A. 340, 341 (1930)).
" See note 7 supra.
" The court in Graham refers to the husband's education as simply an intellectual
achievement that may assist in the acquisition of property, without having any of the
attributes of property itself. 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978).
" As to whether the wife's share of the marital assets is an inchoate right during
coverture, see note 32 supra.
52 Accord, In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Mo. 1976); Stern v. Stern,
66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773
(1961) (court finds present right to practice medicine to be in the nature of a franchise
constituting property, and admits evidence concerning potential earning power for the
purpose of awarding alimony since Dr. Daniel's salary as a resident was not fairly indicative of earning capacity).
11 In re Marriage of Dally, 222 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 1974).
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court has indicated that expectation of future professional income
can be a community asset.54 Moreover, the notion that vesting of
a party's property is a prerequisite to its inclusion among the
divisible assets of the marriage has been considered unnecessary
with respect to retirement benefits, 55 pensions," and profitsharing plans57 without doing any violence to the concept of property, generally because courts have viewed the dependence on a
contingency to be something greater than a "mere expectancy." 5
Thus, a New Jersey court determined the husband's accounts
receivable to be a marital asset, noting the irrelevancy of the
customary usages of the concept of vesting to the question of
establishing an equitable property division. The statute was interpreted as focusing on acquisition, without reference to vest59

ing.

Speculation is, in fact, a slippery term: What is permissible
may ultimately rest on what is most expedient or necessary. A
California court valued the good will of the husband's business
at $25,000 for the purpose of a property division, reasoning that
when a person acquires a reputation for learning in a particular

field, he creates a valuable, though intangible, property by winning the confidence of patrons. 0 A Wyoming court valued a parcel of real estate according to its potential mining value to assure
each party a fair share of the fruits of their joint efforts during
marriage.6 It seems that when the conventional indicia of earning
capacity do not fairly describe the assets a party possesses, a
"'

See Fritschi v. Teed, 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (1963) (dictum).
" In re Marriage of Roesch, 81 Cal. App. 3d 137, 146 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261-62
(1978); contra, Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976).
".In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 562, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 634-35 (1976); contra, Robbins v.Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Mo. 1971).
57In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949,.957 (Mo. App. 1975).
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d 561, 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
637.
" Stern v.Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257, 262; cf. In re Marriage of Carruthers, 577
P.2d 773 (Colo. App. 1977) (unsevered crops harvested by husband alone considered
marital property). See text accompanying note 32 supra. This is logically consistent with
the fact that it is the totality of the wife's contributions to the objects of the marital
relationship that is determinative of her right to an equitable share of the assets accumulated during coverture. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
10 Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90, 95 (1956); contra, Nail v.
Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 7&1 (Tex. 1972).
61 Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo. 1978).
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court may speculate to arrive at a more accurate measure of those
assets .62
An example of the interrelationship of the dynamic concept
of property and the primarily equitable nature of property division is California's characterization of either spouse's cause of
action for personal injury as community property, 3 despite the
fact that such cause of action is intangible, and has been held to
be non-survivable 4 and non-transferable. 5 Nevertheless, a claim
for personal injury is community property because the courts
characterize the damage as an injury to the community. In the
same sense a professional education may be considered a benefit
to the partnership, and therefore a necessary inclusion in the
parties' marital assets.
V.

REMEDIES AND CONCLUSORY REMARKS

Despite its recognition of a guarantee in the nature of a property interest, Horstmann fails to provide a remedy of equal scope.
Without some modification, its purported redefinition of equitable property division is eclipsed by a remedy of no greater practical impact than that of Graham or Moss. Premised on the assumption that a professional education is solely a monetary purchase, the court measured Donna's recovery in the amount her
financial contributions exceeded Randall's during his law school
career: an implied loan, repaid without interest.6 Conceptually
a loan requires a return on one's investment in the form of interest; its omission in Horstmann makes the remedy inadequate,
because the wife derives absolutely no monetary benefit from the
association while the husband leaves the marriage with a valuable asset.
However, an implied loan remedy that includes interest is
not without advantages. The amount due the wife can be easily
calculated, without the need for speculation concerning earning
capacity. 7 Further, such a remedy is consistent with the general
'5

Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1961).

Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 662, 248 P.2d 992 (1952).
De la Torre v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 754, 254 P. 1105 (1927). Today a cause of action
for personal injury is considered survivable. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1974).
',

Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 206 Cal. 461, 274 P. 959 (1929).
W
'5 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
'7 At a return rate of 6% Donna would receive approximately $19,100; at 61/2% about
$19,200.
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practice of courts to equate the commitment of the parties to a
marriage with its duration and frame the decree accordingly."
The acquisition of an education represents more than a mere
monetary purchase. Both partners also expend considerable time
and effort in its acquisition, and the wife's right to share in the
rewards should be based on her total contribution to the marital
partnership.A9 Realistically, the monetary cost of a professional
education has only the loosest sort of relationship to the value of
that education as a means to the end of practicing a profession,
and to the extent its value to the husband exceeds its cost, the
implied loan theory permits the husband to be unjustly enriched.
One commentator 0 has proposed a formula that seems a
more accurate assessment of the value of the present right to
practice a profession for the purpose of a property division. He
advocates the wife be reimbursed for approximately one-half the
opportunity cost of the education. Opportunity cost is the sum of
the direct cost 7 plus the indirect cost (basically what the husband's total earnings would have been if he had worked during
coverture rather than going to school)." Because such a formula
confines income speculation to a relatively short period and,
moreover, does not allow the court to speculate beyond the duration of the parties' marriage, it allows monetary recognition of the
significance of the wife's contributions without eschewing criteria
" Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968) (duration of the marriage is
considered a post-marital criterion in the equitable determination of the parties' respective property rights).
63 Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 507-08, 176 P.2d 363, 364 (1946) (Where wife has
contributed either funds or services enabling husband to increase or preserve his property
holdings, she is entitled to equitable division of that property, dependent on extent of her
contribution). See also text accompanying note 47 supra.
7oSchaefer, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL.
WEST. L. REV. 590 (1974).
' Direct cost is here defined as the extent of the wife's monetary contributions to the
family during the period her husband attends professional school. Schaefer actually defines direct cost as the price of the education itself (i.e. tuition, etc.) but the Iowa court
calculated cost in the amount Donna's contributions exceeded her husband's. See note
12 supra. Because such contributions alleviated Randall of his support obligations and
freed his separate funds for tuition purposes, the Horstmann offset formula for computing
direct cost is perfectly adequate.
72 Assuming Randall could have earned $12,000 per year instead of going to law school
(certainly possible since he had received a masters degree in 1973), Donna's share would
be approximately ($18,000 + $36,000) + 2 or $27,000. Moreover, the court would not be
bound to a strict fifty-fifty split and could adjust the moieties according to the parties'
circumstances. See note 32 supra.
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for considering duration of a marriage in property division. 3
Read literally, Horstmann'srecognition of a guarantee in the
nature of a property right is a bold attempt to cure a traditional
inequity. The appropriate remedy, however, calls for a certain
amount of speculation, and the willingness (or lack thereof) of
subsequent decisions to grapple with this exigency may well prevent the wife's full realization of her interest.
Amy Therese Loper
, Schaefer suggests the following formula to determine the amount of the wife's
interest, premised on the fact that the value of experience and skill increases, while that
of education diminishes, in subsequent years of practice. The calculations are made for
each year of the husband's remaining work life and should reflect the fact that earnings
tend to decline just before retirement.
Income with
Professional
Education

Income without
Professional
Education

>(

Number of Years
of Professional Ed.
Number of Years
Since Professional Ed.
Commenced

Although such a calculation in theory reflects the most accurate assessment of the extent
of the wife's interest, it is almost indefensibly speculative in practice, and moreover,
calculates over too great a time span to accord with the Schantz requirement that duration
of the marriage have some relevance in the division of property. See note 68 supra.
Moreover, in this case, cost opportunity and future earning formulas yield a similar figure.
Assuming Randall's salary would increase at $1,000 per year as he testified, 263 N.W.2d
at 887, and that without a professional education his earning would be $12,000 per year
(see note 71 supra). Donna would receive about $25,000 as her share of his earnings over
the next thirteen years. As the facts did not include Randall's age, it is difficult to compute
his remaining useful worklife; thus this calculation extends only over the period mentioned in the testimony, although the award could increase another $2,000 to $3,000 were
the calculations extended another five or six years.
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Solar Law provides some excellent analysis in a difficult

area. The topic of solar law is difficult because the field is new
and rapidly developing. Sandy F. Kraemer has compiled a thorough and useful treatment of some aspects.
An abundance of technical and legal terminology presents a
hurdle to the reader's comprehension which the author helps to
overcome by providing a complete glossary and well-written introductory chapters. A suggested improvement in the introductory material would be to explain the reasoning supporting some
conclusions. For example, it is not obvious why low grade heat is
better provided by solar systems.
The book is organized and easy to understand. The introduction familiarizes the reader with solar energy technology. The
remaining chapters deal with alternative methods of regulating
access to sunlight. Each alternative is discussed in a separate
chapter and background is provided for the reader who is not
familiar with the field. There is enough detail for an in-depth
analysis of each topic included in the book. A conclusion at the
end of each chapter and model legislation for each alternative
presented are helpful in clarifying the issues. The alternatives
generally are arranged in order of decreasing feasibility.
Exhaustive research is evidenced by compilations of building
codes and state tax incentives. An understandable case of tunnel
visiQn favors solar legislation. Particularly in the discussion of
feasible alternatives, the obstacles to legislation are not always
given the significance they deserve.
Other shortcomings of the book are, for the most part, an
unavoidable result of the newness of the area and lack of development of the law, which will be forced to change quickly to keep
abreast of problems that will arise. In the time required to publish
the book, whole new technologies may develop. For example,
most discussions in the book concern only flat plate collectors,
which had been the state of the art. A quite different technique,
solar concentrators, now is being developed. It appears solar concentrators already have or soon will have economic and efficiency
advantages over flat plate collectors. The worsening world energy
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situation adds to a need for rapid technological development and
is an indication that any legal framework must be flexible and
forward-looking. Therefore, a book covering all aspects of solar
law is not practical.
However, one criticism of the book is that a work titled Solar
Law should provide more of an overview. Most of the book is
about methods of assuring and regulating access to the sun. There
are other important topics. For example, the role of public utilities, which is treated briefly in an appendix, raises issues such as
rates to be charged, utilities' roles in the manufacture and distribution of solar devices, and the level of competition between the
utilities and solar energy industries. Other concerns include the
kinds of restraints and incentives that can and should be offered
for the development of large multi-megawatt solar collection systems for community use, and encouragement of technological
advances. The government's potential to mandate use of and
restrictions on development of solar devices also should be explored because of the possbible need for drastic measures due to
the worsening world energy situation.
The time has come for solar energy development. Unfortunately, it will not be a natural, gradual development but is being
forced upon us. This development emphasizes the need for books
such as this, which eagerly probe uncertain and undeveloped
areas. Mr. Kraemer has provided a good start for the analysis of
some of the legal problems.
Robert A. Holmes

